

**Sources of violence, conflict mediation and reconciliation:
a socio-anthropological study on Dar Sila.**

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Research for this report was conducted by Christine Pawlitzky and Babett Jánszky.
The study was supervised by Andrea Behrends and Stephen Reyna.

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
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Abbreviations

ACTT	Association des Chefs Traditionnels du Tchad
ADS	Association Pour le Développement de Sila
AN	Alliance Nationale
ANR	Alliance Nationale de la Résistance
ANT	Armée Nationale du Tchad
CEFOD	Centre d'Études et de Formation pour le Développement
CNT	Concorde Nationale du Tchad
COP.SILA	Coopérative Sila pour le Développement Durable
FONALT	Forces des Organisations Nationales pour l'Alternance et les Libertés au Tchad
FROLINAT	Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad
FUC	Front Uni pour le Changement
GNNT	Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFORD	Institut de Formation et de Recherche Démographiques
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MP	Member of Parliament
MPS	Mouvement Patriotique pour le Salut
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
RAFD	Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques
RFC	Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement
RDL	Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et les Libertés
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
UFDD	Union des forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Executive Summary

Chad has experienced an influx of some 240.000 Sudanese refugees since 2003 in the eastern border region due to the escalation of the Darfur conflict. The security situation in the area welcoming the refugees deteriorated alarmingly from 2005 onwards because of repeated cross-border incursions of Janjawid militias, the presence of Chadian rebel groups occasionally clashing with government troops, and inter-communal fighting of local militias. More than 150.000 Chadians were displaced until mid-2007 which caused severe exacerbation of the regional humanitarian crisis. The largest concentrations of internally displaced people live in the Dar Sila region of south-eastern Chad.

Following the exacerbation of the crisis the demand for background studies increased among international organizations seeking to better understand the region and the crisis. At that time knowledge on the Sila region and on the crisis that it had encountered was critically low. On the request of the international community the European Commission therefore launched this study within the frame of the planning process of its “*Programme d’Accompagement à la Stabilisation*” in eastern Chad in order to provide the international humanitarian community as well as national and international development actors with an independent and profound analysis of the sources of the violence that escalated in Dar Sila between 2005 and 2007, with practical recommendations as to regional reconciliation, and with ideas about future conflict prevention. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) discussed and supported the project.

Major findings:

• Multi-level conflict

The sources of the Dar Sila violence, often described as either farmer-herder conflict between communities competing for scarce resources or portrayed as spill-over from Darfur, include a broader array of factors than is included in these two propositions. This wider range of conflict causing factors is usefully conceptualized in terms of a *multi-level model*. This model comprises *local*, *regional*, *national* and *international conflict levels*, with a level being understood as a geographic space within which are located and act particular groups with particular histories. We distinguish between ‘higher’ (national and international) and ‘lower’ (local and regional) conflict levels. Conflicts can occur *within* one level (‘intra-level’ conflicts) or *between* levels (‘inter-level’ conflicts).

- **Inter-level impacts**

We found that higher level conflict (national: internal Chadian conflict, international: political crisis Chad-Sudan) provoked or reinforced lower level conflict in Dar Sila (local: distrust and clashes between neighbouring communities, regional: fighting between different militia groups).

- **Multi-level reconciliation approach**

Because certain conflict levels influenced others, each conflict level has to be considered in conflict resolution in order to ease or solve the complex conflict situation affecting Dar Sila. Conversely, this means that actions on one level *alone* (such as that of local communities) will not be sufficient to address the complex problem.

- **Limitations of existing conflict management institutions**

The communities' existing conflict management institutions are able to solve local and regional conflicts (e.g. over access to water and pasture, destruction of fields during transhumance etc.). However, when confronted with national and international level conflicts (organized violence by Janjawid militia, rebel militias etc.), existing conflict management strategies failed.

- **Risk of violence due to unresolved conflicts**

No effective conflict mediation process has been launched and no regional reconciliation has been achieved in Dar Sila so far. Neighbouring communities continue to eye one another with deep distrust, which adds to volatility in everyday life and the potential for a relapse into violence.

Major recommendations:

- ***Security needs to be re-established in Dar Sila.***

If insecurity persists, the everyday life of the Dar Sila population continues to be dominated by interpersonal and inter-communal mistrust and there is little likelihood for sustainable reconciliation. Re-establishment of security in Dar Sila is a state responsibility.

- ***Development interventions alone are not sufficient to produce reconciliation.***

Development interventions in the presence of insecurity can accelerate insecurity, because the development provides a resource that can prompt opponents to utilize violence to acquire it. Interventions need to consider and take measures for this potential risk and need to be accompanied by effective conflict mediation and resolution strategies to diminish it.

- ***Re-establishment of security must involve removal, or mitigation, of international and national level conflicts.***

Because national and international conflicts have been found to have exacerbated local and regional violence, these conflicts have to be greatly reduced in order to re-establish security in Dar Sila. Consequently, efforts have to be made in national and international arenas in order to find *political solutions* for these crises.

Short-term interventions:

- ***Support is recommended for existing local and regional conflict management structures.***

Mixed reconciliation committees, the Islamic Committee and judges (*juges de paix*) are the existing conflict mediating and resolution structures including 'traditional', religious and state authorities that the Dar Sila local population refers to. If local and / or regional conflicts occur, they are the first to act so as to arbitrate conflict. Their capacities and regional mobility need to be enhanced as they suffer from lacking material and structural support.

- ***Support is recommended for one professional conflict mediator (CM)***

The CM would have four functions. i) directly intervene and provide mediation services in local and regional conflicts, ii) provide assistance to existing conflict resolution structures and personnel, iii) compile an inventory of conflicts thereby gathering information necessary to predict when and where conflict will occur as well as that about what actions reduce or enhance conflict, iv) issue an annual report predicting future conflicts and suggesting strategy and tactics for mitigating these.

- ***Support is recommended for the founding of local community reconciliation and development cooperatives (RDCs).***

Existing conflict resolution mechanisms collapsed in the course of the Dar Sila violence, making it impossible for local actors to settle those conflicts. A new institution is required for local communities to address this situation. We suggest creating cooperatives based on local communities comprising both farmers and herders so as to make communities themselves

formulate interventions that assist all members of a local community, thus contributing to reconciliation.

Medium-term interventions:

- ***Support is recommended for one ecological / economic specialist.***

Dar Sila is one of the *least* known areas of the world. It is thus a first order of business to collect information on ecological as well as socio-economic features of the region. This information should be secured by one development anthropologist specialized in analyzing the economy and ecology of arid land populations. He or she would work with the MC and the RDCs to create particular development strategies tailored to reduce herder / farmer competition in the local communities of Dar Sila.

- ***It is recommended that judicial services on a local, regional and national level be improved.***

Legal state services are severely lacking on a local and regional level. Impunity caused by corruption in the state apparatus is a nationwide problem. Consequently, the population lacks faith in state institutions pertaining to rule of law and seeks justice using 'traditional' mechanisms of conflict resolution or by violence in form of retaliation and vengeance. A national legal system needs to be developed which is regarded as legitimate by the majority of Chadians. It should build upon the existing legal pluralism comprising traditional, religious and state law.

Long-term interventions:

- ***It is recommended that a National Committee for Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation be instituted.***

It is recommended that a *National Committee for Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation* be created to address long-term problems Chad experiences and will continue to experience due to prolonged conflict. It would have the following authorities: i) to devise strategies and programs of conciliation at all levels. This would include formulating in the medium term and implementing over the long term a plural legal system that would be regarded as legitimate by the population, ii) to coordinate reconciliation interventions at all levels. This would include conciliation efforts at the international, national, regional, and local levels, iii) it would be a repository of expert knowledge concerning different techniques of conciliation and mediation, iv) it would have training authorities. This is to say its personnel would develop and teach different techniques of conciliation and mediation designed for the particular conditions prevailing in Chad.

Introduction

Study context

Since April 2003 more than 240.000 Sudanese refugees¹ arrived in the border region of eastern Chad, mainly in Waddai and Wadi Fira. The refugees were fleeing ongoing fighting in the Darfur region of Sudan. Security conditions in the host regions of eastern Chad welcoming the refugees constantly deteriorated from 2004 to 2007 as these areas became the scene of military operations in the civil war between the Chadian central government and opposition militias. In 2006 alliances between certain communities, militias and self-defence groups brought inter-communal violence of an unprecedented level to eastern Chad. This caused severe exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis.

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) increased to 150.000 until 2007 in eastern Chad.² Most displacements took place in the – at that time - Waddai region and especially the department of Dar Sila³, because the area was severely affected both by cross-border incursions of Sudanese armed groups targeting the civilian population as well as by interethnic clashes driven by political and economic polarization. These IDPs rely heavily on humanitarian aid because the security situation precludes their return, and because their mechanisms of solidarity and survival presently are severely compromised. The presence of the displaced populations in the IDP sites results in pressure on the area's already scarce natural resources, enhances tensions between displaced and host communities, and leads to a high demand for assistance.

Within the context of the adoption of the Resolution 1778, taken on 25 September 2007 by the Security Council of the United Nations, and particularly the decision to deploy a European military and a Chadian police force supported by the United Nations, the European Commission considered it important to reflect on policy alternatives to enhance peaceful cohabitation in the area. A programme that would accompany a stabilization process (*Programme d'Accompagnement à la Stabilisation* or PAS) was launched with the objective of facilitating the reinstallation of the displaced populations in eastern Chad as well as the groups that fled from inter-communal violence across the border to Sudan. Voluntary return of refugees or internally displaced persons has proven to be little understood and difficult. Debacles such as that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo involving Rwandan refugees

¹ UNHCR 2008: 200.

² UNHCR 2007b: 5.

³ Following changes in the administrative set up of Chad, Dar Sila became a separate region by decree in February 2008. The former department of Dar Sila became the department of Kimiti.

remind official, scientific, and humanitarian organizations of the price of failure; because refugees refused return to their places of origin eventually falling victim to further violence, provoking great costs to themselves and the humanitarian community. However, one point is certain: a real process of conflict mediation and reconciliation is a prerequisite for return of the displaced to their villages of origin.

In 2006 and 2007 the demand for background studies increased among humanitarian organizations operating in Chad who felt them necessary in order to better understand the immediate environment of their operations in the conflict affected zone. At this point, a global study concerning the sources of the Dar Sila violence and methodologies relevant to reconciliation processes had not been undertaken. However, the recent planning for a voluntary return of the displaced communities in Dar Sila necessitates an independent and weighty study on the historical, political, social and cultural determinants of the violence that escalated in 2006. At the same time it requires reflections about the ways of how such conflicts can be prevented in the future.

In this regard the *general objectives* of this study were to provide the international humanitarian community as well as national and international development actors operating in Chad with an independent and professional analysis of the conflict, with practical recommendations concerning reconciliation, and with ideas about future conflict prevention. The *specific objectives* of this study were i) to synthesize the ethnological and sociological studies conducted before and after 2006 on the ethnic relations of the Dar Sila communities, ii) to perform case studies in Dar Sila at representative sites, iii) to establish an analysis of the historical, political, social and ethnic causes of the conflict, iv) to formulate feasible methods to support a future reconciliation process through critical evaluation of the attempts made in this direction on a local and regional level, and v) to develop practical recommendations that would help the humanitarian and development actors to avoid enhancing conflicts and to mitigate violence through humanitarian and development operations.

Existing documents and reports on Sila

The deterioration of the security situation along the south-eastern Chadian border region of Assoungha and Dar Sila was documented from February 2006 onwards by Human Rights organizations. At that time a Human Rights Watch report was published documenting the increase of violent cross-border incursions and the targeting of Dar Sila civilians.⁴ Another

⁴ Human Rights Watch 2006a.

Human Rights Watch report on the humanitarian crisis in south-eastern Chad followed in mid-2006, focusing on the human rights situation in eastern Chad including the region of Dar Sila.⁵ There was additionally an Amnesty International report describing the ethnically biased targeting of civilian populations by militias crossing into Chad from the Sudan in the Assoungha and Dar Sila region of Chad.⁶ The escalation of regional inter-communal violence in Dar Sila that escalated in October and November 2006 was documented by a third Human Rights Watch report in January 2007.⁷ The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre published a report about the IDP crisis in eastern Chad in July 2007.⁸ In October 2007 the report of the fact finding mission of the International Federation for Human Rights appeared which assessed the human rights and international humanitarian rights situation in Darfur and Eastern Chad by interviewing Sudanese refugees and Chadian displaced persons.⁹ Two articles by the Small Arms Survey, authored by Jérôme Tubiana, examine the Dar Sila violence in the light of the national political crisis in Chad and the Darfur crisis in neighbouring Sudan.¹⁰

Two major assessment projects on eastern Chadian IDPs were financed by the UNHCR and realized by its implementing partners. Their reports were intended to serve as background information and to direct operations of international and national humanitarian organizations operating in eastern Chad. One focuses on the IDPs in eastern Chad providing statistical information on their demographic and socio-economic characteristics, reasons for displacement, intentions and conditions of return, as well as their assistance needs and expectations.¹¹ The second evaluates the situation in their villages of origin providing information about population movements and the current situation in the home villages of the IDPs. This study was conducted by Intersos in 2007 and 2008; its results are accessible on an Internet platform.¹² Within the frame of an internal evaluation mission the German Development Organization EIRENE in August 2007 analyzed the types of conflicts along the eastern border.¹³

Historical analysis of the Dar Sila region are provided in the works of Kapteins¹⁴ and Berre¹⁵, both appeared in the 1980s and emphasized information on the history of Dar Sila and its

⁵ Human Rights Watch 2006b.

⁶ Amnesty International 2006.

⁷ Human Rights Watch 2007.

⁸ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2007.

⁹ International Federation for Human Rights 2007.

¹⁰ Small Arms Survey 2008a and Small Arms Survey 2008b.

¹¹ UNHCR / Diagne et al. 2007.

¹² UNHCR / Intersos 2008.

¹³ EIRENE 2007.

¹⁴ Kapteins 1983.

¹⁵ Berre 1985.

sultanate. Some ethnographic context can be found in the publication of *Le Rouvreur*¹⁶, which provides a general ethnographic overview on ethnic groups of eastern and northern Chad.

The above-mentioned reports, articles and books served as starting point for and provided supplementary information about the Dar Sila conflict setting. This 'supplementary' literature is spectacularly scanty. There has been *no* published professional ethnographic research on Dar Sila. Indeed, Dar Sila is one of the least known areas of the world in all areas of social science and ecology. The present study therefore begins amelioration of this situation.

Approach and methods

Choice of research sites and research schedule

The socio-anthropological study was designed in conformity to its Terms of References, and focuses on conflict data as well as that relevant to reconciliation. Research sites were therefore chosen because of their relevance to these two subjects and with regard to the Dar Sila security situation. The investigative team had to flexibly adapt its research plan following rebel militia attacks on N'Djaména (early February 2008); after which the security situation became exceptionally volatile throughout the whole of the country, especially in its eastern parts. Due to considerable military movements in and around Adé in April 2008, the team decided to avoid working in this region, even though it had been an important scene for some major clashes in the conflict that had caused the Dar Sila displacements. Nevertheless, the researchers were able to talk to that area's residents by visiting them in different IDP sites. So as to gather as many opinions of different conflict actors as possible interviewing focussed on different IDP sites, villages of origin, as well as *damras*¹⁷ and *feriks*¹⁸. Goz Beïda, Kerfi, Koukou-Angarana, Dogdoré and their surroundings were the major sites of interviewing. Information gathered in the field was supplemented by further interviews in N'Djaména and Abéché with key figures originating from, or in some way connected to Dar Sila. Thus, the main eyewitness information provided in this paper is based on three weeks field research conducted in the above mentioned Dar Sila research sites and on another approximately three weeks of interviewing in N'Djaména and Abéché.

The first project phase in N'Djaména and Abéché served to make contact with key figures representing Sila communities at different levels. We were particularly interested in civil

¹⁶ *Le Rouvreur* 1989 [1968].

¹⁷ A *damra* is a permanent Arab settlement.

¹⁸ A *ferik* is a temporary Arab settlement.

society, traditional, and national political leadership. Several key interviews revealed the conditions of the complex conflict situation in Dar Sila which helped to further hone the research design and to adapt questionnaires and interview directories. Furthermore, the persons contacted identified other key figures present in Abéché and in different sites of Dar Sila. During the second project phase in Dar Sila the team concentrated on intensive interviewing of representative key, regional actors. Throughout the entire research the team was in contact with different members of the international community and national organizations to acquire information from their perspectives.

Research methods

Interview instruments for the present study were developed on the basis of questions and subjects raised in the terms of references of the project proposal. To acquire the appropriate information, the team used different tools of the socio-anthropological, or ethnographic, methodological inventory. The main focus was laid on qualitative interviewing utilizing interview directories and questionnaires including elements of narrative methods but also participant observation and informal interviews during encounters of everyday life.

In this context it cannot be overemphasized that ethnographic approaches to information gathering drastically differ from simple quantitative evaluations based upon 'stopover' visits that provide only a very general idea of a given situation. The crux of this difference is that ethnographic techniques are designed to provide information in depth. They seek to present the cultural contexts which influence actors' subjectivities, their actions, and their practices. In doing so, the researcher tries to be able to provide both emic and etic information. The former is data concerning how actors interpret situations; the latter, information, upon how 'scientists' interpret the same situations.

Social anthropological techniques emphasize principles of observer impartiality and neutrality. They seek to create rapport with the person or persons studied especially by giving them the freedom to speak; by allowing excursions from an actual interview directory; offering a large time frame to probe details; and deepening this relationship by coming back to the interviewee several times, offering the possibility of further dialogue. A goal of such research is that the person interviewed is given his or her 'voice'. Such investigative techniques become even more important when research focuses on politically and emotionally sensitive subjects such as was the case for the present study.

So, the team concentrated on intensive interviewing, giving informants several hours to talk (sometimes even half of or an entire day), at the expense of a larger number of interviews. The team thus gained valuable information on ethnic context, conflict causes and the state of reconciliation in Dar Sila. Information gathered in interview settings was counter-checked with statements of other informants and with information gathered in informal conversations.

It should be understood that the research team acquired informants' consent to their participation in the investigation. Equally, great care has been taken to guarantee informant anonymity.

The expatriate team was accompanied by two national researchers of Dadjo and Waddaian origins. One temporary Dadjo interpreter who was born and raised in Goz Beïda completed the team. Interview translation was sometimes necessary, especially in rural areas. Translation of interview statements in other languages always leads to a loss of information, which the researchers tried to take into account by cross-checking information and by concentrating on key questions.

Research conditions

Politically sensitive subjects like conflict contexts are always difficult to investigate especially in the exceptionally volatile security situation in Chad. It is a widely held view that the complex conflict situation in Dar Sila is – as in other areas – a result of political manipulation involving influence of corrupt political figures. This means that people are restrained in conveying information about such topics. Under such circumstances, the researcher does not only need to dispose over the according technical skills to guide fruitful interviews, but also the patience and the social skills to react appropriately to the interlocutors needs and worries to create a trustful and understanding atmosphere during interviews. This confidential relation, of course, persists after the personal encounter(s) by treating the given information accordingly, which means for example not to pass it on to other related actors but also to anonymize the gathered data in analysis and publication of findings to protect single informants.

From a security perspective the field research in Dar Sila took place without major incidents. Nevertheless, the team faced some minor difficulties in contacts with local leaders who expressed their 'tiredness' at visits from members of the international community. Some interlocutors expressed disappointment because they had spoken with a number of foreigners who had raised hopes by promising projects and the amelioration of the current

situation of IDPs, which then never materialized. False promises grow deepening mistrust. The encounters with Arab representatives in some cases turned out to be difficult as they anticipated being branded as 'aggressors' in the polarization of ethnic groups (a perception created in part by political manipulation and media reporting). With reference to its impartiality the expert team nevertheless was able to create a confidential atmosphere with them and to conduct interviews in a constructive way.

Methods and principals for analyzing field data

Some relevant paradigms of ethnographic inquiry and research in conflict contexts need to be discussed to briefly explain how the researchers developed the present analysis on the basis of data that was collected for the study.

One characteristic of the socio-anthropological approach is that interview information is treated as "raw" material basically representing ideas and conceptualisations of informants themselves. Thus, the details of subject gained in the field have to be validated by cross-checking and by relating them to a further context such as own observations and information available in reports and written documents. The combination of different data, methods and theories in socio-anthropological methodology is often described as *triangulation*.¹⁹ This term was introduced in socio-anthropological terminology in the 1970s by Denzin who defined it as follows: "Methodological triangulation involves a complex process of playing each method off against the other so as to maximize the validity of field efforts."²⁰ This method becomes especially important when written evidence on information gathered is scarce or includes politically sensitive matters as does the present research subject.

To be able to acquire as much additional information as possible, the expert team discussed findings and personal observations after each interview and collected additional data from all kinds of corresponding reports and news listings. By relating the interview data to this kind of information – and thereby *triangulating* – the data set acquired further reliability and validity so to serve as a basis for further analysis and conclusions.

Furthermore, this approach helps the researchers to maintain objectivity regarding the research subject. This is especially important when it contains strong emotional components, which is the case when investigating violent conflict and mass displacement. It can not be neglected that the process of collecting eyewitness reports and opinions on atrocities and

¹⁹ Köttig 2005: 65.

²⁰ Denzin 1978: 304.

reasons for displacement and conflict reveals a whole range of emotional reactions that have to be taken into account during the research and analysis process.

For evaluation and analysis the researchers focussed on elements of *Grounded Theory*²¹. This sociological methodology is applied in systematic evaluation of qualitative data with the aim of formulating theory from collected data that can be applied in praxis. The interest of *Grounded Theory* is not the reconstruction of subjective points of view but rather the extraction of their underlying social phenomena so to deliver descriptive theory for human behaviour patterns and social processes.

What we try to accomplish in the present study is to account for the violent phenomena that occurred in Dar Sila in terms of their cultural and political contexts in order to formulate a deeper understanding of the violence and, then, on the basis of this understanding to propose appropriate procedures for easing tensions and to accompany the process of reconciliation. To achieve those aims, data is analyzed by building categories and codification of statements so to assemble all information belonging to their respective subjects, thereby counterchecking and balancing the different accounts to later relate them to other information sources. In the analysis of complex conflict situations, as in many other contexts, it is also necessary to consider certain particularities bearing upon the validity of informants' information, especially concerning the socio-political perspective of the informants.

In the context of the present study, for example, special attention needs to be paid to mechanisms of *Collective Memory*²² or also *Transactive Memory*.²³ Collective memory in this context means the common memory performance of a group of people, in our case more precisely of one or more ethnic groups. Such memory allows for the construction of 'frames' of group-specific actions for actors sharing the same memory. 'Frames' are ways of perceiving and acting upon realities. If the collective memory of a Dar Sila group frames someone as *hakuma*²⁴ then this person is likely to be treated profoundly differently than if he or she was framed as *Janjawid* (pro Sudanese government militia).

²¹ The concept of *Grounded Theory* was first formulated by Strauss and Glaser at the beginning of the 1960s and further developed until the present day. It is a research methodology in which the researcher collects data about a single subject without any preconceived idea concerning its content or structure. The data set is then analyzed to identify common themes or constructs which are then used to develop generalizations about their meaning and relationship to one another (theory). Thus the theory is 'grounded' in the data rather than the data having been collected to test a pre-existing theory, a procedure which is likely to bias the data used. See e.g. Glaser / Strauss 1967.

²² The concept of *Collective Memory* originated from the French philosopher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. It is used as analysis category in different sciences. See e.g. Halbwachs 1950 [1939].

²³ Theory first formulated by Wegner in the 1980s. See e.g. Wegner 1986.

²⁴ Arabic term for government.

Closely related to the preceding concept is that of *Transactive Memory* which basically asserts that group members can serve as “external” memory aids to others. It distinguishes between internal encoding of new knowledge in the own memory and external memory encoding, the latter referring to external knowledge sources such as books but also other people’s memories, thereby not encoding the knowledge itself but its external location. This constellation can furthermore lead to encoding of so called “meta-memories” that can be memories about the memories of others.

In the context of this study the two concepts help estimate the origin and validity of data provided by single informants. For example, often people refer to certain attacks of *Janjawid* against Dadjo villages and even though they themselves might not have been present, they are able to give details on the specific attack. So if e.g. in the memory of another person the people who attacked were possibly recognized as former (Arab) neighbours, the informant will pass the information that this specific village had been attacked by its neighbours.

This background is at the same time closely related to the reflection about *truth* and what is perceived as such. The *collective truth* is based on memories and encodings given by individuals of one group that are transferred to the group level by oral transmission, endorsed by further eyewitness narratives (or meta-memories) with similar contents confirming certain details. In short, what we find through interviews in Dar Sila today is a mosaic of several “collective truths” of the different conflict actors or conflict groups. The researcher has to be conscious that people’s reports often reproduce a truth that has emerged from different social and psychological (group) processes and that it is often manipulative by selective representations (e.g. conflict actors rarely confirm details about counter-attacks that they themselves might have effectuated). Nevertheless, this does not mean that what people report is less credible. On the contrary, what is important for the process of reconciliation and pacification are the proper perceptions of truth of all conflict actors so to be able to achieve consent among all of them, leaving no party to conflicts with the consciousness of unfair judgement.

Additionally, in analyzing the collected data, the researchers must always be aware of their own role or *participative impact* in interview interactions. In the present case the international researchers were - even though insisting on their impartial and neutral role – of course perceived as representatives of the international community, so their identities had an impact on the subjects discussed with, and information given by, informants. For example, some of the interlocutors met in Dar Sila claimed the need for certain material or support from the

international community or in other way expected the researchers to react on their behalf towards the international community. Thus the gathered data had to be reviewed by paying attention to this circumstance, too.

I Analysis

What we want to make clear and support with strong evidence in this report is that the complex conflict situation in Dar Sila is understood to require the adoption of a *multi-level approach* to reconciliation. Explanations of the Dar Sila situation have often centred around two propositions. The first is that the violence in Dar Sila diffused from Darfur, implying that the political patterns and backgrounds of conflict in eastern Chad are largely identical to those in Darfur. The other proposition postulates that the conflicts which eventually produced massive violence and displacement in Dar Sila originated in farmer-herdsman pressures concerning subsistence resources that escalated throughout the recent years. We argue that the determinants of conflict include a broader array of factors than is included in these two propositions; and that this wider range of conflict causing factors is usefully conceptualized in terms of a multi-level model, with a 'level' being understood as a geographic space within which are located particular groups with particular histories. We believe that by understanding the nature and history of the institutions of the different levels it is possible to give a fuller account of the conflict backgrounds and, thereby, to develop effective strategies for a reconciliation process that aims to contribute to the resolution of existing conflicts, the stabilization of security in Dar Sila, and the return of displaced populations.

To begin this analysis, we present in this chapter data pertaining to Dar Sila's geographical and cultural environment, history, conflict evolution and violent clashes. Additionally, we review the state of pacification and past attempts of reunification of the areas' ethnic groups. We also highlight certain existing structures of utility for conflict resolution on different levels.

1 Cultural and historical background

For a general overview on Dar Sila, its situation, population and living conditions we first give some details on geographical, cultural and historical context. The information assembled in this chapter makes part of the analysis as some of the circumstances described played and still play a decisive role in conflict evolution, escalation, and displacement but, furthermore, can show directions for possible strategies of reconciliation.

1.1 Geography

While formerly a department of the Waddai region in eastern Chad, Sila became a region by decree in February 2008.²⁵ It now comprises the two departments of Djourf Al-Ahmar and Kimiti, the latter contains seven sub-prefectures (Goz Beïda, Kerfi, Adé, Modoyna, Koukou-Angarana, Mogororo and Tissi) and 9 cantons (see Map 1). It stretches along the Sudanese border from north of Adé to the border of the Central African Republic in the south. The department of Djourouf Al Ahmar comprises three sub-prefectures: Am Dam, Magrane and Haouich. Our study concentrated on the department of Kimiti (the former department of Sila) which extends between 11th and 14th degree north and 20th and 23rd degree east. This is where the majority of inter-community clashes and mass population displacement took place.

Dar Sila covers a surface of about 26.000 km² and is inhabited by approximately 350.000 to 360.000 people. The region is characterized by a Sahelo-Sudanian climate with temperatures around an annual mean of 28 degrees. Annual precipitation is extremely variable and on average ranges between 700 to 900 mm accumulating between May and September. Several large Wadis like Bahr-Azoum and Wadi Kadja as well as some water basins and important sub-soil reservoirs facilitate the water provision of the region. The vegetal cover ranges from arid savannah in the north to scrub and tree savannah vegetation in the south.

1.2 Dar Sila history and ethnic background

Several ethnic groups are resident in Dar Sila and, due to the more favourable subsistence conditions, ethnic composition is more complex than in regions further north. Dar Sila is a frontier region, so parts of its groups live on both side of the border and have only been separated by the colonial border demarcation at the beginning of the 20th century. Cross-border relations play an important role in today's ethno-cultural setting and are relevant to the conflict backgrounds of Dar Sila.

According to their own accounts, all of the residing groups lived in relative 'harmony' since their arrival. Some of them came to Dar Sila centuries ago and negotiated their incorporation into the Sila Sultanate, others followed only recently after political conflict of the 1960s and the severe droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. Importantly, people acknowledge that conflict – especially over natural resources such as pasture, fields, and water – occurred among the co-residing groups, but that in the past this had been straightforwardly resolved by local traditional authorities.

²⁵ République du Tchad: 19.02.2008.

One factor, among others, uniting all of Dar Sila's groups is that they are Muslim. All of them claim Middle Eastern origin, which is a common presumption in eastern Sahel, indicating a "precious" Arab pedigree. However, this fact becomes interesting in regard to the categorization that arises from today's discourse on the conflicts in Darfur and eastern Chad, namely the distinction between "Arab" and "African". The sudden hesitation of some groups towards their own origin shows the actual confusion the "Arab" vs. "African" paradigm bears. For example, asked for their origin, the Sinyar ethnic group, living at the south-eastern corner of Dar Sila, hesitated to answer as by indicating their origin in the Arabian Peninsula region they nowadays fear to declare themselves descendants from Arab origin.²⁶

Throughout history until recently the different ethnic groups have been united by different forms of alliance. One means of alliance was inter-marriage between families of different ethnic groups. Marriage between the Sila residents of different origin was frequent, including those between Arabs and non-Arabs. Marital alliances led to further forms of collaboration such as reciprocal support for the in-laws' subsistence strategies. For example, more sedentary farmers confided some of their livestock with their more semi-nomadic or nomadic affines who, in turn, left their grains in the villagers' granaries. In history the nomads also played an important role by providing transportation to local markets.

Between certain groups, alliances also included judicial arrangements, especially with regard to *diya*²⁷ payments. For example, there are ancient agreements between Dadjo, Zagħawa Kobé²⁸ and Tama²⁹, and between Sinyar, Dadjo, Masalit and Fur³⁰ that resign from *diya* payments in case of murder between those groups (see also chapter 3.1).

Collaboration between co-resident, allied groups also included support for defence. Often this kind of agreement existed in silence between neighbouring villages and *feriks*. In case of theft of livestock or other kind of harassment, neighbours supported each other by prosecuting the attackers together or even assisted each other in retaliation. This form of assistance basically founded on the fact of co-residence rather than ethnic origin. This becomes especially important as one reason for suspicion against other groups throughout

²⁶ Interview with Sinyar representatives, 22.04.2008.

²⁷ The term *diya* stands for the so called "blood money" which refers to a mean of compensation in case of violent conflict that is still applied in Chad, above all in the eastern and in the northern parts of the country. The blood money is meant to compensate the loss of a person from an economical point of view as well as the expenditures for the sacrifice for the dead.

²⁸ The Zagħawa Kobé is a sub-clan of the Zagħawa with an own Sultanate that has its seat in Iriba.

²⁹ This arrangement actually goes back onto oral history accounts that assume the Dadjo, Tama and Zagħawa being brothers at origin. Accordingly, three brothers had arrived together in today's eastern Chad, one of them installing in Dar Sila, the next continuing to Dar Tama and the third going further north to Dar Zagħawa. (Interviews with Tama elders, January / February 2006, and Dadjo elders, April 2008).

³⁰ Interview with Sinyar elder, 23.03.2008.

the last years arose from the fact that neighbours stayed away from this responsibility. The importance of the previous information concerning inter-ethnic alliance and cooperation is that it suggests that the sources of the recent conflicts are *not* to be found in primordial ethnic antagonisms.

Some of today's tensions between Dar Sila communities appear related to the "first-comers"³¹ and "late-comers"³² distinction, which concerns the date of arrival of the different groups. To explain this distinction, we provide some brief information about the main co-residing ethnic groups.³³

The Dadjo and the Dar Sila Sultanate

The Dadjo claim to be the founders of the Dar Sila Sultanate and probably have arrived in that region in the 17th century. According to oral history accounts the Dadjo were brought to Sila by Sultan Saleh coming from the Djebel Marra region in Sudan where they had settled in the 15th century. The Dadjo Sultanate was first founded in 1486 by Ahmat Al Dadj after the Dadjo had arrived from Yemen and Saudi Arabia (see Figure 1).

Sultan's name	Period of regency
Ahmat Al Dadj	1486 - 1508
Ibrahim	1508 - 1519
Adam	1519 - 1572
Hassaballah	1572 - 1616
Habib	1616 - 1644
Chouab	1644 - 1664
Saleh	1664 - 1703
Charaf	1703 - 1735
Issa Hadjar	1735 - 1779
Abdelkerim	1779 - 1813
Abdelatif	1813 - 1851
Al Hadj Bolat	1851 - 1879
Issakha Abu Rishe	1879 - 1900
Bakhid	1900 - 1916
Moustafa	1916 - ?
Brahim	? - 1987
Saïd	1987 - 2007
Brahim	since 2007

Figure 1 : Sultans' genealogy.³⁴

³¹ Descriptive term for communities who claim to have been first arrivals in a certain territory.

³² Descriptive term for communities who arrived only after the first settlers of a given territory.

³³ Among Sila residents count furthermore Masalit, Dagal, Kibet, Runga and some Fur.

³⁴ Based on interviews with several Dadjo elders, April 2008.

Following arrival from Djebel Marra, the Dadjo first chose Kimiti Mountain, situated close to today's Goz Beïda, as their place of settlement but later installed in an area called Sila, which is the origin of the Sultanate's name.³⁵ One brother of Sultan Ahmat al Dadj is said to have continued west with his clan and soldiers. They settled in the mountainous area around Mongo in the Guera province. In order to distinguish them from their Dar Sila brothers, the Dadjo of central Chad are referred to as *Dar Dadjo Dadjo*.

In early times the Sila Sultanate was organized in four provinces called *kamkalak* with several *fursha*³⁶ as local representants. The sultan's court included a council of elders and several adjutants to execute his rule. For judicial questions he was furthermore assisted by a legal council who normally consisted of clerics specialized in Islamic law. This old court of the sultan persists today. The sultan himself was chosen by his predecessor and his council of elders. Other tribes and ethnic groups who had been incorporated into the sultanate were represented on the council of elders, and so had a word on the choice of sultans.³⁷

The sultanate's territory bordered Dar Mouro and Dar Kadjakse (who belonged to the Sultanate of Waddai) to the west, Waddai to the north, and Dar Fongoro and Dar Sinyar to the south. Its eastern neighbour was the Sultanate of Darfur. This sultanate, together with that of Waddai, was the strongest pre-colonial state at the end of the 19th century. Like several other small sultanates, Dar Sila was in constant struggle with its powerful neighbours over its sovereignty, but throughout its history able to remain independent. Given the ongoing competition and the changing power balances between Waddai and Darfur, the region was always marked by changing alliances and rivalries between them. Dar Sila under Sultan Abu Rishe enjoyed strong ties with Darfur because of a defence pact during the late 19th century rule of Sultan Ali Dinar. Abu Rishe's successor, Sultan Bakhid, had renewed this pact with Sudanese dignitaries in the beginning of the 20th century. In coalition with other tribes of eastern Chad like Waddaian, Masalit and Tama they fought against the Mahdi³⁸ who had conquered Darfur in the late 19th century. Dar Sila was expanding just prior to the imposition of colonial rule. Ali Dinar peacefully ceded Dar Fongoro to the rule of the Sila Sultanate. Also Dar Sinyar fell under the Sila Sultanate's rule.³⁹

³⁵ According to Waddaian accounts the new arrivals had received the land for installation from the Sultan of Waddai. Dadjo elders deny this by saying that at their arrival the region was empty so they started to transform it into arable land. (Interviews with Waddaian and Dadjo elders, 06.04.2008 and 20.04.2008).

³⁶ Arabic term for a local leader.

³⁷ Several interviews with Dadjo elders in Goz Beïda, April 2008.

³⁸ The Mahdi or Mahamat Ahmad Al Mahdi (1844-1885) was a religious leader in Sudan, who proclaimed himself the "Mahdi" or prophesied saviour of Islam in 1881. He declared a holy war against Turko-Egyptian rule in Sudan.

³⁹ Interviews with Dadjo and Sinyar elders in Goz Beïda, April 2008; see also Kapteijns 1983 and Berre 1985.

The beginning of the 20th century brought a major change with the arrival of the colonial powers to the border region. Both the English in Sudan and the French in Chad encountered strong resistance in the territories they invaded. Nevertheless, Sultan Bakhid of Sila negotiated an arrangement with General Largeau, who operated in the area, which prevented open confrontations with the colonial forces. The accord between the two parties “allowed” the Sila residents continuance of their traditional ways of living. However, the accord had been broken by 1916 when the French overthrew Sila resistance of some adversaries that had not subscribed to Bakhid’s accord and installed a sub-division in Dar Sila. The sultanate fell under the direct rule of the French who created several cantons in Dar Sila. Sultan Bakhid became a prisoner of war and died in the same year.⁴⁰

The historical overview of the Sila Sultanate shows that the emphasis upon regional or trans-regional ties and alliances has always been strong throughout the border region. The Sila residents, like most ethnic groups and sultanates in eastern Chad and western Sudan, flexibly choose strong allies throughout history to resist the influence of the surrounding large kingdoms and, later on, of the French and English invaders. As the border between the empires was always changing because of the gaining or loosing of territories in conquests, the loyalties of many of the region’s ethnic groups remained fluid, always leaving the “door open” for new alliances. This finding is fundamental with regard to today’s Chadian and Sudanese political dynamics, especially in the micro politics of the border region. Moreover, we find striking parallels between past and present patterns of shifting alliances in both regional and national conflicts of Chad and Sudan, their neighbour states and beyond.⁴¹

The Sinyar

The common ancestor of the Sinyar is said to be Ousman Ben Kardam. It is said that the Sinyar originally came from Iraq and passed by Sudan before settling in today’s Chad territory in a mountain area called Hadjer Ngaire, near Daguessa, several hundred years ago. Supposedly, the territory was deserted at their arrival so that they settled down in the preferable areas. The Sinyar had their own sultanate, with Dabar being its first King.

Throughout history, the Sinyar were unsuccessfully attacked several times by the Waddai empire who wanted to conquer them and gain power over Sinyar territory. Later, during the time of Ali Dinar of Darfur, the Sinyar allied with the Dadjo which assisted them in their resistance against Waddai. However, at the time of Sila Sultan Abu Rishe, the two sultanates

⁴⁰ Some Dadjo elders still accuse the French to never have indicated the location of the Sultans grave.

⁴¹ See also the analysis of Behrends 2008; Jánszky, B. / Jánszky, T. 2008.

got into a dispute, and Abu Rishe killed the then ruling Sinyar Sultan Siam and Dar Sinyar fell under Dar Sila's control.

The Sultanate of Sinyar finally came to an end as a result of the demarcation of the border between Chad and Sudan. With the support of the Dadjo and the Sila Sultanate the French proposed the Chadian part of Dar Sinyar should become a canton of Dar Sila named Sinyar. The Sinyar Sultan, faced with a Franco-Sila alliance against him, accepted and became its first *chef de canton*. Up until today, the canton chiefs descend from the ancient royal sultan's family. On the other side of the border, the Sinyar Sultanate was integrated into Dar Masalit.

The Fongoro

According to their oral history, the Fongoro have had their own sultanate on the southern border of the Sila Sultanate. At the time of the Sila Sultan Abu Rishe, the Fongoro were under the rule of Ali Dinar from Darfur.⁴² When they were attacked by Arabs⁴³, they solicited Abu Rishe's support, as they felt Ali Dinar with his capital in El Fashir was too far away for an immediate reaction. The Sila Sultan then sent a note to Ali Dinar explaining this situation. In his response, Ali Dinar declared Dar Fongoro to be under the command of Abu Rishe as he did not feel capable of defending this remote territory.

Abu Rishe then sent troops to Dar Fongoro and successfully drove back the attackers. Nevertheless, shortly afterwards, the Fongoro rejected the Sila Sultan's authority of their territory so that the latter sent his son Bakhid to re-establish order among its southern allies. When the Fongoro still refused, Bakhid killed the Fongoro Sultan and the territory was integrated into the Dar Sila Sultanate.

The Mouro

The Mouro's oral history recalls that their ethnic group immigrated several hundred years ago, coming from the Middle East. They first settled in Waddai and later moved to Kerfi region in Dar Sila, a place shown to them by the Sultan of Waddai himself. At this time, according to the Mouro, no other ethnic group but the Waddaiens and the Sinyar were present in the region. Years later the Dadjo reached Kerfi and spread in the Mouro region. The Mouro paid their taxes to the Waddai Sultan until colonial times. However, with the arrival of the French, they started to pay their taxes to the Sila Sultan.⁴⁴

⁴² Dar Fongoro was also a slaving ground of Darfur; see Kapteijns 1985 for further reading.

⁴³ No further specification available.

⁴⁴ Interview with Mouro representatives, 18.04.2008.

What is of special interest is that the Dadjo tell the Mouro history in a quite different version. According to them, both Dadjo and Mouro entered the region together, as they both have the same origin, descending from the same ancestor. While the Dadjo populated the area around Kerfi, the Mouro settled in a mountainous region called *Abukussun* further east according to the advice of their Dadjo brothers.

Kerfi later became part of the canton of Bahr Azoum with its canton chief in Koukou and one representative in Kerfi. When the Mouro got under attack in their territory, they took refuge among the Dadjo around Kerfi, bringing along their own canton chief. Both communities thereafter paid their taxes to the canton chief in Koukou.

After independence, when the Kerfi inhabitants were asked for the legitimate owners of this land, the Mouro profited from the opportunity and declared themselves to be such. Based on this “mistake”, the Mouro gained the post of *chef de canton* after independence, when Kerfi was declared a canton. This is according to Dadjo oral history and explains why, after independence, a Mouro became canton chief in Kerfi region.⁴⁵

We interpret the rival interpretations of local residents as a result of recent land tenure disputes in the Kerfi region. This is because the majority of the displaced people, who are mostly Dadjo, in and around Kerfi were settled on the fields of the Mouro. Accordingly, tensions between the two groups rose. The Mouro complain that they need to farm their land in order to assure subsistence but that, since the arrival of the IDPs, they have not been able to do so. On the other hand, the displaced Dadjo claim this land originally belonging to them, asking the Mouro to share it now that they are in need. The Mouro insist that Dadjo return to their original villages because they want to work on their fields.

The Kadjakse

According to the Kadjakse oral history, they are a small ethnic group that accompanied the Dadjo from Sudan to what today is Chad and paid their taxes to the Sila Sultan. They later moved on to the centre of today's Chad and settled in the region around Am Dam, some 120 kilometers north-west of Goz Beïda. After the arrival of the French colonialists, the Kadjakse were given their own canton in Dar Sila called Dar Kadjakse. In the 1960s, after Chad had become an independent state, Kadjakse villages were attacked by Arab groups fighting against President Tombalbaye. The assaults left dozens of Kadjakse dead and drove the survivors out of their land. They moved to Dar Sila where they still live today.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Interview with Dadjo representatives, 16.04.2008.

⁴⁶ Interview with Kadjakse representative, 21.04.2008

The Moubi

The Moubi are an ethnic group who resided in the area of Mangalmé, some 200 kilometers west of Goz Beïda. In the mid-1960s they began migrating to Dar Sila, escaping the persecution by Chadian President Tombalbaye's troops, who attacked the Moubi because of their support for the anti-government rebel movement (FROLINAT⁴⁷). During and after the severe drought of 1984 a second wave of Moubi migrants arrived in Dar Sila where they were given land by the Sila Sultan to assure their subsistence.

The Waddaian⁴⁸ and Mimi

Both Waddaian and Mimi arrived in Dar Sila only in the 1970s and 1980s after the severe droughts of that time. They originate from Waddai and Biltine region, where they lived under the rule of the powerful empire of Waddai throughout history. They settled throughout Dar Sila after having secured agreements with the respective local Sila leaders. In the beginning, all of them paid their taxes to the neighbouring *chefs de village*. Recently this way of paying taxes has been flouted with implications described in our chronology chapter (chapter 2.1). Significantly, Waddaians still believe the sultan in Abéché to be their sovereign and look to him for support in case of conflict. The Waddaian became important in trade during the last decades, especially in the regional trading centres like Adré and Adé.

Arab tribes

Besides all of the precedent groups who mainly lived sedentarily as farmers, several Arab tribes reside in Dar Sila. The Arab tribes present in Dar Sila can be basically classified into three categories: those who have settled their long time ago with parts of their families living sedentarily and other parts circling with the herds; those who live to the north, but during dry season transhume to Dar Sila since a longer period of time; those who have been disturbed in their regions of origin in the north and recently have migrated to Dar Sila or widened transhumance until Sila region.

It is said that eleven Arab tribes officially had become members of the Sila Sultanate, some of them since its early days, taking part in sultans' elections. These eleven include: Beni Hassan, Scharafa, Hemat, Emar hemar, Salamat, Noweibe Djamul, Noweibe Samara, Missirie, Awadfe, Mahamid and Bornuan Arabs.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ For further reading see e.g. Buijtenhuijs 1987.

⁴⁸ Waddaian is a generic term that refers to all people in originating from the Waddai region, including several different ethnic groups. Most of the immigrants of Waddaian origin in Dar Sila are probably from Maba origin.

⁴⁹ Several interviews with Dadjo elders, April 2008.

Additionally, with the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s many other Arab tribes came to Dar Sila to pasture their herds there, but also to definitely install in permanent settlements (*damra*) throughout the whole of Sila. Among these are the Arab Zaghawa, Khosam, Bederie and Beni Halba. Some of them separated from their original tribes, no longer depending on their original leaders⁵⁰ and appointing new representatives with the agreement of the Sila Sultan and his council instead. As described earlier, the Arab population forged links with sedentary communities by different forms of alliance.

1.3 Livelihoods and economic strategies

Household economy in Dar Sila depends on several economical sources. Agriculture is complemented by livestock farming or vice-versa. In comparison to the regions further north, ecological conditions in Dar Sila are quite advantageous permitting successful cultivation of soils with the growing of millet, sorghum, rice, maize, lentils, sesame, peanuts and a range of horticulture products as well as fruit trees.⁵¹ The livestock breeding emphasis is on cattle, sheep and goats. Camels are largely raised by Arab groups and their stock increases seasonally with the transhumance of camel herders from northern regions. The gathering of wild fruit and cereals still plays a role. In former times hunting contributed to the family's food supply. Often (young) male family members seek seasonal employment in rural areas or migrate to urban regions for wage-labour positions. Others try to establish a small business or become traders to supplement to the family's subsistence. Trade was very important in the region as Dar Sila is situated in the frontier triangle of Sudan – RCA – Chad but trading activities mainly came to a halt with the fierce cross-border conflict.

The variation of economic strategies is a way of adaptation to the uncertain ecological and political environment where crises can occur suddenly at any time as history shows. The limiting of such strategies due to either a scarcity of resources or ongoing violence can result in a serious threat to household survival. This also means that the absolute classification of the different ethnic groups to different economic specializations is misleading. It is true that the region's household economies vary along a continuum from nomadic pastoralism to intensive farming. But it is equally true that within families there may be, and indeed are, both pastoral and agricultural activities. Even the nomads (or parts of their families) originating from the north nowadays cultivate fields and gardens.

⁵⁰ The French term often used by Chadians for those "splinter" groups is *fraction* while they originally might rather be lineages or lineage segments of Arab tribes.

⁵¹ COP.SILA 2007: 1f.; ADS 2007: 4f.

However, the two main economic specializations in Dar Sila appear to increasingly compete over natural resources due to growing demand for them throughout the last decades as several droughts have afflicted the region. Especially since the 1980s migration from northern parts of Chad has reinforced, leading to increasing ecological pressure. Accordingly, tensions between farmers and herders – which can also apply to members of the same (ethnic) group – competing over the same resources have risen. Also the existing state's regulation instruments like the *loi n°04* dating already from October 1959 that was meant to regulate conditions of transhumance for nomads did not help to prevent the aggravation of those tensions.

1.4 Local leadership in Dar Sila

In Chad the government delegates some of its responsibilities to 'traditional'⁵² local leaders (village chief, tribal chief, canton chief, sultan etc.) working under the control of administrative government authorities (like prefects and sub-prefects). In this way some pre-colonial authority positions have survived and some administrative structures of the modern state refer to traditional or local society institutions like sultanates and cantons. Most Chadians identify with this local society. The nation state – hardly represented on a local level and perceived as corrupt on a regional and national level - has little meaning to the individual.

State representatives: Governor, prefect, sub-prefect

The governor, the prefect and the sub-prefect represent the state in the regional governmental hierarchy. The governor as the head of a region has the highest position ranking under the President. He is followed by the prefect who governs a department under the supervision of the governor followed in hierarchy by the sub-prefect, who is responsible for a sub-prefecture. All three positions are appointed by Presidential decree. The governor and prefect are commonly represented by a secretary general (SG) or a deputy. In Dar Sila as elsewhere in Chad appointments to these administrative positions are often made according to ethnic and / or political affiliations or loyalty to the president rather than qualification. Thus, administrative authorities are often accused as being incompetent, uninformed about and uninterested in the local context they have been sent to, because they often originate from regions other than Dar Sila.

The Sultanate and the Sultan of Dar Sila

The sultanate is the traditional administrative structure in Dar Sila as it is in the neighbouring northern areas of eastern Chad (Dar Tama, Dar Zagawa). The sultan appeared in history as

⁵² See the glossary for the utilisation of this term.

a sacred person and as such represented the highest authority. Although the sultanate as part of the pre-colonial traditional society is nowadays integrated into the administrative system of the Chadian state the sultan is still highly respected by the local population. He is perceived as the legitimate ruler of Dar Sila, while the legitimacy of state authorities is often questioned. Today the sultan pursues mainly representative tasks and stays in touch with the administrative authorities as well as with other sultans of neighbouring areas to discuss general problems of his people and its land.

The Dar Sila Sultan has several representatives in Abéché, N'Djamena and other important towns who represent his and his people's interests in the absence of the sultan himself. They are also referred to in cases of conflict in urban areas in which people from Dar Sila are involved.

The cantons and their chiefs

The canton is the smallest entity of the administrative structure and constitutes the lowest administrative level of the state. Cantons as administrative units and canton chiefs were introduced by French colonial administration after the arrival of the French colonial power in the region in 1909. In pre-colonial times the Sila Sultanate was, like other Sudanic states of the Waddai / Darfur region, administratively divided into larger and smaller districts and private estates, which were ruled by representatives of the sultan. It is reported that the number of administrative districts was doubled from four to eight under the reign of Sultan Abu Risha (1879-1900, see Figure 1). Additionally, the sultan provided his kin and councillors with land and villages (as de facto private estates) whose populations were under their rule and jurisdiction and whose production they taxed for their own subsistence and profit. While they owed the sultan few if any taxes, representatives of larger districts were obliged to collect and divide taxes between themselves, the local village chiefs and the sultan. This complex administrative system was simplified by the French, who divided Dar Sila - as all other regions of Chad they had conquered - into cantons. The department of Kimiti (the former department of Sila that constitutes the Sila Sultanate) currently comprises nine cantons (see map 1).⁵³ They are administered by cantonal chiefs (*chefs de canton*). A canton chief normally is a member of a dominant clan and formerly had to be a member of the same family as his predecessor.⁵⁴ In practice the *chef de canton* is nominated by government authorities, though local preferences are respected through consultation of the sultan and other local leaders. The *chef de canton* is, so to say, an assistant to governmental

⁵³ Commonly canton borders match with the borders of sub-prefectures, yet some Dar Sila sub-prefectures comprise more than one canton.

⁵⁴ This practice is not imperative anymore.

administration and is placed under the authority of the prefect and the sub-prefect. He is the mediator between the state and the local social structure, representing both sides. He also links village chiefs and the sultan. The canton chief can designate representatives in important villages in his canton. He always has a representative in the administrative centre of the department, in this case in Goz Beïda. This representative has an important role in establishing and upholding relations with government authorities. The *chef de canton* has numerous functions and powers. He collects and refers taxes. He also has to intervene as a mediator in cases of conflict between people in his canton and he has to settle claims for damages caused by grazing animals.

The villages, *feriks* and their chiefs

Cantons are subdivided into villages. The entity of “village” covers both all the arable land that is cultivated by the inhabitants of a certain settlement area and the actual territory over which the local people exercise rights of ownership.

Each village is headed by a *chef de village*. Often those chiefs are lineage or clan chiefs, or members of the kinship group that claims rights to a given territory. The position of village chiefs has been heritable. Today the village chiefs are officially appointed by the local prefects and sub-prefects, so that there are some village chiefs who do not originate from the village they are appointed to. The village chiefs represent the connection of villages to the local administrative authorities. Having a chief as local authority and representative, each village is to be seen as an autonomous unit.

The village chief supervises the distribution and exploitation of arable land and mediates conflicts concerning property rights. In such cases of conflict he can be assisted by the *imam*⁵⁵. In all conflict resolution meetings the chief is also assisted by a council of wise men (*fashir* or *ajawid*). If a conflict, whatever it is about, cannot be resolved, it is submitted to the canton chief. Other official duties of the village chief are the protection of crops and plantations from grazing animals and particularly from bush fires as well as the surveillance of hygiene, for instance he has to report outbreaks of infectious diseases to the canton chief. Additionally, the village chief is responsible for the collection of taxes in his village and receives a portion of the collected taxes.

Pastoral groups are led by a chief called *cheikh de ferik*, who is responsible for settling all conflicts within the group or between his group and other communities. He negotiates access

⁵⁵ The *imam* is the spiritual leader of a mosque and / or a Muslim community.

to water and pasture with the village chiefs of the sedentary population and assures that agreements are respected. The *cheikh* belongs to the clan that he leads.

Religious leaders

In the context of Dar Sila where the overwhelming majority of the population are Muslim and where religion plays an important role in everyday life, religious leaders are highly respected persons who can have a great influence on the local community.

The *imam* as the spiritual leader of a mosque and / or a community has several functions in the Muslim community. Similar to other spiritual leaders he leads prayers during Islamic gatherings. He is responsible to direct and administer the Muslim community in all religious aspects of life. In that regard he is also involved in settling disputes according to Islamic *Sharia* law. Furthermore, the *imam* assists the *chef de canton* in the distribution of land.

Quranic clerics, called *marabout*, who can be spiritual leaders, Quran teachers or wandering holy men surviving on alms, can be as influential in a community as the *imam*. Some *marabouts* maintain pre-Muslim traditions making amulets for protection, telling the future, thereby adding supernatural spiritual powers to their religious authority.

The Islamic Committee (*Comité Islamique*) is a religious nationwide institution that has its headquarters in N'Djamena and offices and representatives in the regions, departments and sub-prefectures in Chad. In each sub-prefecture twelve members constitute the committee. The members of the committee are chosen according to their religious knowledge and respect. They are often *marabouts* or other religious leaders. All members are volunteers. The principal function of the committee is to provide guidance and advice according to Islamic jurisprudence. The committee also has jurisdiction in cases of conflict if the problem falls into the domain of religious law, such as for instance adultery, divorce, problems in marriage, questions of dowry, inheritance, subsistence of children, questions of land attribution etc. Each member of the local committee specializes in a certain legal domain. The Islamic Committee is sometimes assigned judicial cases when all other legal institutions are overtaxed by a special case and conflict parties cannot be brought to consent by official administration or the traditional leaders. However, in most cases they are just queried for advice.

2 Conflict contexts, evolution and levels of conflict

The second part of our analysis describes the actual evolution of the conflict that has resulted in mass displacement in Dar Sila from 2005 onwards. Considering the complexity of the conflict context, we first provide a chronology of main events and circumstances that in our view and after analysis of information gathered in the field were central to the escalation of violence as well as actual descriptions of major events and attacks (see also annex for a conflict timeline).

2.1 Chronology of conflict evolution

Pre 2003

As mentioned earlier, and according to their own accounts, the different Dar Sila ethnic groups lived peacefully for decades or even centuries without facing unsolvable conflicts. However, the ethnic composition of this region became even more complex throughout the 1970s and 1980s – as detailed in chapter 1 – due to migration from mainly northern parts of Chad because of violence and drought that had affected the area. The arriving migrants were integrated in the local communities and received land to assure their subsistence in the new environment.

However, the arrival of large numbers of newcomers led to an increasing pressure on natural resources like water and pasture, resulting in land tenure and distribution problems between concurring livelihoods. These kinds of conflicts are said to have easily been solved by the respective traditional authorities, yet they were recurrent. Therefore, land appropriation throughout history and people's perception of holding proper and original rights to their land are important to look at when examining today's conflicts, because they hint to underlying conflict sources.

Some interlocutors disparage the former Dar Sila Sultan Saïd insisting that he did not pay enough attention to whom he granted land rights. This criticism seems accurate because it is also mentioned by the "late-comers" who were the recipients of these land grants. One Waddaian elder for example stated: «*Il [le Sultan] n'a pas joué son rôle, parce qu'il ne faut pas donner la terre à n'importe qui. Chez le Sultan du Waddai par exemple, on ne trouve pas facilement de la terre. On ne peut que louer des parcelles.*»⁵⁶ This reproach reveals a certain ambiguity concerning the distribution rights in the land tenure system.

⁵⁶ Interview on 27.04.2008.

Thus there were problems between Waddaians and Dadjo over access to land and differences between Sultan Saïd and some portions of the Dadjo community over his readiness to grant land rights.

Inter-communal tensions between Waddaian and Dadjo seem to have increased in 2000 when several Waddaian merchants are said to have been attacked by Dadjo in Adé and Modoyna region. Thereafter, the Waddaian community went so far as to call for the Waddaian Sultan Brahim to help ease the tensions, saying that "*les Dadjo ne veulent plus de nous*".⁵⁷ Although further details on those attacks and their after-effects are not available, some informants from both communities had mentioned pre-existing resentments between them, sometimes referring to the successful Waddaian merchants who had gained an important position in local and trans-local trade of the region.

Further possible conflict influencing factors given by our interlocutors that lay way back in the past are credited to Sultan Saïd. After the death of the Sila Sultan Brahim in 1987 his son, Saïd, was chosen as successor. In the course of time, the new sultan replaced the majority of his father's council of elders as well as many of his *goumiers*.⁵⁸ This left some people unsatisfied who sought to continue the sultan's father's traditions.⁵⁹ During his regency, Sultan Saïd also had named - as apparently had some sub-prefects of Dar Sila, too - several Arab elders as local leaders, namely as *chef de fraction*⁶⁰. For the sultan it was necessary to choose local partners because the original chiefs of some of the Arab groups were still located further north at the places of origin of the respective groups, e.g. in the sub-prefectures of Arada and Abougoudam. There they could not accomplish their tasks as community leaders being far out of reach of their daily interactions.⁶¹ With the nomination of other local representatives as tribal leaders like e.g. *chef de fraction*, these persons became equivalent to other local leaders in their position as speakers for their group or fraction and key interlocutors for the sultan.⁶² Even if such nominations were probably meant to facilitate dialogue within local communities, they were understood by some to be a means of bypassing Dadjo and other local traditional authorities like the village chiefs and canton chiefs. The sultan was even suspected to being complicit in this bypassing of these officials.

⁵⁷ Interview with Waddaian representative on 27.04.2008.

⁵⁸ French term for the adjutants of the Sultan. It originally is a military term that could be translated "assistant rider".

⁵⁹ Interview with Dadjo elder, 20.04.2008.

⁶⁰ An Arab fraction originally is the split of a group of people declaring themselves independent from an Arab tribe (see also glossary).

⁶¹ Interview with ACTT, 01.04.2008.

⁶² Interviews with Waddaian representative, 27.04.2008, and Arab representative, 28.04.2008.

Whatever the real reason was for the naming of Arab *chefs de fraction*, in fact some Arabs and Waddaians in Dar Sila began ignoring local (Dadro) authorities. One way they did this was by paying taxes directly to the sultan instead of delivering it to the Dadro *chefs de village* and *chefs de canton*. The Dadro community declared that this was one reason for their having lost confidence in Sultan Saïd whose measures to prevent the bypassing of Dadro local authorities did not seem sufficient. Rather they believed he was collaborating with the Waddaians and Arabs. So, this changing of personnel on the local level had weakened cohesion in the region.

Additionally, due to administrative reforms, the last decades have witnessed the creation of further sub-prefectures and other administrative entities.⁶³ The occupants of these new posts often did not know the living circumstances and contexts of Dar Sila as many of them originated from other regions in Chad. Additionally, the turn-over in those positions has been so high that few of their occupants acquire familiarity with the region. This has led to a weakening of traditional powers as they have to cooperate with new governmental representatives who, ignorant of traditional ways, overlooked traditional leaders.

Far from Dar Sila, in N'Djamena, the Dadro political elite⁶⁴ jointly resigned from the ruling party MPS in 2001 due to dissatisfaction with the government's politics. The discontent was mainly based on the fact that many important positions in Dar Sila's regional administration were occupied by non-Dadro (especially Zagawa). Furthermore, only a few Dadro held political positions in the central government. Also, the Dadro population of Guéra, quite sizable, was poorly represented in political positions. Negotiations of the Dadro dissidents with the government did not improve relations between the two sides. So, in 2001, some Dadro intellectuals decided to join the armed opposition in collaboration with Abdoulaye Issakha Sarwa, a former member of the presidential guard. When a secret arms' supply for this group was discovered by ANT in Am Dam, some of the leaders of the Dadro rebellion fled into exile. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of this incident many young Dadro joined a movement called FONALT (*Forces des Organisations Nationales pour l'Alternance et les Libertés au Tchad*) that was led by Sarwa.

According to reliable information the FONALT first allied with the Janjawid in Darfur who had promised support in overthrowing President Déby. The alliance allegedly ended after several

⁶³ Chad agreed to decentralization measures within the frame of broader structural adjustment programmes proposed to them by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1995. See IMF: IMF approves ESAF loans for Chad, 01.09.1995, available under: <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1995/pr9544.htm>> [25.06.2008]

⁶⁴ This concerned Dadro politicians from a local level like sub-prefecture and cantonal positions as well as political leading positions in the Chadian government.

months of collaboration in early 2002 when the FONALT leaders realized that their partner was urging the ideology of an ‘Arab gathering’ or *wihida Arabiya*.⁶⁵ They then migrated to Birao region in the Central African Republic where shortly thereafter they joined the ANR (*Alliance Nationale de la Résistance*), a rebel militia founded in 1995 under the leadership of Mahamat Garfa, a Tama and former Chief of Staff of Chad’s armed forces. Abdoulaye Issakha Sarwa became Vice President of the ANR which in 2002 was particularly active in eastern and south-eastern Chad operating from rear bases both in Sudan and CAR. The threat posed by armed opposition reinforced insecurity in the frontier areas both south and east of Dar Sila, connecting a national conflict to local and regional levels.

2003

In early 2003 the ANR, or rather parts of it, rallied to the Chadian government by signing a peace agreement with President Déby in Libreville, Gabon; although the agreement was jeopardized because Sarwa, who felt “neither informed nor asked for advice”,⁶⁶ announced he would continue armed struggle. Due to the influx of Dadjo into Sarwa’s rebellion, they have ever since been – according to their own understanding of political discourse – perceived as rebels by the Chadian government. The Dadjo repeatedly emphasized that the government fears Sila as a region suitable for the hiding of rebels; with Dadjo being excellent connoisseurs of this, having recruits on both sides of the Chad / Sudan border.

In February 2003, the Darfur rebellion began with the revolt of the Darfurian armed opposition. Soon after these first clashes, eastern Chad experienced an influx of several thousand refugees. As far as Dar Sila was concerned, the refugees first arrived in the border region between Adé and Modoyna. Dar Sila informants stated that the Janjawid militia started crossing the border more frequently after the arrival of the refugees; pursuing them to steal their remaining cattle; and to drive them even further away from their homelands. Almost all our interlocutors believe that with the onset of the Darfur conflict violence in Dar Sila began to escalate. It is difficult to determine if this understanding developed internally from personal experience of events or if it is rather the Chadian government’s anti-Sudanese propaganda that has entered the local discourse.

After the devastating February attacks of the Sudanese rebel groups in El-Fashir, the Sudanese government reacted by reinforcing armament of pro-government ethnic groups. Some Sila informants presume that the Sudanese government already suspected the

⁶⁵ The ideology of the ‘Arab Gathering’ conveyed the idea of Arab supremacy over the *zurga* (pejorative term for black Africans) spread in the Darfur region of western Sudan in the 1980s. It provided legitimacy to attack the so called ‘black’ communities such as the Fur in order to gain political power over them.

⁶⁶ Ouazani / Jeune Afrique: 12.01.2003.

Chadian government of complicity in the Darfur insurgency and therefore chose its allies among its population according to existing ethnic polarities. The informants' suspicion is important because it slowly entered peoples' minds and perception, sowing the seeds of an ethnic polarization also among the Chadian border population.

Though the main focus of attacks in 2003 seems to have been aimed at Darfurian refugees, some informants report the first violent cross-border attacks against Chadian communities. Most Dadjo assert that these assaults were only against them and the communities that have close ties with them such as the Kadjakse, Mouro, Sinyar etc. while other communities such as Arabs, Waddaians and Mimi claim to have also been attacked. However, all informants concur that from that moment on violence slowly increased. Aggression started mainly with cattle theft; later reached the level of pillaging of whole villages and areas; and culminated in massacres against its inhabitants.

Adding to tensions, in 2003 the *chef de tribu* of the Arab Nowaibe, Tahir, died which prompted a succession struggle. According to our information, the reason for the clash was that the legitimate successor, the eldest son of Tahir, had a Dadjo mother; and the Nowaibe did not want the Dadjo to acquire more influence in their tribe. They refused his nomination which offended the Dadjo community, who used their influence to support the rightful heir. When the Nowaibe realized that they would be unsuccessful with their candidate, they moved to Gobe in Darfur and allied to the Janjawid section under Hamid ad-Dawai⁶⁷. At the same time they brought with them the cattle that the Dadjo had confided in them, and later defended these animals with the help of the Janjawid. Furthermore, the Janjawid leader, Hamid ad-Dawai, is said to have later told Sultan Saïd from Dar Sila to allow the Nowaibe to themselves choose their leader, warning that otherwise the Dadjo population in Sila would be displaced.⁶⁸ This succession dispute is offered as one main reason why the Arab Nowaibe choose to enter an alliance with the Janjawid.

Another informant reported that in early March 2003 a Dadjo village named Am Djimena close to Modoyna was attacked by Janjawid and that the attackers were accompanied by Tahir who had therefore allied to the Janjawid already at this point. Accordingly, he was said to have become the local leader of the Janjawid for the region of Wadi Kadja⁶⁹ at the

⁶⁷ Hamid ad-Dawai is supposed to be a local Janjawid leader at the Terbeba-Arara-Beïda area in Southern Darfur. Together with Abdullah Abu Shineibat, the local leader of Habila and Foro Barranga, he is said to be under the command of Mussa Hilal, the suspected Janjawid leader. Both figures, ad-Dawai and Shineibar, were repeatedly named responsible for Janjawid attacks in Dar Sila by our informants.

⁶⁸ Interview with Arab representative, 14.04.2008.

⁶⁹ The Janjawid are said to have several "agents" on Chadian territory who execute their orders there. (Interviews with Dadjo representatives, April 2008).

Chadian frontier with Sudan after a conflict about land appropriation between Dadjo and Arab Nowaibe had earlier occurred in that region. The informant also declared that normally surrounding villages supported their attacked neighbours (see chapter 1). But in the case of the Am Djimena attack the nearby Mimi suddenly refused their support and even led the Dadjo into an ambush. From then on, distrust against the co-residing groups intensified because of their differing positions towards the Janjawid.⁷⁰

2004

According to a former Adé official, a group of 'bandits' - Zaghawa ANT officers who had deserted with their troops, and some local Masalit, serving as guides – operated between Adé and André. In 2004 they are suspected of having launched a major attack against a Chadian Arab village in Darfur between Beïda and Arada (Sudan), where they are said to have taken 300 camels. During the pursuit of the thieves around 20 people were killed and the Arabs were able to confiscate Chadian documents and uniforms of the attackers. These Arabs are said to have joined the local Janjawid in order to retaliate against their Chadian 'bandit' attackers.⁷¹

In November of the same year the Chadian government sent an official delegation to Adé led by General Mahamat Saleh Brahim, commandant of the National Nomadic Guard of Chad (*Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad - GNNT*), an uncle of President Déby. The goal of this delegation was to win back to the government's side certain Arab groups who had left for Sudan throughout the last decades. The initiative might have been a try to separate them from Chadian opposition in Sudan, as many Arabs had joined with the ANR. They allegedly were guaranteed the protection of their herds, which probably meant that they were also allowed to keep their arms. The delegation's negotiations were a success, but arrival of the repatriated Arabs⁷² elevated fear in the region, as the Arab groups were perceived by the local Dadjo population as allied to the Janjawid. The fact that they were not disarmed by government forces further increased those tensions.

During this period several Dadjo were killed in clashes in the Adé-Modoyna region. Some informants said that the delegation headed by Déby's uncle used the situation of increasing insecurity to persuade the local Dadjo youth to take up arms against Sudanese aggressors and Chadian armed opposition.⁷³ Nevertheless, most Dadjo informants say that - at least in

⁷⁰ Interview with Dadjo representative from Modoyna, 28.04.2008.

⁷¹ Interviews with Dadjo representatives, 20.04.2008.

⁷² Informed sources indicate about 1000 to 1500 Arab returnees in the following.

⁷³ Interview with Dadjo representatives, 28.03.2008 and 19.04.2008.

the early days of conflict escalation - they have not received any support or material from the Chadian government and that this was punishment for their earlier rebel attempts.⁷⁴

2005

In 2005 the (re-)settlement of Arabs continued in the border region, mainly around Wadi Kadja. During a January (pre-election) governmental delegation tour of the Chadian Prime Minister⁷⁵ along the border from Adé to Tissi, that also aimed at promoting regional reconciliation and stabilization, Mahamat Saleh Brahim is said to have held a meeting with several Arab groups and to have given a “*parole intoxicante*” against the Dadjo community portraying them as rebels. The speech is said by Dadjo to have infuriated the Arab communities against them.⁷⁶

Dar Sila's security situation increasingly worsened throughout 2005. The region experienced multiple demoralizing village attacks mainly from Janjawid against Dadjo villages.⁷⁷ In April 2005, after an assault on two border villages north of Modoyna (Aniata, Djerene) several neighbouring villages, fearing they too would be attacked, decided to displace to Koloy (bringing some 4.000 people). At the same time relations between Chad and Sudan further deteriorated. The Chadian government released a statement that accused Sudan of backing and financing the Chadian armed opposition.⁷⁸ Rumours circulated in Chad that Chadian opposition forces were building up bases on the Sudanese side of the border.

One major Janjawid attack struck several neighbouring Dadjo villages of Koloy, about 40 kilometres from Adé. Eyewitnesses estimated that the attackers numbered around 3.000 fighters, riding camels, and well equipped with automatic weapons. The battle left 125 people dead and three dozen injured. Several women and children are said to have been kidnapped. The attack led to massive displacement of the local population of this area.⁷⁹ In late May 2005, Janjawid militia, estimated at 2.000 fighters, attacked the site of Djabal Gada where Dadjo breeders keep their cattle during the rainy season. 44 Dadjo civilians were

⁷⁴ Confirmed also by representatives of other Sila communities, e.g. interview with Waddaian leader, 27.04.2008.

⁷⁵ At this time the position was held by Moussa Faki. He resigned on 03.02.2005 and was replaced by Pascal Yodimnadji.

⁷⁶ Interviews with Dadjo representatives, April 2008.

⁷⁷ It has to be pointed out that not only Dadjo, but also the communities closely linked to them and often living together with the Dadjo majority population in villages like Kadakse, Mouro, Sinyar, Kibet, Dagal etc. were targeted, too. These groups later on also fought alongside Dadjo in village defence groups and in what had become known as Dadjo militias. When we talk about e.g. Dadjo villages, Dadjo militias etc. it has to be understood that these categories often comprise members of the aforementioned communities with close historical, cultural and socio-economic ties to the Dadjo.

⁷⁸ Irinnews 11.04.2005.

⁷⁹ Interview with Dadjo elder, 29.03.2008. Informants also specified that this area is now occupied by Mahamat Saleh Brahim's father, supposed to be an Arab Sharafa. The researchers were not able to verify this information as circulation in this region was suspended due to the security situation during the phase of field research.

killed. ANT forces at Modoyna and Adé, according to witnesses, did not support the villagers, in either of these attacks.

At the same time, Chad's Minister of Defence, Bichara Hissein Abdallah, prohibited the possession of arms under threat of being treated as rebel. The government sent ANT forces to Adé-Modoyna region to confiscate arms from the local population, especially Arab groups. When Arab leaders and representatives protested, the government finally intervened and allegedly compensated the Arabs for harassment suffered from the military.⁸⁰

According to the Waddaian perspective, one of their villages to the south along the border in Tissi area had allegedly been attacked by Arab Janjawid in the same year. Around 20 villagers died. During this encounter the attackers declared they were in conflict with the Chadian government and asked the Waddaian to keep out of it. The latter accepted the deal and were therefore spared from further attacks, which probably contributed to the general assumption of Dadjo that the Waddaian allied with the Arabs.⁸¹

Furthermore, there is said to have been a conflict between Kadjakse and their Arab neighbours in Kerfi region at the same time concerning a farmer-herder incident in which, according to our information, the Kadjakse have chased the participating Arabs until the Sudanese border.⁸²

Increasingly confronted with violence originating from Janjawid militias, the Dadjo complained before Sultan Saïd who responded by sending a letter to Hamid ad-Dawai in Beïda (Sudan) through a delegation of Dadjo elders. According to several witnesses, this delegation was informed by the Janjawid leaders present that they had allied with several Dar Sila communities including Arabs, Waddaian and Mimi to pursue the aim of overthrowing the government of Déby, emphasizing that the Dadjo were not part of this alliance.⁸³ After their return to Dar Sila the Dadjo then decided to create self-defence forces to prepare for further attacks.⁸⁴

There were such attacks and following them many Dadjo were very disappointed by the reactions of Sultan Saïd which they perceived as insufficient. He had neither visited the

⁸⁰ Interviews with humanitarian representatives, April 2008.

⁸¹ Interview with Waddaian representative, 27.03.2008.

⁸² Interview with Dadjo representatives, 16.04.2008.

⁸³ According to other sources Chadian Arab groups had been approached by representatives of the Janjawid in late 2005 and offered immunity from attack should they decide to join the 'Arab Gathering'. Their membership would have to be paid in cash and cattle, which would be raised by raiding and looting alongside Janjawid militias. It was reported that Waddaian and Mimi communities joined Arab militias, too. (HRW 2006b: 22.).

⁸⁴ Interviews with Dadjo representatives, 27. / 28.03.2008.

attacked villages nor sent delegations for investigation of the respective events which was the usual way of dealing with such incidents as part of traditional conflict resolution strategies.⁸⁵

On a national political level tensions rose when Chad in early June held a referendum on a constitutional change to allow Déby a third term in office.⁸⁶ In the following, opposition forces faced an increasing inflow of dissidents who wanted to fight government's politics.

In August a Chadian special unit was deployed in the Chadian border region to oppose incursions from Sudan, which in the following weeks allegedly decreased. Nevertheless, from September on cross-border attacks increased again. At the end of September a major Janjawid raid took place in the village of Modoyna. A significant number of heads of livestock was stolen and at least 40 civilians were killed during the attack. The government protested against increasing cross-border incursions and broke diplomatic relations with Sudan on a regional level by closing the Chadian consulate in Al Geneina and the Sudanese consulate in Abéché.⁸⁷

Throughout October 2005 tensions between Arabs and Dadjo communities in Kerfi region rose. The Sila Prefect visited the region twice trying in vain to ease the tensions.

By the end of 2005 the ANT experienced massive desertions from its ranks; desertions also affected the inner political circle of President Déby including members of his family.⁸⁸ The deserters joined the Chadian armed opposition based in Darfur, which was at that time preparing attacks on Chadian territory. Therefore, the government - to be able to protect the main centres of the east - decided to withdraw its troops from the border area to reinforce contingents in Abéché and Adré, accepting that thereafter the border regions were even more exposed to cross-border raids. The whole area of Dar Sila and Assoungha became affected by increasing violence. Supposedly at this time the opposition movement of Hassan Al-Djineidi, called CNT (*Concorde Nationale du Tchad*), which would later be accused of joint attacks on Dadjo villages in Dar Sila, signed an agreement with Janjawid militias in Sudan.

Finally, on 18 December 2005 the rebel movement of Mahamat Nour, called RDL (*Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et les Libertés*), founded in October of the same year, attacked Adré. Later in December the RDL entered into alliance with other armed opposition

⁸⁵ Interviews with Dadjo representatives, March / April 2008.

⁸⁶ The Presidential election was finally held in May 2006 but widely boycotted by the political opposition.

⁸⁷ Sudan Tribune: 4 October 2005.

⁸⁸ The President's nephews Timane and Tom Erdimi joined the rebellion at the same time, leaving President Déby questioned by and isolated from his own group.

groups to found the FUC(D) under the leadership of Nour. Shortly after, the Chadian Minister of Foreign Affairs accused Sudan of supporting Chadian rebel groups on its territory, in a press release the Chadian government declared an “état de belligérance avec le Soudan”.⁸⁹ The Chadian government seems to have boosted its support for Sudanese rebel movements, particularly the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) from this time onwards.⁹⁰

2006

The cross-border incursions and theft of livestock in the border region continued in early 2006. At the same time, tensions between Dadjo communities and Arab groups of the region, as well as the Waddaians and Mimi, who were accused by Dadjo to be associated with the Arab communities, were reported to rise in the area south of Adé and further inland in the canton of Wadi Habilé. Clashes included the killing of a Waddaian leader by Dadjo in January 2006.⁹¹ Attacks on Dadjo villages by Janjawid militias were reported to have taken place in February. As a result, several Dadjo villagers decided to leave and to go to Adé for fearing of attacks on their villages.

On the 14 January 2006 a high ranking government delegation - including three Members of Parliament (the representatives of the sub-prefectures of Koukou, Adé and Tissi) as well as members of the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Defence - arrived in Goz Beïda to calm the strain between the ethnic groups. Meetings with the Prefect and the Dar Sila Sultan were held, resulting in replacements of sub-prefectural administrative personnel. The initiative, however, failed to mitigate the region's rising conflict.⁹²

An important event with severe consequences was witnessed to have taken place in spring 2006,⁹³ following a significant theft of livestock in the village of Djimeze.⁹⁴ Our Dadjo informants reported that the Dadjo communities affected by the theft located traces of the stolen herds near a camp of Janjawid leaders on the Sudanese side of the border. The Dadjo sent a delegation of several men from their community (all of whom had lost animals during the raid) to negotiate about regaining their herds.⁹⁵ There are differing accounts of the meeting, some say that once arrived the Dadjo were informed that their livestock was already taken further inland Sudan and would not be returned. They were further informed that their herds were stolen because they did not belong to the “Arab Gathering” and that in order to live peacefully in the region, they would have to join this union under the leadership of the

⁸⁹ Le Monde: 23.12.2005.

⁹⁰ Interview with Dadjo informant, 27.04.2008; see also Tubiana 2008b: 28.

⁹¹ Interview with Waddaian representative, 27.03.2008.

⁹² Interview with Dadjo representative, 12.04.2008.

⁹³ The team was given several versions of the event with dates alternating between March and April 2006.

⁹⁴ Other sources give the villages of Tiero and Marena as scene of the livestock theft.

⁹⁵ According to some accounts the meeting took place in the village of Salah Khamsa near For Boranga.

Janjawid. Other Dadjo accounts claim that they met Janjawid leaders together with members of the Chadian armed opposition, who asked the Dadjo to join their alliance (Janjawid-Chadian rebellion) and to support them in their struggle against President Déby. The Dadjo were offered 60% of the stolen livestock should they decide to ally with the Janjawid and the Chadian rebellion. In case they would refuse, the Janjawid threatened that they would not only take all their herds away, but that also their granaries would not be spared and their villages attacked. They were advised to discuss with their communities and to give the answer to certain Chadian Arab leaders. The Dadjo left for their villages where they gathered the elders and discussed the consequences of this meeting. The Dadjo then refused to ally with the Janjawid and the Chadian armed opposition, because they felt that they should better stay neutral. They had no intention of collaborating with the Janjawid who had attacked and killed their kin and whose cause was perceived as a purely Sudanese matter.⁹⁶ Following the refusal of the Dadjo to join the Janjawid “Arab Gathering” and/or the Chadian rebellion several Dadjo villages were attacked by Janjawid militias⁹⁷. Major attacks took place in the Dadjo villages Djawara, Djimeze, Singatao and Korkosanyo between 12 and 13 April. Civilians were targeted by Janjawid militias together with members of neighbouring Chadian communities. More than 110 villagers were reported to have been killed.⁹⁸

While the Janjawid had an economic interest in raiding the Chadian border region stealing livestock and looting villages and the political aim of destabilizing a region used by Sudanese rebels as rear base, the Chadian armed opposition was interested in acquiring bases on Chadian territory and entry points for operations in Chad. As the FUC / RDL rebel leader Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim was allied with and recruited for the Sudanese Janjawid⁹⁹ it is not excluded that his rebel group was indeed collaborating with the Janjawid as claimed by our informants.¹⁰⁰ An alliance between the Janjawid and the CNT rebel faction of Al-Djineidi is also likely as the CNT is basically composed of Chadian Arabs and known for close links to the Janjawid.¹⁰¹

Dadjo informants say that it was at this stage (March / April 2006), that they started reinforcing their self-defence groups on the village level and to renew alliances with neighbouring villages and communities sharing the same agricultural lifestyle (such as the

⁹⁶ Interviews with several Dadjo representatives, April 2008.

⁹⁷ This included attacks on two villages north of Modoyna and the village Amdjereme in March 2006; in April 2006 attacks on Tiero, seven people killed; Djimeze, seven people killed; Saraf Borokou, three people killed; Garsila, eight people killed; and Agougou, six people killed.

⁹⁸ HRW 2006b: 13.

⁹⁹ Tubiana 2008b: 38.

¹⁰⁰ See also HRW 2006b: 13.

¹⁰¹ Tubiana 2008b: 68.

Mouro, Kadjakse, Sinyar Dagal, Kibet etc.).¹⁰² They organized the young men of their communities in groups each one responsible for a certain area and a number of villages in this area. These groups are based on the remnants of a former age grade system in which young men of the same age group come together for work (e.g. collective agricultural labour) or warfare.¹⁰³ The Dadjo reported that all this happened on their own initiative and that they did not receive any support at that stage. The groups did not possess many weapons except spears and poisoned arrows.¹⁰⁴ In late March 2006 violent clashes broke out between village defence groups and Arab militias around Koloy leading to displacements to Dogdore, Koloy and Goz Beïda.

Massive partly forced recruitment among the refugee and IDP communities, including children, took place in Dar Sila by the Chadian backed Sudanese rebel groups (SLA/JEM) throughout March and April 2006. Child soldiers were also identified among the Dadjo village defence groups, later trained by JEM.¹⁰⁵

In March 2006 rebel troops of Mahamat Nour (FUC) arrived in the border region of Dar Sila north of Wadi Kadja¹⁰⁶ and attacked the village of Modoyna. Violent combats between the FUC and the ANT then led to further displacement of the civilian population of that zone. During April 2006 the north of Wadi Kadja fell under rebel control. The rebel offensive against N'Djamena on 13 April 2006 was launched from that area. The FUC rebel troops passed Koukou-Angarana on 10 and 11 April before continuing to N'Djamena.¹⁰⁷

In April 2006 the government was unable to regain and secure the Dar Sila border region militarily (because it was busy securing the capital and the town of Abéché in eastern Chad). Consequently, the Dadjo self-defence groups were used as a small force that would detect rebel movements at an early stage and hamper the incursion of rebel troops. They were able to do this because the village self-defence forces started to receive modest support from the government¹⁰⁸ and the Sudanese armed opposition (JEM) loyal to the Chadian government. In JEM training camps the village defence groups were trained on the use of arms. Such camps allegedly had been placed near Adé, Koloy, Tiero, Djourlo, Kerfi and Am Kharouba.

¹⁰² Interviews with Dadjo informants, 16.04.2008 and 27.04.2008.

¹⁰³ See also Tubiana 2008b, 50.

¹⁰⁴ Interviews with Dadjo informants, 28.04.2008.

¹⁰⁵ United Nations Security Council 2007: 9. The report refers to two agreements between the Dadjo and the JEM (from September 2006) and between the Dadjo and the Zaghawa (from November 2006) both stipulating that in exchange for arms and training, Dadjo communities would provide "young" people to be trained. It has to be noted that the authenticity of the documentation of the cited agreements, which are available on the Internet, is controversial.

¹⁰⁶ This is an area that is cut off from the rest of the Dar Sila region during the rainy season by the Wadi Kadja.

¹⁰⁷ Even in June 2008 rebel colons crossed into Chad from the Dar Sila border region, where up to today Chadian armed opposition groups are present.

¹⁰⁸ HRW 2006b: 23.

From June to August 2006, Dadjo militias together with JEM troops are said to have sporadically clashed with Chadian armed opposition in the border region.¹⁰⁹

From May to June Janjawid militia incursions, systematic lootings and increasing insecurity in the region south of Bahr Azoum near Tissi at the Central African border made some thousand Chadians flee across the border into the area of Um Dukhun in West Darfur, Sudan.¹¹⁰ The number of IDPs in eastern Chad was at that time estimated at 50.000.¹¹¹

During the rainy season (June, July and August) tensions between the Dadjo and the Arab communities of the region increased. An attempted reconciliation in Daguessa that was undertaken on the initiative of the sub-prefect failed in June because important Arab leaders of the region refused to participate.¹¹² In July, several incidents occurred between Dadjo and Arab militias¹¹³. The Arab groups reported to have set up self-defence groups as a reaction to the aggression of the Dadjo militias and in order to defend themselves. They do not deny that they organized support from Arab groups from Sudan but reject links with the Janjawid.¹¹⁴ In late August the Arab village of Damkush near Dogdore was attacked by Dadjo militias leaving 16 inhabitants dead.

While the foundation of self-defence groups among the Dadjo and allied communities was first motivated by the lack of the state's protection and a necessity for self-defence, the militias later on seem to have used the situation in order to settle old bills with neighbouring Arab communities and the Waddaian and Mimi associated with them, especially in the region of Koukou-Angarana, south of the Bahr Azoum and around Tiero and Marena. Some interlocutors described the strategy of the Dadjo militias towards the Arabic groups as "terre brûlée".¹¹⁵ It is said that the former Sultan of Dar Sila, Saïd, opposed the anti-Arab actions of the Dadjo militias and tried to mediate between the groups. He was widely criticized for this by his own people who had already earlier mistrusted his position versus non-Dadjo communities and which among other things later led to his resignation as Dar Sila's Sultan. In September 2006 the Sultan Saïd was ordered to N'Djaména and held there for several weeks before returning to Goz Beïda. Some informants interpreted this as evidence for governmental support for the Dadjo militias and the government's interest in having them in

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Dadjo informants, 28.04.2008.

¹¹⁰ MSF 16.06.2006.

¹¹¹ UNHCR 06.06.2006.

¹¹² Interview with Sinyar informant, 22.04.2008.

¹¹³ We distinguish between Janjawid militias and Arab militias in order to differentiate between militia groups basically associated with Sudanese Arabs, Chadian Arabs and Chadian non-Arabs who do not originate from the Dar Sila region (Janjawid militias) and Arab militias formed by the Arab groups of Dar Sila as self-defence forces (Arab militias).

¹¹⁴ Interview with Arab leaders, 27./28.04. 2008.

¹¹⁵ Term that emerged from the discourse on the Darfur crises.

the area. They said that the government put pressure on the sultan in order to break his objection to the Dadjo militias.¹¹⁶

At the same time (September / October 2006) clashes between Dadjo militias and Arab communities, Waddaian and Mimi continued. *Feriks, damras* and Waddaian / Mimi villages were attacked by Dadjo militias between Koloy and Modoyna, south of Adé, around Koukou and south of Bahr Azoum. The increasing insecurity made several Arab communities leave Dar Sila for Sudan.

In October violence reached the region of Tiero and Marena, where a particularly strong Dadjo militia group was operating (attacks by Arabs on Djimeze 3.10., Marfakatal 03. / 04.10. and Tiero 08.10.; 9 killed, 13 wounded) and the southwestern part of Dar Sila in the area of Kerfi. There the Dadjo militias attacked a *ferik* called Amchamgari (13.10.; 17 killed, 7 wounded). It is said that this attack was done in retaliation for the attack of Arabs on Tiero earlier that month.¹¹⁷

On the 22 October 2006, the Chadian rebel coalition UFDD (*Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement*), which had just been created, entered the administrative capital of Goz Beïda holding it for several hours before continuing to Am Timan. The attack was seen as an attempt to disperse ANT from Adé and showed once more the inability of the government to control the Dar Sila region militarily at that time. Rebel groups remained in the area north of Wadi Kadja and installed themselves also in the region of Dogdoré and Daguessa.

In November Koloy was attacked four times on the 1st, 4th, 7th and 11th by Janjawid and Arab militias. These attacks were characterized by extreme brutality. One man was reported to have had his eyes pulled out with a bayonet and two women were said to have been tied and burnt alive in their hut.¹¹⁸ The last attack on Koloy led to the displacement of the entire village population to Adé (including the IDPs that gathered there, around 10.000 persons).

Throughout November fighting continued in the region of Kerfi. Several villages around Kerfi and between Kerfi and Koukou-Angarana (amongst others Bandiako, Argoutoulou, Tamajour, Djourlo, Louboutigue, Tedji, Arata, Sesebana) were targeted by Arab militias. It is estimated that up to 220 persons were killed.¹¹⁹ Those fighting included on the one side

¹¹⁶ Interview with Dadjo elders, 28.03.2008, and Arab representatives, 14.04.2008.

¹¹⁷ Interview with Arab leader, 19.04.2008.

¹¹⁸ HRW 2007: 55.

¹¹⁹ UNHCR 2006b.

Dadio militias sometimes allegedly supported by ANT forces and on the other side Janjawid allegedly joined by Arab militias from the area „followed“ by Chadian rebel forces.¹²⁰

Fighting continued in December despite the fact that a reconciliation initiative to settle the inter-community violence took place at the beginning of December. This initiative involved a governmental delegation comprising members of the Ministry of Interior, the Governor of Waddai,¹²¹ the Sultan of Waddai, and the Sultan of Dar Sila. The delegation travelled to Kerfi and met with the leaders of the conflicting communities (Dadio and allies vs. Arab population); discussed recent hostilities; and reached a reconciliation agreement (signed 3 December 2006). However, attacks on villages reoccurred in the region after that date and people felt that the reconciliation initiative had failed.¹²² The Governor of Waddai and the Sultan of Dar Sila continued reconciliation efforts by sensitization tours in Koukou-Angarana, after fighting between Arab and Dadio self-defence groups re-emerged in mid December. By the end of the year the UNHCR estimated the number of IDPs in eastern Chad at over 100.000.¹²³

2007

President Idriss Déby visited Dar Sila for ten days in January 2007, accompanied by a high ranking delegation including the Resident Minister¹²⁴ of Waddai, the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Solidarity. The President gathered all administrative and traditional authorities to announce reorganization of the area's security, the disarmament of all groups, and the support and assistance for the displaced people of Dar Sila. Following this Presidential visit, the Dar Sila Sultan Saïd stepped down and his son Brahim was chosen as his successor by a Dadio council of elders and ratified by the Minister of Interior. The sultan's resignation is said to have been the result of ongoing pressure from within his own Dadio community, which opposed the sultan's effort to seek conciliation with the region's Arab communities.

The CNT took Adé on 16 January and remained in the region north of Wadi Kadja as well as that of Adé, Dogdoré and Dagessa. This was an area from which the ANT had withdrawn most of its troops in late 2006 to reinforce other eastern areas following the October rebel offensive on Goz Beïda (22.10.) and the November rebel attack on Abéché (25.11.).

¹²⁰ Interview with IDP representatives, 16.04.2008.

¹²¹ At that time, Dar Sila administratively was a department of the Waddai region that is under the authority of the Waddai governor.

¹²² Interviews with IDP representatives, 16.04.2008.

¹²³ UNHCR 2007a.

¹²⁴ A Resident Minister is nominated by decree when a state of emergency is declared in a certain region in order to support the responsible governor. His assignment ends with the end of the state of emergency.

During February and March 2007 the activities of the Dadjo self-defence forces of Tiero and Marena increased. They targeted *feriks* and *damras* looting and stealing livestock belonging to these Arab communities. The Dadjo forces of the area operated with great brutality according to Waddaian accounts. They allegedly hung two Waddaians whom they had killed in trees for several days. According to other accounts they had been killed and the dead bodies had then been roasted over a fire.¹²⁵ The Dadjo, for their part, return the blame; accusing the Waddaian of having committed serious crimes that they cannot forgive, such as killing people by slitting their victims' bellies and removing organs.¹²⁶ On 20 March the village of Marena was attacked by Arab militias allegedly, supported by Janjawid militias, who were repulsed by the Dadjo militias. Eleven days later, Tiero and Marena were attacked by some hundred armed militia men in the early morning hours. The fighting involved several assaults throughout the day, with the majority of the local Dadjo self-defence units' members killed in the combat. More than 9.000 civilians fled to Habilé.¹²⁷ The rebel forces of Al-Djineidi (CNT) were reported involved in the fighting, supporting the Janjawid and Arab militias who led the attack, which in the last wave of fighting were supported by heavy arms and pick-ups. During this attack, the ANT, which was deployed in the near vicinity, offered no support to the Dadjo. The Dadjo self-defence militias basically disappeared from the scene after this engagement. Parts of it were later integrated into the ANT.¹²⁸

Apparently the government had never fully trusted its Dadjo ally against the rebel threat. Governmental support was granted late¹²⁹ and only light weapons, some ammunition and training through the JEM. Two factors might explain the government's mistrust of the Dadjo. The first is Déby's general fear of armed groups not belonging to his Zaghawa tribe (as they could easily turn against the government). Second, the Dadjo had tried to obtain arms and ammunition in order to enter the rebellion in 2001.

The support of the Sudanese armed opposition – namely JEM – for the Dadjo self-defence militias in form of training centres in Dar Sila was most likely motivated by JEM's need to recruit combatants for its fight against the Sudanese government. As has been said above, Sudanese rebel groups have recruited among both the refugee and IDP populations in Dar Sila. Actually, relations between the JEM and the Dadjo militias soured over the question of fighting in Sudan. According to our information the Dadjo were asked to fight with JEM in

¹²⁵ Interview with Waddaian representative, 27.04.2008.

¹²⁶ Interview with Dadjo, Kadakse and Moubi informants, 25.04.2008.

¹²⁷ UNHCR 2007b.

¹²⁸ Interview with Dadjo informant, 28.04.2008.

¹²⁹ It was only after the 13 April 2006 offensive on N'Djamena at a time, when the government was under high pressure to prevent further rebel incursions and not in a position to send troops to the border region (as they were needed to secure the capital and strategic towns such as Abéché) that governmental support for the Dadjo militias started.

Sudan, but refused as it was their primary goal to defend their people and villages in Dar Sila, and had no interest in fighting in Darfur.¹³⁰

The ANT conducted an offensive in April 2007 against CNT in Adé, Dogdoré and Daguessa and recaptured the two towns. The Adé and Daguessa garrisons were then reinforced by ANT troops and the CNT rebels pushed back to the north of Wadi Kadja. No further serious clashes between communities or attacks on Dadjo villages were reported in the region until present. However, from April 2007 onwards, Arab communities reported harassment and raids on their *ferik* and *damras* from government forces which led to further displacements of Arab groups to Sudan.¹³¹

Summary: Non-violent and violent conflicts

The pre-2003 to 2007 chronology shows that not all of the conflicts and tensions were violent. For the pre-2003 phase we demonstrated that certain non-violent conflicts co-occurred. They mainly involved two key issues:

- Strains arose in regard to the resource use of mainly water and pasture that led to land tenure and land appropriation uncertainties. So-called “first-comers” experienced conflict with “late-comers” whose integration into the existing system of land use was not accepted by all co-residing communities.
- Another key factor was the weakening power position of traditional authorities. This phenomenon has been caused by several factors. One is related to “first-comer” and “late-comer” communities as some of the latter evaded the authority of local and regional traditional leaders including the village and canton chiefs. Their position was further diminished by the nomination of new local leaders. At the same time the government’s efforts of decentralization fragmented former traditional power structures. Tensions were further aggravated because many of the civil authorities of public administration were perceived as incompetent, corrupt, and illegitimate.

The conflicts concerning these issues were on local and regional levels. The communities’ existing conflict management institutions were normally able to solve these disputes. However, when national and international violent conflicts impacted on regional and local conflict levels, existing conflict management strategies collapsed.

¹³⁰ Interview with Dadjo informant, 28.04.2008

¹³¹ Hancock / BBC 10.07.2007; Washington Post 23.09.2007.

Violent elements of conflict that occurred since 2001 included the following:

- In 2001 Dadjo elite leaders founded a rebellion recruiting large numbers of mainly young Dadjo behind them. Based in the border area of Chad, Sudan and Central African Republic, this rebellion launched several attacks against governmental positions raising insecurity in those areas until 2003. The turn of Dadjo to rebellion raised central government suspicions against them.
- In 2003 the Darfur conflict violently escalated. With the installation of Sudanese refugees in the Chadian border area violence spilled across the border raising insecurity through cross-border incursions by Janjawid militias. Like in the Darfur conflict, Janjawid militias targeted primarily non-Arab communities while Arab groups were spared. This led to inter-communal mistrust and ethnic polarization in the region.
- By the end of 2005 the Chadian armed opposition had gathered in the western border area of Sudan, launching operations on Chadian territory such as the attack on Adré in December. Responding to the threat posed by the Chadian rebellion, the government withdrew its troops from the Sudanese border in order to secure main centres in eastern Chad such as Abéche, Adré and Goz Beïda. Subsequently Janjawid attacks in the border region multiplied and spread further inland provoking a first wave of population displacement that made more than 50'000 leave their home areas until June 2006.
- With the presence of rebel groups in the border area of Dar Sila insecurity further increased from March 2006 onwards. Fighting between them and ANT as well as seemingly coordinated attacks of rebel troops and Janjawid militias on mostly Dadjo communities led to displacement of the population in the border area of Dar Sila.
- In the course of increasing violence, the Sila communities divided into two major camps: i) Dadjo and communities linked to them by historical ties, intermarriage and shared lifestyles (Mouro, Kadjakse, Sinyar etc.) and ii) Arab communities. In the absence of the state's armed forces, the two camps formed self-defence groups. It has to be noted that this division did not clearly follow the polarization pattern of 'Africans' vs 'Arabs' because the Waddaian and Mimi communities¹³², who are non-

¹³² Waddaian and Mimi have close cultural links with some Arab tribes from their places of origin. See glossary for further details.

Arab communities joined the side of the Arabs in Dar Sila. They are said to have suddenly resigned from traditional defence pacts with their non-Arab neighbours and were thereafter perceived as accomplices of the Janjawid.

Armament and training of these self-defence groups, allegedly given by the Chadian government and/or Sudanese armed opposition movements (namely JEM) to the Dadjo militias and by Janjawid support to local Arabs, resulted in large scale inter-communal fighting involving the whole region of Dar Sila in late 2006 and the beginning of 2007. The number of IDPs in the region doubled in this second wave of displacement. By the end of 2006 the IDP population was estimated at over 100.000.

When suddenly faced with national and international organized violence, local communities were overwhelmed by the extent of violence and lacked the conflict mediation practices that could deal with national and international actors. Unable to solve the problems in their immediate local environment, suffering terribly from violence, large parts of the Sila population (non-Arabs and Arabs alike) decided to leave their home areas and to displace.

2.2 Analysis of conflicts

Analysis of the chronology of events just presented supports the finding that the Dar Sila violence between 2003 and 2007 occurred on local, regional, national and international levels (see Figure. 2). It was further found that certain of the conflicts that led to violence or that reinforced it occurred *within* one level ('intra-level' conflicts), while others occurred *between* levels ('inter-level' conflicts).




Figure 2: Conflict levels.

We define the *local level* as composed of local communities of villages and camps of herders and farmers within a distinct ecological zone (see Figure 3).



Figure 3: Local level.

The *regional level* consists of the whole area of Dar Sila or, administratively speaking, the newly created Department of Kimiti (see Figure 4).




Figure 4: Regional level.

The *national level* is the territory within which the Chadian state is found and in which the central government operates.

Finally, the *international level* comprises other independent nations (the Sudan and the Central African Republic) bordering the Dar Sila region; any other foreign state actor (such as the Janjawid); or any international organization (such as the EUFOR, UNHCR, the World Bank, etc.). We distinguish between ‚higher‘ (national and international) and ‚lower‘ (local and regional) conflict levels.

To facilitate the methodological disentanglement of the chronology of conflict evolution, we now evaluate the different levels of conflict by classifying them within the categories of the multilevel scheme presented above.

Local conflict level

Pressure on the natural resources of Dar Sila grew, especially since the 1980s, with migration from the northern regions of Chad. This provoked land tenure tensions between different herders and farmers. These problems mainly occurred between individuals in the villages or cattle camps of a local community. Hence, they were on a local level. The ignoring by certain ‚new-comers‘ of local authorities and the nomination of new local leaders led to a deterioration of traditional authority structures which on a local level meant the loss of trust between neighbouring populations. This happened with regards to the relationship between the Dadjo and Waddaian communities when the latter stopped paying taxes to the Dadjo *chefs the canton and chefs de village* and, instead, paid their taxes directly to the sultan.

Suspicion increased even more, when traditional forms of alliances suddenly were repudiated by Arab, Waddaian and Mimi communities. This included the refusal of support to Dadjo villagers against their Arab attackers. Waddaian and Mimi neighbours apparently withdrew this aid as early as the first reported border region Janjawid attacks. Furthermore, Dadjo and Mouro reported that at one point before the violence escalated, their Arab neighbours asked for their women and cereal stocks back from the Dadjo villagers. At that point it became clear that formerly existing alliances were no longer intact, a fact that suggests that local community conflict had grown and was now on a regional level, ethnic polarization spreading throughout the whole of Dar Sila.

Finally, the influx of Arabs in the border region (at the end of 2004) led at first to tensions (non-violent conflict) on a local level apparently because of land distribution questions and the armament of the returning Arab groups.

Regional conflict level

The conflict over local leadership legitimacy reached the regional level when the sultan and other regional authorities became involved in it. Decentralization efforts of the government reinforced the weakening of traditional authorities. The accusations made against administrative authorities describing them as incompetent because they often originated from regions other than Dar Sila furthermore demonstrates a link between regional and national conflict level as the public administration personnel represents the link to the central government.

The succession dispute among the Nowaibe Arabs described in the preceding chronology was at first a local intra-community conflict, but quickly became regional when Dadjo leaders intervened and tried to influence the choice of the successor in order to gain more power on a regional level. The Nowaibe by seeking support of the Sudanese Janjawid in the succession row brought elements of international conflict level to the regional conflict.

Violent conflict on the regional level also took place between members of the Dadjo community and Waddaian (killing of a Dadjo leader from the region) and Dadjo and Arab communities (attacks on Arab villages south of Adé committed by Dadjo self-defence groups) in early 2006.

National conflict level

On a national level, tensions rose when parts of the Dadjo community in 2001 participated in a 2001 rebellion led by the Dadjo political elite. Dadjo politicians had openly accused the government of ignoring Dadjo for local and regional political positions and giving them to Zaghawa and Goran, who were widely perceived as incompetent.

Additionally, the Chadian government's attempts to win back the Chadian Arabs in Sudan (in 2005), which was partly successful, has to be understood as a national conflict level because the government therewith tried to prevent their participation in the Chadian rebellion that was organizing itself on the other side of the border or – on an international level – alliances between Chadian Arabs and Janjawid militias supporting the Chadian rebellion.

The armament / training and disarmament of groups belongs to the national conflict level as it was reported to have been executed by the central government. Informants claimed that the government tried to compensate its inability to secure the border in order to protect its citizens from Janjawid attacks by arming and training certain ethnically based "self-defence" forces, which it used as militia to hamper rebel incursion. Complementary, it is said that the government tried to disarm Chadian Arab groups, which it feared could join the Chadian rebellion. Armament and training, however, have an international component, too, because the Sudanese ally of the Chadian government, the Sudanese armed opposition, reportedly undertook the training of the Dadjo self-defence groups; while the local Dar Sila Arab self-defence groups allegedly received support from the Janjawid in Sudan.

Tensions on a national political level rose when President Déby had changed the constitution in order to be able to run for a third term in office. This led to mass defections from the national army and an increased inflow of Chadians into rebellion, which strengthened the Chadian rebel movements.

The installation of Chadian rebel troops north of Wadi Kadja in the region around Modoyna (that is on Chadian territory), led to the intensification of violent conflict on a national level (intra-level fighting of RDL rebels against ANT).

According to our informants, the national army was also engaged in fighting alongside Dadjo militias when attacking Arab villages. And Chadian rebels allegedly supported Arab militias when attacking Dadjo villages. Provided that this information is correct, then in these cases national actors (ANT, Chadian armed opposition) have crossed into and participated in regional conflict. Further examples were the March / April 2007 attacks on Tiero and Marena. The villages were said to have been attacked because they possessed a very strong local Dadjo militia, who provoked clashes with the neighbouring Arab communities. This regional actor functioned at the same time on a national conflict level as an agent of the government (the Dadjo militias were reportedly used by the government as an early warning unit detecting rebel movements in the area). They were targeted as national level actors by the Chadian armed opposition in local level fighting.

International or transnational conflict level

The 2003 outbreak of the Darfur conflict, in conjunction with the Chadian government's troops combat with the Chadian armed opposition, substantially worsened the security situation in eastern Chad. The circulation of arms and armed groups in this area led to a

situation of general insecurity. Violent conflict on the international level then occurred in the Dar Sila region in form of cross-border incursions of Janjawid militias from Sudan. These attacks and thefts of livestock basically targeted the non-Arab communities and spared the Arab communities sowing inter-communal mistrust. Allegedly Janjawid and / or Chadian rebels then asked local communities to rally with them threatening communities with severe sanctions should they decide against joining them. Speculations on who accepted or refused this proposition enhanced suspicion and fear among the local communities. In search for protection they formed alliances that divided the local population in two camps: Dadjo, Kadjakse, Mouro, Sinyar etc. vs. Arabs, Waddaian and Mimi. International violent conflict thus created at first local and regional non-violent conflict (tensions and intercommunal mistrust) and later on local and regional violent conflict (fighting of militia groups).

At the same time, the international conflict level influenced the national conflict level as the shared aim of destabilizing the Chadian government led to the coalition of Janjawid militias and Chadian armed opposition groups such as the CNT. As the Sudanese government seemed to further support Chadian rebels, the Chadian government reinforced support for the Sudanese opposition. As international actor the JEM, part of the Sudanese armed opposition, operated on a national conflict level in that it became an ally of the Chadian government that was active on a regional level when training the Dadjo militias in Dar Sila.

The meeting described in the chronology section between the Janjawid and / or the Chadian rebellion and a delegation of Dadjo from Djimeze shows the interaction between the international and the regional level. Two actors belonging to the international conflict level, that is Janjawid militias and Chadian rebel groups both operating from Sudan and with the support of the Sudanese government (what makes even the Chadian rebels an international actor rather than a national one) ask local actors (members of the Dadjo community of the village of Djimeze) representing the Dadjo on a regional level to ally with them. By threatening them with severe sanctions in the case they should not collaborate, they express their willingness to provoke conflict on a local and regional level. Their motivation of doing so has yet to be seen as interests on the international level. The Chadian rebels are basically interested in destabilizing the national government of Chad, which would be on a national level. By accepting support from the Sudanese government and operating from its territory, however, they entered the international conflict level. The meeting had two effects on the regional level: one, attacks on Dadjo villages in the region increased and, two, Dadjo mobilised and reorganized their village defence-groups.

Intra- and inter-level conflicts

What becomes clear in reviewing the different levels of conflict is that certain conflicts have had effects on several levels. The weakening of traditional authorities on one hand was caused by local misunderstandings and ignorance of existing structures by new-comers, on a regional level by ambiguities concerning the sultan's position towards Arab and other non-Dadio communities and on a national level by the employment of incompetent or foreign administrative personnel in Dar Sila. Taking the example of the successor conflict of the Arab Nowaibe, tensions arose on a regional level, whereas the solution of those tensions was sought by the Arabs on an international level.

The Chadian armed opposition acted on a national level intention by pursuing the aim to overthrow the Chadian government, acting on a regional level by attacking the border region and sowing insecurity in the border area and holding on to assistance on an international level by allying to Sudanese militia, acting with the support from Sudan's (and/or Central African) government.

Critically, international and national conflict raised the level of violence in local and regional levels to grim heights. Repeated cross border Janjawid attacks caused terrible violence in local communities that quickly spread throughout the region of Dar Sila. Repeated Janjawid attacks turned Dadjo against Arabs, Waddaians and Mimi who then proceeded first locally and then regionally to fight against each other. The struggle between Chad's central government and the various rebel militias that was played out in Dar Sila increased the violence in local communities or throughout the region, with those supporting rebels at risk from the central government and those supporting the government from those supporting the rebels.

Three findings follow from the above:

1. That higher level conflict provoked lower level conflict in Dar Sila between 2003 and 2007;
2. That different conflict levels influence each other; meaning that to ease or solve the complex conflict situation affecting Dar Sila, each of those levels has to be considered;
3. Conversely, that actions on one level (such as that of local communities) will not be sufficient to address the problem of Dar Sila violence.

3 State of conflict mediation and voluntary return

Since the last outbreak of inter-communal violence in Dar Sila in the first half of 2007, the security situation especially concerning militia attacks seems to have improved but is still far from being stable. This is especially true because of the latest combats between the Chadian army and armed opposition that took place in the Dar Sila region – as in other parts of eastern Chad - in June 2008.¹³³ Furthermore, no effective conflict mediation process has been launched and no regional reconciliation has been achieved. Neighbouring communities continue to eye one another with deep distrust, which adds to volatility in everyday life and the potential for a relapse into violence.

When violence escalated in the Dar Sila region, widespread insecurity resulted; and displacement occurred either after attacks on villages and as a preventive measure to prevent such attacks from occurring. IDPs will not return to insecure places. Consequently, the restoration of security is a critically important condition for IDPs returning to their villages of origin. As this condition is currently not fulfilled, return movements are still insignificant.

Presently only the displaced populations originating from villages in the Kerfi area, and to a lesser extend from villages around Koukou-Angarana, indicate a will to return. IDPs originating from the border region of Wadi Kadja as well as those having fled from villages south of Wadi Bahr Azoum currently do not consider returning, given the still tense security situation and the presence of armed groups in their regions of origin.

If people return, there are different strategies of going back to the villages of origin and of reinstallation. Most IDPs report sending some members of their family to evaluate the security situation, who, if conditions seem favourable, begin to cultivate their fields. Other IDPs organize just the young men of their village of origin for these tasks. Only a few IDP households return to their places of origin with the entire displaced family. Generally, return is only envisaged when security information of the places of origin is known. Families do not relinquish the safety of IDP camps for the peril of fought over places.

Interestingly, the re-establishment of security is not always seen as linked with conflict resolution. For some informants it would be sufficient to install armed government forces or EUFOR soldiers (as substitute for the national army) in their home villages and - should they succeed in providing security - they would return. Others gave the disarmament of all ethnic groups in the region as a condition for return.

¹³³ Capture of Goz Beïda by AN (Alliance Nationale) rebel forces on 14 June 2008, combats north of Goz Beïda and Daguessa on 15 June 2008.

Nevertheless, the majority of informants indicate that dialogue with neighbouring communities leading to a reconciliation agreement is a prerequisite for a peaceful cohabitation in their home areas. For some a reconciliation process on a local level would be sufficient, for others reconciliation efforts need to comprise all conflict actors including those on a regional, national and even international level. The latter informants stress that any regional reconciliation attempt would have to involve the predominantly Arab communities, who left Dar Sila for the Sudan in 2006 and 2007, and that regional stability can not be achieved without them.

With regard to the question of who would be an appropriate conflict mediator, informants identify traditional and administrative authorities as major actors and expect the application of traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution in conjunction with state law. The tendency to demand combined action by traditional and state authorities can be interpreted as a desire to broadly shore up conflict mediation and to ensure wide legitimacy for the results of the negotiation process by including all influential actors on a local level. The logic here appears to be: The more authorities there are involved, the more respected the judgement would be. Additionally, the international community is named as a possible mediator and witness in such negotiations. These informants are indicating by their statements that they recognize Chad's legal system to exhibit a legal pluralism, by which it is meant that a number of conflict resolution organizations co-exist. There are 'traditional', Islamic, and formal Chadian conflict resolution practices and informants indicate that the mediators will have to include practitioners of all these practices.

The rehabilitation of village infrastructures and regional development are conditions, which are commonly seen as necessary measures for durable return and restoration of living conditions but only after the security situation would have stabilized.¹³⁴

3.1 Mechanisms of conflict mediation and resolution

An important finding that has to be highlighted is that people feel baffled by the extent of the violence that escalated in their region. When the team asked displaced and resident populations about the sources of conflict in Dar Sila many informants stated suspicions of political manipulations but could not identify what actually caused the outbreak of extreme violence between groups that had cohabited peacefully for years and even centuries. This

¹³⁴ For further reading on IDPs willingness, expectations and conditions for return see UNHCR / Diagne et al. 2007: 42ff.

confusion on the side of the informants is significant, because it is important to understand conflict causes, dynamics and actors in order to be able to solve existing conflicts. If the reasons for conflict and its actors are not known, it is difficult for the affected groups to launch a process of effective conflict resolution. If conflicts are not resolved, insecurity and the potential for more violence persist.

As described above our informants called for the application of existing conflict resolution mechanisms, led by traditional and state authorities, in order to address the inter-communal violence that escalated in Dar Sila. They do so because these are the means at their disposal on a local and regional level, which have worked before in minor crises such as conflicts around fields destroyed by animals etc.

Conflict resolution mechanisms led by local leaders (*sultan, chef de canton, chef de village, cheikh*) usually follow the pattern of bringing the representatives of all conflicting parties together, hearing the case, discussing responsibilities, identifying the damages and losses suffered and fixing compensations for them. Mediation efforts aim at assuring compensation and consensus rather than punishing perpetrators through imprisonment. They are based on a collective willingness for conciliation and peaceful cohabitation and apply on a local or regional level. By holding the whole community responsible for offences and criminal acts committed by individual members of the group, the moral obligation towards the community assures obedience to the sentence. If perpetrators are not identifiable, unwilling to conciliate and heavily armed, these mechanisms of conflict mediation cannot be applied. In these cases local authorities demand the inclusion of state institutions like the police and courts in order to restore law and order. Yet, in the case of Dar Sila, local authorities deplore the lack of judicial state institutions on a local and regional level, the state of impunity for members of certain ethnic groups and express a general mistrust towards state jurisdiction that they perceive as corrupt and only following own interests.

The Chadian judicial system, which is a legal pluralism, is predicated upon the assumption that legal services are available to and accessible by each citizen. In theory services are meant to be provided under the responsibility of a professional judge (*juge de paix*) installed in each sub-prefecture and under the supervision of the nearest court. If no professional judge is available, a credible person that has undergone some juridical training or the sub-prefect can be appointed as *juge de paix*. The *juge de paix* is authorised to judge cases of civil law (e.g. bride price, inheritance, debt, adoption, determination of paternity and arrangements of child support etc.) as well as criminal law (e.g. bodily harm, tax fraud, falsification of documents etc.). Serious offences are directly transferred to the nearest

court.¹³⁵ In practise, however, the position of *juge de paix* is rarely filled on the level of the sub-prefecture.

Further institutions for addressing conflict that operate on a local level are the *Comités Mixtes*. These mixed committees comprise representatives of agricultural and pastoral communities and aim at mediating local conflicts arising between communities e.g. during transhumance. They are supervised by state as well as traditional authorities and use the same mediation techniques (hearing, evaluation, compensation) as applied by traditional authorities. Lacking financial support and necessary infrastructure, the Mixed Committees face difficulties in fulfilling the tasks assigned to them.

Religious clerics such as *imams* and *marabouts*, too, play a role in conflict mediation and resolution. They commonly function as advisers in traditional conflict mediation processes. A nationwide religious institution of the religious domain is the Islamic Committee (*Comité Islamique*). Its members work on a local and regional level and can intervene as main mediators in cases of conflict. Yet, they are more often consulted for advice in conflict mediation led by traditional and state authorities.

A national governmental structure created by decree in 1993 in order to intervene in cases of conflict between Chadian citizens and the government or its administration is the National Mediator (*Médiateur National*). He is mandated to restore social and political peace in times of crises. He acts on instruction of the Prime Minister or the President and intervenes as conciliator in the name of the government. The National Mediator has so far primarily operated on a national level reunifying opposition groups with the government. However, his office suffers from a mal-defined mandate and the lack of visibility of its institution on a regional and local level.¹³⁶

3.2 Initiatives of reconciliation and outcomes

The attempts that have been made to address and reduce the escalating inter-communal violence in Dar Sila, fall into five categories:

- i) Interventions by local and regional state representatives (governor, prefect, sub-prefect)

¹³⁵ See Roasngar 2007.

¹³⁶ CEFOD 2006: 9ff.

- ii) Central governmental engagement (visits of high ranking government delegations, convocations of traditional and local state authorities)
- iii) Reconciliation initiatives by traditional authorities (sultan, canton chief, *chef de tribu* etc.)
- iv) Joined initiatives by state representatives, traditional authorities and religious leaders
- v) Attempts to launch a dialogue by the UNHCR.

The first category includes visits of the governor, prefect and/or sub-prefect to villages and regions in order to ease mounting tensions between communities (preventive measures) and visits to a region or village after it faced outbreaks of violence (e.g. attacks on villages in the border region of Wadi Kadja) in order to assess the situation, talk to local leaders (e.g. village chiefs, *chefs de tribu*, religious leaders etc.), and eventually bring conflicting parties together. In both cases local state representatives did not succeed in their endeavour to calm inter-communal violence in Dar Sila. Their failure can be attributed to the fact that they are often perceived as illegitimate leaders within the local society. As such they lack the legitimacy and authority that conflict mediators need in order to bring conflicting parties together and arbitrate in acute conflict. In June 2006, for instance, the sub-prefect of Mogororo tried to reconcile non-Arab and Arab communities of the region. The initiative failed because important representatives (such as the ones of the Arab Mahariye) refused to participate in the meeting, while other leaders declined to swear on the Quran as a sign of respect for the conciliation agreement reached.¹³⁷

The mediation initiatives launched by the central government (second category) like visits of high ranking governmental delegations (including visits by members of parliament, members of the Ministry of Interior, and even Ministers and the Chadian President) are perceived by local leaders to be short term measures to gain control in the region, to weaken or change unwanted leaders, but lacking in the political will to forge durable conflict resolution. Traditional leaders commonly describe the Dar Sila violence as a political problem and claim political manipulations by the central government as one of the main sources of conflicts in the region. This makes the government an actor in the conflicts, rather than an unbiased conflict mediator. The resignation of Sultan Saïd following the visit of President Déby in January 2007 is commonly given as an example to illustrate this claim. The convocation of traditional and administrative authorities to Biltine in November 2007 is seen in the same light.

¹³⁷ Interview with Arab fraction chief, 28.04.2008.

Traditional leaders insist that they were trying to ease rising tensions between neighbouring communities during the escalation of violence in Dar Sila, which they did by holding meetings with community leaders (category three). Yet at a certain point they reported having felt overcome by the extent of violence that ravaged in Dar Sila, which they judged as far beyond their customary means of conflict resolution. Because important conditions (e.g. identification of perpetrators, mutual will for reconciliation, respect for reached reconciliation agreements etc.) for applying traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution were not met, they felt powerless with regard to ending violence and conflict. They referred to the state and its responsibility to protect its citizens from attacks by organized, armed groups. The local population, however, does not share this perception. Interlocutors deplored the lack of initiative by traditional authorities and especially the sultan in ending violence by a regional reconciliation process. Particularly in the eastern border region around Dogdoré and Daguessa, informants complained about the fact that the Dar Sila Sultan never visited the area after raids and attacks on villages and accused him of not having fulfilled his role.

Reconciliation processes that were launched and led by mixed delegations comprising traditional, religious and state authorities (category 4) such as the one held in Kerfi and Koukou Angarana (December 2006) succeeded in bringing local community leaders together and made them agree on reconciliation documents. Yet, violence occurred in both areas after the reconciliation was agreed on by local leaders. A fact that leads to the assumption that violent conflict occurred on more than just the local level and involved more than just local actors. However, it led local communities to accusing one another of not having respected the agreement and mutual mistrust instead of conciliation.

Finally, two meetings that were meant to start a dialogue on reconciliation initiated by UNHCR (category five) took place in Abéché (October 2007) and Louboutigué (March 2008). The Abéché workshop was widely perceived to have failed because of its over-regional dimension. Interlocutors complained about the fact that leaders from all along the eastern border were invited and that they did not want to conflate cases and discuss the Dar Sila violence together with that of Dar Tama. Additionally, they criticised that there was no follow up on the workshop recommendations and that no projects or programmes sustained the dialogue afterwards. In the more recent meeting in Louboutigué traditional authorities, civil administration and representatives of IDPs and Arab populations were brought together for the first time ever since the violent clashes. This meeting was seen as a valuable initiative but was judged to be a one shot attempt at reconciliation without the necessary follow up. Informants did not question the involvement of the international community. On the contrary, given the perception of lack of initiative from the government and traditional authorities, they

ask for the involvement of international organizations as catalyst for dialogue and as neutral observers.

The review of past reconciliation attempts suggests that even if some of the mentioned initiatives might have had positive impacts in some cases, they did not lead to an overall regional pacification process in Dar Sila. This is so because existing traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have been overwhelmed and have turned out to be inapplicable in the escalation of regional violence in Dar Sila. The absence of the state in restoring law and order and the perceived illegitimacy of state representatives further contributed to the current situation; which is one where nobody quite knows how to address the past violence, solve its causes, and prevent their future reoccurrence.

Another finding is that conflict resolution in Dar Sila - as elsewhere in Chad - is based upon legal pluralism. Conflict resolution institutions and social practices from different domains (traditional society, religion, state) co-exist and intermingle in conflict mediation and resolution processes. So far there is only little information available on the circumstances under which constellations of legal pluralism contribute to or reduce legal insecurity and social and political conflict. A better understanding of the potential of legal pluralism in this regard, however, would be necessary in order to make it serve as basis of effective conflict resolution strategies.

In order to elaborate on what can be done so as to change this situation of stagnation with regard to conflict mediation and resolution, our final chapter will present our recommendations that have been developed on the basis of our analysis.

II Recommendations

As our analysis has shown, different yet intertwined conflict levels have caused the escalation of violence in Dar Sila. Consequently, all those levels have to be addressed in conflict mediation and resolution. No durable reconciliation can be achieved without a multilevel approach. This is not to say that interventions on a local level have to be deemed fruitless. Yet, they have to be accompanied by efforts on a national and international level by way of political interventions and have to be framed by long-term strategies for national reconciliation.

Below our recommendations with regard to accompanying a regional reconciliation process are presented. First the recommendations are offered, followed by a rationale justifying them. Recommendations 1 to 5 present general reflections as regards to the reconciliation process. They are followed by recommendations for practical interventions on a short, medium and long term basis (6 to 11).

1. Security needs to be re-established in Dar Sila.

Rationale: Without security there is little likelihood of reconciliation, because if opponents do not see other ways of settling conflict than using violence, if they do not regain trust in the state, if security forces remain unavailable for separating conflicting parties, if impunity persists, they will continue to fight each other. Then life continues insecure dominated by interpersonal and inter-communal mistrust. Obviously, re-establishment of security in Dar Sila is a state responsibility.

2. Development interventions alone are not sufficient to produce reconciliation.

Rationale: The report finds opponents in local areas of Dar Sila fight to secure resources. These resources may be water, pasture, arable land, political advantage etc. Development interventions in the presence of insecurity accelerate insecurity because the intervention provides another resource, prompting opponents to utilize violence to acquire it. If new resources are distributed in manners deemed illegitimate, then pre-existing tensions between communities will be intensified. This assertion is illustrated by the existence of tensions in Dar Sila between IDP/refugee communities and the host population provoked because IDP/refugee communities receive more humanitarian assistance in the form of food, water, health services, education etc.. It is thus important to decrease insecurity, to explicitly address conflict mediation in Dar Sila and to outline strategies for reconciliation on a local, regional and national level that complement to development interventions judged by different communities to be equitable.

3. Re-establishment of security must involve removal, or mitigation, of international and national level conflicts.

Rationale: First, an important finding of this study is that there are four levels of local, regional, national and international conflict in Dar Sila. A further important finding is that international and national conflicts exacerbate local and regional conflicts. This means that if international and national conflicts are not greatly reduced, insecurity will remain prevalent in Dar Sila.

As a consequence, efforts have to be made in national and international arenas in order to find political solutions for the crises originating on these levels that intensify conflict on regional and local levels. Such solutions would include diplomatic interventions to i) create a political will for durable conflict resolution on a national level, ii) convince the Chadian government to enter into negotiation with the armed and civil opposition, including the civil society, over questions of power-sharing, iii) address and relax the international clash between Chad and Sudan, and iv) aim at politically solving the Darfur conflict in Sudan.

4. The role of EUFOR, and other western military forces, needs to be continually monitored.

Rationale: The solutions to the conflicts effecting Dar Sila at the international and national levels are ultimately political. The logic of introducing Western troops into the central African region is that neither Chad nor Sudan is able to politically resolve these debates and that, hence, for humanitarian reasons Western troops need to be introduced to stabilize the situation.

This is a risky logic. There are two problems with it. The first problem is general and is that introduction of foreign troops into existing conflicts has been known to intensify those conflicts. One thinks of the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s. More recently, one thinks of the U.S. 2007 intervention in Somalia. There a rough peace had been introduced. However, the U.S. disapproved of the Somalia actors who controlled the central government. It supported an Ethiopian invasion of the country, which involved the direct use of American airpower. The result is that Somalia is back to a state of extensive, violent, insecurity.

The second problem pertains to the specifics of the Chadian conflict. Attitudes towards EUFOR vary. IDPs and resident populations in Dar Sila, suffering from continuing insecurity, express high hopes for EUFOR, hoping it will provide them with direct physical protection. They see EUFOR as substitute for the state. Other politically active segments of the Chadian population regard EUFOR with suspicion. This is because it is viewed to have 'taken a side', that of the Chadian government. The opposition has already declared that they believe

EUFOR to be biased in favour of the President. This means that should EUFOR perform military operations, it might be the case that it will suffer counter-attacks. EUFOR might respond in kind, provoking still further counter-attacks. EUFOR should be ended if such escalation obtains, as it would have become an additional source of insecurity in the Dar Sila region.

5. It is recommended that questions of disarmament be dealt with at the national level by a national committee for conflict mediation and reconciliation.

Rationale: IDPs in Dar Sila tend to be especially concerned that all communities of the region be disarmed. Certainly, a long term aim is disarmament of fighters in Dar Sila. However, under current insecure conditions this is not likely to occur. Indeed, the current situation is one of stagnation with regards to conflict resolution. Acute large scale inter-communal violence has stopped (at least for the moment), but no successful regional reconciliation of conflicting communities has been achieved so far in Dar Sila. Communities continue to distrust each other. Furthermore, armed opposition groups remain in the area enhancing the risk of fighting with ANT troops and increasing insecurity.

There are two concerns about disarmament in the short term. The first is that it will be perceived as an attempt to make people defenceless – in an unstable situation in which the need for self-defence is high – and thus will be resisted. The second is that if disarmament is performed by central government or EUFOR troops, it will further harden opposition to the central government and EUFOR. Disarmament is a long term problem. We suggest attempts to disarm Chadian citizens prior to the return of security are utopian.

We propose that a national institution or national committee be created to address long term issues of reconciliation. We believe that it should be given the responsibility to develop policy concerning disarmament. This committee is discussed in recommendation 11.

Short, Medium, and Long Term Recommendations

Interventions are implemented to have effects over short, medium, and long-terms. *Short term* interventions are those whose benefits are intended to commence during an initial period of project funding. *Medium term* interventions are those whose benefits might be planned during an initial project funding period but which are intended to commence during a second, follow-up period. *Long term* interventions' benefits might begin immediately, but involve attainment of complex goals which requires donor commitment to extensive, multiple periods of funding.

Short-term interventions:

6. Support is recommended for mixed reconciliation committees (Comités Mixtes), the Islamic Committee (Comité Islamique) and judges (juge de paix) in Dar Sila.

Rationale: These are the existing conflict mediating and resolution structures and personnel in the Dar Sila local population that include 'traditional', religious and state authorities. Their capacities need to be enhanced. Two ways this can be done is by providing them with financial and logistical support. We suggest providing remuneration and transportation (motorbikes) to these actors in the areas of Dar Sila most touched by conflict.

Furthermore, this study found that traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution can be effective on a local and regional level if certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions include the ability to identify perpetrators, presence of a shared will among opposing parties for conflict resolution and respect for the legitimacy of any decision. If these conditions are not met, then 'traditional' mechanisms of conflict resolution do not work. During times of high violence such as that just occurred in Dar Sila it becomes difficult to know who perpetrated what crime; there is a desire for vengeance, not conflict resolution; and all decisions are viewed as illegitimate. Under such conditions, the first order of business is restoring the rule of law and re-establishing the legitimacy of legal institutions. Often this is a function of the national government. There is a problem here.

'Traditional' leaders and the local population in the Dar Sila tend to be suspicious of state actors who they accuse of being corrupt and ineffective. It would thus be mandatory to create confidence and enhance cooperation between actors in 'traditional' (village chief, *cheikh*, canton chief, sultan, *imam* etc.) and state conflict resolution (*juges de paix*). Joint capacity building programmes and workshops would be short term measures to achieve this goal. On a medium term basis, the overall improvement of judicial state services on a local and regional level has to be envisaged (see recommendation 10).

7. Support is recommended for one conflict mediator (CM) and a technical assistant in Dar Sila.

Rationale: It is envisioned that the CM and the technical assistant would be trained professionals. They would have at least a master's level of education, and both training in, and practical experience of, conflict resolution. The CM would be a Chadian.

The CM would have four functions. i) The first is to directly intervene and provide mediation services in important conflicts. ii) The second is to provide assistance to local reconciliation

and development cooperatives (see recommendation 8 below), *juges de paix*, *Comité Islamique* and *Comités Mixtes* in their interventions. iii) The third is to compile an inventory of conflicts that includes understanding of their causes and what was done that led to their peaceful or non-peaceful resolution. This third function is crucial because it provides information necessary to predict when and where conflict will occur as well as that about what actions reduce or enhance conflict. iv) The fourth function would be to issue an annual report predicting future conflicts and suggesting strategy and tactics for mitigating these. The CM's third and fourth functions would use knowledge of past conflicts to formulate judgments about prevention of future conflicts.

The budget for this intervention would include the salaries for the two personnel and their logistical costs. It should be noted that senior conflict mediators are scarce and valued, their remuneration reflects this.

8. Support is recommended for the founding of local community reconciliation and development cooperatives (RDCs).

Rationale: Between 2003 and 2007 there has been local, regional, national, and internationalised violence occurring in the region. Such violence is unprecedented. Existing conflict resolution mechanisms – such as performed by religious specialists, village elders, pastoral elders and actors like the *juges de paix*, *Comités Mixtes* and the *Islamic Committee* – have simply been overwhelmed. Nobody quite knows how to solve the conflicts. Thus, a new institution is required for local communities to address this situation. There are recommendations from Dar Sila national NGOs that development cooperatives should be initiated at village levels; that reconciliation cooperatives be developed; and that these be organized at a regional level.¹³⁸

We believe these are useful recommendations. However, we advise certain amplifications. First, no village is an island unto itself. Rather, they are units of local communities organized around some ecological feature (a Wadi, especially fertile soil, etc.) in which there are other villages and pastoralist camps. All local communities have their particularities; almost all have more-pastoral and more-agricultural people in residence. Local communities are the places where local level conflicts are most likely to originate. For this reason we suggest that local communities, not villages, be the basis for RDCs.

Second, most of the time herders and farmers live in symbiosis in local communities. This has become more difficult due to migration into the region, land tenure and land distribution disputes and the general level of violence. Hence, we believe that when development

¹³⁸ See e.g. ADS 2007 and COP.SILA 2007.

interventions are planned for local communities these are done in a spirit of increasing the complementarities of herding and farming life styles. It is for this reason that we recommend the RDCs have both reconciliation and development responsibilities.

Third, we suggest that the local community RDCs be managed on a regional level by the CM and his or her technical assistant. Further, that the Dar Sila organization of RDCs be part of a national institution or committee for conflict mediation and reconciliation (see recommendation 11). However, the goal of the RDCs is that they themselves formulate development interventions that assist all members of a local community, thus contributing to reconciliation.

Medium-term interventions:

9. Support is recommended for one ecological/economic specialist.

Rationale: The project document of the EU *Programme d'accompagnement à la Stabilisation de l'Est du Tchad* (PAS) makes it clear that one chore of the initial stabilization of the situation in eastern Chad is formulating a development strategy for a less conflicted future. A medium term intervention is the preparation of such a plan to be submitted at the end of PAS for future EU investment.

Such a development strategy should be sustainable and follow a 'bottom-up' approach. Further – given the rural nature of Dar Sila, and given the growing global crisis in foods – the strategy should emphasize transformations in the region's food production and food transformation industries systems. Additionally, given past conflicts, and the fact that the existing pastoral and farming systems have the potential to be both complementary and competing, it is important that changes in food production systems should enhance complementary capabilities of the system.

This is problematic for the following reasons: Dar Sila is one of the **least** known areas of the world. This is true of its society, its agrarian economy, and of its ecology. There is, for instance, information that drought and conflict north and northeast led to 'massive' migrations into Dar Sila, which led to increased land tenure and land distribution conflict between herder and farmers in local communities. If this is substantially correct, then the way to address local community conflict is alleviate land tenure and land distribution disputes. Yet the study team judges all this information, which it carefully collected and analyzed, to be 'anecdotal'. It is unknown whether migrations were 'massive'. It is unknown whether these led to severe land tenure and land distribution conflicts. It is thus a first order of business to discover whether in-migration, land tenure and land distribution disputes caused most local conflict in Dar Sila. We advise that this information be secured by one development anthropologist specialized in analyzing the economy and ecology of arid land populations. He or she would work with the

MC and the RDCs to create particular development strategies tailored to reduce herder/farmer competition in the local communities of Dar Sila.

The budget for this intervention would include the salary of the specialist plus the costs of his, or her, research.¹³⁹

10. It is recommended that judicial services on a local, regional and national level be improved.

Rationale: Legal state services are very limited on a local and regional level resulting in a severe lack of access to these services. Impunity caused by corruption in the state apparatus is a nationwide problem. Consequently, the population has little faith in state institutions pertaining to rule of law and seeks justice using ‘traditional’ mechanisms of conflict resolution or by violence in form of retaliation and vengeance. A national legal system needs to be developed which is regarded as legitimate by the majority of Chadians. We recommend that strategies be formulated on a medium term basis and implemented on a long term basis by international and national actors with expertise in rule of law programs.

There are three legal systems co-occurring in Chad. These are the formal state system, based upon adaption of French law to Chadian circumstances; Islamic jurisprudence; and legal codes pertaining to different ethnic groups. This means that legal pluralism characterizes Chadian law. It suggests that any new legal system, if it is to be legitimate, should build upon the characteristics of the existing legal pluralism. The new legal system should be formulated in the medium term by Chadians in the National Committee for Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation (see recommendation 11 below) and implemented over the long term by this same committee.¹⁴⁰

Long-term interventions:

11. It is recommended that a National Committee for Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation (NCCMR) be instituted.

Rationale: The project document of PAS stresses that in Chad there will be ‘... *un processus long, complexe et incertain de réconciliation...*’. This is an important and correct assessment.

¹³⁹ The specialist could be seconded by an independent, Chadian institution of applied social sciences such as the *Centre de Recherche en Anthropologie et Sciences Humaines* (CRASH) in N'Djaména.

¹⁴⁰ The committee in formulating the new legal system should use the services of an institution with expertise in Islamic and plural legal systems, such as the Legal Pluralism Project Group at the Max Planck Institute of Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany. This group aims at analyzing and explaining how different constellations of legal pluralism are generated and maintained. It focuses in particular on the mutual interdependences between customary laws, religious laws, state and international laws. By studying social practices in which different kinds of law are used, insights are generated in the circumstances under which constellations of legal pluralism contribute to or reduce legal insecurity and social and political conflict. (See <http://www.eth.mpg.de/research/legal-pluralism/index.html>).

There is no place in the world except for Chad that has experienced 42 continual years of war. Countries that have been in situations similar to Chad's have instituted institutions of conciliation and mediation at the national level, upon which institutions they have conferred significant authorities. Such institutions have been founded in South Africa and a number of Latin American countries. They have ameliorated difficult conflicts.

It is recommended that a *National Committee for Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation* (NCCMR) be created to address long-term problems Chad experiences and will continue to experience due to prolonged conflict. This committee would be provisionally headed by the *Médiateur National*. It would be attached to the Prime Minister's office.

It would have the following authorities. First, it would have the authority to devise strategies and programs of conciliation at all levels. This would include formulating in the medium term and implementing over the long term a plural legal system that would be regarded as legitimate by the majority of the population. Second, it would have the authority to coordinate reconciliation interventions at all levels. For example, this would include conciliation efforts at the international, national, regional, and local levels. Third, it would be a repository of expert knowledge concerning different techniques of conciliation and mediation. Fourth, it would have training authorities. This is to say its personnel would develop and teach different techniques of conciliation and mediation designed for the particular conditions prevailing in Chad.

The NCCMR would have a senior staff of three persons. These would be senior social scientist with expertise in conciliation, a senior jurist with such expertise, and a respected national politician. This last position would rotate among politicians of varying political bias. There would be a junior professional staff of three persons, especially responsible for training and administering NCCMR policies. The costs of this intervention would be those of the six professional personnel, a support staff, and logistical and supply expenses.

The NCCMR in fulfillment of its third authority, in addition to other sorts of information discussed earlier, would seek the following sorts of information:

- a. *Violence specialists*: These are military forces. The NCCMR needs to know how many of these there are, where they are located, what sort of weapons they possess.
- b. *Violence accelerators*: These are actors who intensify violence by providing in some way additional means of destruction. The NCCMR needs to know who these are, and how much they have accelerated the potential for violence.

- c. *Violence brokers*: These are actors who negotiate between different violence specialists. They can broker increased military cooperation or the reverse.
- d. *Boundary specialists*: These are actors who either raise or lower boundaries between opposing groups. A boundary specialist who makes opponents ‘hate’ each other, raises boundaries; one who makes opponents ‘like’ each other, lowers boundaries.
- e. *Violence ideologies*: These are ideological formations that either raise or lower opposing group boundaries. For example, in Darfur, the ‘Black Book’¹⁴¹ was an ideology that raised the boundary of some against the supporters of the Sudanese central government. Conversely, the “Arab Gathering” was an ideology that raised the boundary of some against those who challenged the central government.
- f. *Social structures of violence*: Different structural situations have varying potentials for violence. For example, as Charles Tilly reports a generalization to the effect that “In general, it [organized violence] occurs when beneficiaries (governmental or non-governmental) of exploitation and opportunity hoarding encounter connected resistance to those systems ...”¹⁴² Currently, there is very considerable opportunity hoarding of the benefits of oil by certain Chadian actors. There is also resistance to this; suggesting continued organized violence.

The logic of collecting such information is that, in fact, humans are normally peaceful. Peace is the human ‘default condition.’ Rather, it is the accumulation of violence specialists, accelerators, and brokers; as well a boundary specialists; violence ideologies; and structures of violence that provoke organized violence. If one knows that such an accumulation is occurring then one can predict the occurrence of violence, and, further, one knows the conditions (theoretically) to relax in order to avoid it.

¹⁴¹ The *Black Book* is a manuscript claiming a pattern of disproportionate political control by the people of northern Sudan (more precisely the governing elite from the Nile valley) and marginalization of the rest of the country. Its first part was published in May 2000, the second appeared in August 2002. Originally published anonymously, the *Black Book* was later credited with the Sudanese rebel group JEM.

¹⁴² Tilly 2003.

ANNEXES - Conflict timeline


Note: The conflict timeline is based on information gathered in the field as well as information available in reports on Dar Sila mentioned in the introduction. It is neither exhaustive nor complete. The timeline displays events according to our multi-level model of conflict. Inter-level conflict events are highlighted in grey. Arrows display the direction of inter-level influence. Major events marking a turning point or new characteristic in the course of the escalation of violence are highlighted in red. [Abbreviations: GoC = Government of Chad, GoS = Government of Sudan, JJ = Janjawid]

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	Conflict level	
			national (Tchad)	international / transnational
2001			Dadjo political elite jointly resigns from MPS , claiming to be underrepresented in national politics	
			Dadjo join the armed opposition , led by Abdoulaye Issakha Sarwa, head of the FONALT movement	FONALT allies with Sudanese Janjawid (JJ) in Darfur
				FONALT - JJ collaboration ends , movement seeks refuge in Birao, CAR.
			FONALT joins ANR under the leadership of Mahamat Garfa.	ANR rear bases in Sudan and CAR.
2003	February	ANR operations in southeastern Chad , increase in insecurity in the Dar Sila region.		
		Arrival of Sudanese refugees in the border region and increase of cross-border incursions by JJ militias.		Escalation of Darfur conflict.
		Increasing tensions between Arab Nowaibe and Dadjo following succession struggle among the Nowaibe, the latter allegedly join JJ for support.		
2004	March	Mounting inter-communal distrust of Dadjo and Mimi following JJ attack on the village of Am Djimena near Modoyna as neighbouring Mimi allegedly refused Dadjo customary support in self-defense.		
		Attack on Arab village by deserted Zaghawa officers allegedly leads to alliance of inhabitants with JJ.		

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	international / transnational
2004	November	Government initiative to win back Chadian Arabs from Sudan results in enhanced tensions in the region, non-Arab communities accuse armed Arab groups of complicity with JJ, demand disarmament of Arabs.			
			←		
	2005	Influx and installation of returning Arabs in the border region, persisting tensions, several Dadjo killed in the area between Adé and Modoyna.		←	
		Pre-election visit of PM Moussa Faki in Dar Sila border region (Adé to Tissi); Dadjo branded as rebels.			
		Attempted disarmament of returning Arab groups in the eastern border region leads to tensions between the Government of Chad (GoC) and Arab communities, GoC intervenes and compensates Arabs for harassments suffered.			
	April	JJ militia attacks on 2 Dadjo villages near Modoyna (5 dead, 2 wounded, 2 kidnapped). 7 neighbouring villages decide to displace to Koloy for fear of getting attacked next.		←	
			Build up of Chadian rebel forces along the Sudanese side of the eastern border.		Political relations Chad- Sudan deteriorate: Statement by the GoC accuses Government of Sudan (GoS) of backing and financing Chadian armed opposition.
		JJ attacks on several neighbouring Dadjo villages near Koloy , leave 125 dead, 3 dozens injured.	←		
	May	Significant theft of livestock by JJ militias in Djabal Gada , 44 Dadjo killed, traces allegedly pass by a Chadian <i>ferik</i> .	←		
		Delegation of Dadjo elders visits JJ leader Hamid Dawai , letter of Sultan Said delivered; Dadjo learn about alliance JJ with Chadian Arabs, Waddaians and Mimi, common goal: overthrow GoC.	→		

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	Conflict level	
			national (Tchad)	international / transnational
2005	May		Referendum deciding on a third term in office for president Déby, widely boycotted	
	June	JJ militia incursions, livestock thefts in the border region east of Adé and between Modoyna and Daguessa, leading to displacements in the area.		
	July	Reinforcement of ANT along the Sudanese border results in temporary decrease of crossborder incursions by JJ militias.		
	August			Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs received by Déby to discuss Chad's role in the Darfur peace process.
	September	JJ militia raid on the border villages around Koumou, livestock stolen, 55 killed (26.09.)		
		JJ militia raid on Modoyna, significant theft of livestock and attack on village, around 40 civilians dead; ANT follows thieves, kills and arrests perpetrators near Adé (27.09.)		
	October	Tensions between Arabs and non-Arabs in Kerfi region, prefect of Sila visits the region twice trying to calm tensions.	Foundation of the RDL led by Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim.	Breaking of diplomatic relations with the Sudan on a regional level by closing the Chadian consulate in El Geneina and the Sudanese consulate in Abéché.
			Massive defections from the ANT, deserters search refuge in Sudan; tensions in the inner power circle of the President.	
	November	JJ militia attacks near Modoyna, theft of livestock in Toundoussa, ANT follows perpetrators to Sudan and regains stolen livestock (22.11.).		
	December	Significant livestock theft near Modoyna allegedly committed by JJ militias in collaboration with Chadian Arabs.		Mutual accusations of Sudan and Chad of supporting the respective armed opposition (23.11.)

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	Conflict level	international / transnational
			national (Tchad)	
2005	December	<p>JJ militia attacks on 3 non-Arab villages near Koloy, allegedly Chadian Arabs among attackers; displacement from the area to Koloy (18.12.).</p> <p>Withdrawal of ANT troops from the border region.</p>	<p>Massive desertions of ANT troops in N'Djamena (08.12.)</p> <p>Attack of Chadian rebels (RDL) on Adré (18.12.).</p>	
2006	January	<p>JJ militia attack east of Adé, theft of livestock (05.01.).</p> <p>JJ attack on Dadjo village Dorote, south of Adé (10.01.).</p> <p>Governmental delegation in Goz Beida including MPs, ministries; aim: reconcile ethnic groups. Meetings with prefect and Sultan (14.01.).</p> <p>Interethnic tensions following the killing of an Waddaian leader by Dadjo north of Adé; Dadjo accuse Ouaddaian of collaboration with JJ; displacement of Dadjo villages to Adé.</p> <p>Fighting of Dadjo vs. Arabs, Waddaian, Mimi south of Adé throughout January leave around 20 people dead; Sultan Said calls all village chiefs to a meeting in order to restore peace (30.01.).</p> <p>Tensions between Arabs and Dadjo around Ouadi Habile, 3 Dadjo killed.</p>	<p>Foundation of FUC(D) rebel militia alliance.</p>	<p>Deterioration of Chado-Sudanese relations: Press release of Chadian government announces state of belligerence (23.12.).</p>
	February	<p>JJ militia attacks on villages in the area of Djedida (05.02.).</p> <p>JJ militia raid on Dadjo village in the Ouadi Kadja area, theft of livestock, village attacked, 5 killed; displacement of Dadjo to Koloy (05.-07.02.).</p>		<p>Peace agreement signed by Al Bashir and Deby in Tripoli ending state of belligerence declared in December (08.02.).</p>

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	Conflict level	international / transnational
			national (Tchad)	
2006	March	<p>Ultimatum by JJ: either Dadjo ally with JJ militias / Chadian rebels or are going to be treated as enemies (different versions); Dadjo refuse.</p> <p>JJ militia raid on Am Djiména, Moukchacha and Modoyna, livestock stolen, village attacked, 72 killed, displacement of Dadjo to Koloy, Sudan and Dogdore, later JJ attack on Koloy, displacement of Dadjo to Goz Beida. (03.-15.03.).</p> <p>JJ attacks on 2 villages north of Modoyna (04.03.), prefect and subprefect visit the area with a military escort (06.03.).</p> <p>JJ raid on Amdjerema south of Modoyna, theft of livestock, village self-defence group / ANT follow thieves to Sudan; allegedly Sudanese Army supported JJ militias (03-04.03.).</p> <p>Reinforcement of village self-defense groups by Dadjo and allied sedentary communities (Mouro, Kadjakse, Sinyar etc.); arms bought by Dadjo communities.</p> <p>Clashes between Dadjo self defense groups and Arab militias, prefect and subprefect try to reactivate interethnic committees to peacefully settle conflicts.</p> <p>Displacements from the border region to Dogdore, Koloy and Goz Beida.</p>		<p>The GoC accuses the GoS of violating the Tripoli peace agreement claiming that GoS was behind the JJ raid on Amdjerema.</p>
		<p>Chadian rebels (FUC(D)) appear in the region of Koloy and Modoyna.</p> <p>Violent combat between RDL and ANT in the region of Modoyna; nephew of Deby, Abakar Yusuf Itno (CEMAT) killed (30.03.).</p>		
		3 JJ militia attacks on Koloy (30.03. – 05.04.)		

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	Conflict level	international / transnational
2006	April	<p>FUC(D) presence north of Wadi Kadja including Modoyna.</p> <p>FUC(D)/RDL pass at Goz Amir on their way to N'Djaména (10.11.04.).</p> <p>Capture of Tissi by FUC(D)/CNT, withdrawal of ANT from the region (12.4.)</p>	<p>Attack on Adré by FUC(D) pushed back by ANT with the support of JEM (13.04.).</p> <p>Rebel offensive on N'Djamena by FUC(D) (13.04.).</p>	<p>Chad accuses Sudan of being behind the rebel offensive on N'Djaména; border officially closed, diplomatic relations interrupted, official retreat of Chad as a mediator in the Darfur peace talks.</p>
		<p>Numerous JJ militia raids and looting in Tissi and other villages south of Bahr Azoum (Agogo, Birnahal, Harraza, Maguila, Eid-al-Ghanam, Goz Amimi, Amsisi; 12.- 18.04.), participation of Chadian Arabs reported.</p>		
		<p>JJ militia attack on non-Arab villages (Djawara, Djimeze, Singatao and Korkosanyo), participation of Chadian Arabs reported, 110 civilians killed (13.04.); returnees at Djawara intending to bury the dead were shot at and fled again (23.04.).</p>		
		<p>JJ militia attacks on several villages around Maguila (south of Bahr Azoum), theft of livestock, villages attacked, 11 killed, 17 wounded (27.04.).</p>		
		<p>Clashes between Arab militias and Dadjo militias around Koloy, Modoyna and Dogdore.</p>		
		<p>Contacts between JEM/SLA and Dadjo militias regarding support for the latter through training.</p>		

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	international / transnational
2006	May	JJ livestock theft in Dadjo village Dalola (near Koukou-Angarana); 4 people dead, 6 wounded, 1000 cattle stolen (01.05.).			
			←		
			Presidential elections widely boycotted by the population, Deby declared winner (03.05.).		
		JJ militia theft of livestock in Koukou-Angarana;; 2 dead, 5 wounded, up to 2000 cattle stolen; Chadian Arabs allegedly participating (16.05.)	←		
		Attack of JJ militias and Chadian Arab militias on Modoyna, displacement from Modoyna and Koloy to Habilé, Goz Beida and Sudan (27.5.).	←		
	June	Tensions between Dadjo and Waddaian in Am Bourougne, 1 Waddaian killed. Visit of the governor of Waddai in order to calm tensions. Clashes between Arab militias and Dadjo militias near Daguesse, ANT intervenes and chases Arab militias.			
			Fighting between FUC(D) and ANT around Tissi.		
		JEM recruitment in Dar Sila.		→	
		Opening of training camps run by JEM for Dadjo militia groups in Koloy, Adé, Tiero, Kerfi, Djourlo and Am Kharouba.			
		JJ theft of livestock in village near Koukou-Angarana, 350 cattle stolen (03.06.)		←	
		Reconciliation effort by the sub-prefect in Daguesse fails, important Arab leaders refuse to participate, others don't swear on the Quran not to attack neighbouring communities.			Chad accuses Sudan of destabilizing Chad on the occasion of a visit of a Security Council delegation; GoC officially denies internal crisis (05.06.)

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	international / transnational
2006	June		Fighting between ANT and FUC(D) near Daguessa		
		JJ attack on Sinyar village Kadamo (near Daguessa); allegedly coordinated with nearby FUC(D) incursion.		←	
				→	Arrival of 10,000 Chadian refugees in Um Dukhun, West Darfur, Sudan, fleeing attacks on villages / insecurity in Dar Sila (16.06.).
			FUC(D) rebels take Koloy (stay 3 hours) (26.06.).		
	July		FUC(D) attack on Adé (03.07.)		
		Increasing tensions between Arab and non-Arab communities in Koukou Angarana.			Rapprochement Sudan-Chad brokered by Ghaddafi (26.07.).
		JEM activities around and in Goz Amir refugee camp, forced recruitment.		→	
	August	Sporadic clashes between Arab militias and Dadjo militias in the area of Koukou Angarana	Government reshuffle (28.08.).		Al Bashir takes part in Deby's inauguration ceremony (08.08.).
		Fighting between Dadjo militias and Arab militias in Damkoush (arab village near Dogdore), 16 dead (19.08.)			Framework agreement between Khartoum and Chad not to support the rebel movements threatening the power of the other (28.08.)
	September		Dar Sila Sultan Said ordered to and held in N'Djaména.		
			Heavy fighting between FUC(D) and ANT in Dar Tama (05.09.)		
			Violent clashes around Hadjer Marfain ANT vs. RaFD/CNT (18./20.09.)		
		Several clashes of Dadjo militia / ANT vs. JJ militias / FUC(D) in Dar Sila.			
			ANT air raids of FUC(D) positions near Modoyna		

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	International / transnational
2006	September	<p>Defense pact of non-Arab militias concluded in Djourlo.</p> <p>Presence of FUC(D) in the Wadi Kadja region around Modoyna.</p>			
	October	<p>Clashes between Dadjo militias and Mimi south of Adé</p> <p>Sila prefect orders all militias to disarm or leave the area.</p> <p>Attacks of Dadjo militias on <i>feriks</i> and Arab villages north and south of Bahr Azoum, ANT allegedly supports Dadjo militias.</p> <p>Reconciliation initiative by prefect unites local leaders of the Sila region, lets them swear on the Quran not to attack one another (throughout October).</p> <p>Arab militias attack Djimeze and Marfakatal, villages looted and burnt , 1 dead, 3 wounded (03 / 04.10).</p> <p>Arab militias attack several non-Arab villages west of Dogdore (Ayande, Kashkash, Kamour, Ambache, Djamra, Romalie, Adiro, Mouraye, Diri, Dabanai, Djedide (05.-10.10.).</p> <p>Arab militias attack Tiero, 9 killed, 13 wounded, village partially burnt, allegedly Arabs, Waddaian and Mimi from neighbouring Marena took part (08.10.), ANT and Dadjo militias from Djourlo) arrive the following day.</p> <p>Attacks of Arab militias in the region of Koloy, 6 Dadjo women raped on their fields next to Koloy (14.10.).</p> <p>Dadjo militias attack <i>feriks</i> and Arab villages in the Ouadi Kadja region, allegedly ANT support for Dadjo militias.</p>			

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	International / transnational
2006	October	Arabic groups north of Bahr Azoum leave the region for Sudan via Daguessa		→	
		Attack of Dadjo militias on Amchamgari (Arab village near Kerfi), 17 killed, 7 wounded, said to be a reprisal of the attack on Tierro by Arab militias in early October (13.10.).			
		26 Dadjo militia members killed in the region of Koloy , said to be reprisal of rebels for earlier attacks by Dadjo militia on UFDD positions (19.10.).			
				UFDD foundation and capture of Goz Beida (22.10.), allegedly diversion attack to disperse ANT from Adé; colonne continues to Am Timan.	
	November				
				Fighting between UFDD and ANT in the region of Hadjar Meram (Salamat) , heavy losses on ANT side (29.10.)	
		Sultan Said Ibrahim returns to Goz Beida			
		Clashes between Dadjo and Arab herders in André Sé (near Koukou-Angarana) as passing Arab herd mixes with Dadjo herds; 1 Dadjo killed, 4 wounded, Sudanese rebels (SLA) allegedly transported the wounded to Goz Beïda hospital (26.10.).			
		Attacks by JJ militia on Koloy , allegedly supported by Chadian Arabs and Chadian rebels; extreme brutality, ANT does not intervene, last attack leads to displacement of the entire resident and IDP population gathered at Koloy to Adé (10,000) (01., 04., 07. and 11.11.).		←	
		Attacks by JJ and Arab militias on three villages near Koloy (Faradjani, Marmadengue and Kerwajb) (01.-07.11.).		←	
		Fighting between Dadjo militias and Arab militias in Djimeze (04./05.11.).			

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	International / transnational
2006	November	JJ and Arab militia attacks on 23 villages in the area around Kerfi (among them Badia, Bandiako, Neweya, Kerfi, Agourtoulou, Abougsoul, Loubotigue, Tamadjour, Samassin), up to 220 killed, more than 20 villages decide to leave their homes for fear of getting attacked next (04.-15.11.).			
		Attack by Arab militia on Djorlo , 36 killed, 22 wounded (7.11.).			
		JJ militia raid on Ouadi Habilé , livestock stolen, village attacked (10.11.).			
			State of emergency declared in eastern Chad including Dep. Sila (13.11.), announced for 12 days.		
		Fighting between Dadjo militias / ANT and Arab militias in the region of Tiero.			
		Fighting between Dadjo militias and Arab militias near Am Bourougne (Bouri, Kamour, Djiref destroyed).			
			State of emergency prolonged to six months (23.11.).		
		Attacks by Arab militias on villages near Koloy and Modoyna (Tireh, Tendelti, Djerené, Djedide, Koumou, Mormadenga), 2000 villagers flee to Sudan (26.11.).		Rebels take Abéché (25.11.).	
	December	3 attacks by JJ militias on Agourtoulou (south of Kerfi) (28.11.), Chadian arabs reported involved.			
		JJ militia attack on Sassabana (southeast of Kerfi), Chadian arabs reported involved, results in displacement of several villages of the area (Tedi, Agourtoulou, Gdat, Gue, Baridé, Hadjer Halife, Dordora, Hajar Meram) (01.12.)			

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	international / transnational
2006	December	<p>Attack by JJ militia on Arata (near Kerfi), Chadian arabs reported involved (03.12.).</p> <p>Attack of JJ militia on Kachina (5km south of Kerfi), Chadian arabs reported involved (05.12.)</p> <p>Dadjo militias attacking Waddaian villages south of Bahr Azoum (03.12.).</p> <p>Dadjo militias exchanging fire with Arab Noweibe near Koukou-Angarana (04./05.12.).</p> <p>JJ attacks around Koukou-Angarana, in Koukou Angarana some 30 villagers and displaced killed, in villages close to Goz Amir refugee camp 30 people wounded in attacks (15./16.12.).</p>	<p>←</p> <p>←</p>		
		<p>Reconciliation initiative by the governor of Waddai and the Sultan of Dar Sila in Koukou-Angarana.</p> <p>Second initiative by government (delegation comprising members of ministries, Resident Minister Ouaddai, Sila prefect) leads to reconciliation agreement (23.12.).</p>			
				<p>Retreat ANT from Daguessa and Adé to Goz Beida (reinforcement of troops there following capture of town by rebels in October).</p>	
				<p>Mahmat Nour Abdelkerim (RDL) rallies to the government.</p>	
2007	January	<p>Presidential visit in Dar Sila, meetings with administrative authorities and traditional leaders; president announces financial support for IDPs, reinforcement of ANT, disarmament of militias (05.-14.01.).</p> <p>Resignation of Sultan Said. Pressure by the government, coup seen as to weaken traditional authorities and break his resistance to the armament of militias, his son Brahim Said chosen as successor (15.01.).</p>			

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	Conflict level national (Tchad)	International / transnational
2007	January		Rebels (UFDD) capture Adé, in control of the region from Adé to Dogdore and Daguessa, ANT withdraws to Koukou-Angarana (16.01.).	
		Dadio militias of Tiero and Marena leave villages and hide in the mountains following the installation of UFDD forces in Dogdore and Daguessa.		
			Bombardement of UFDD positions in Dogdore by ANT (19.01.).	
	February	JJ militia raid and theft of some hundred heads of livestock belonging to an ANT colonel in Koukou Angarana , ANT follows traces; take livestock from neighbouring Arab village and some women hostage, demanding stolen cattle back (24.01.).		
		Theft of livestock in feriks and Arab villages around Tiero and Marena credited to Dadio militias; delegation of Arab leaders said to have visited militias to warn them that they would be targeted if raids don't stop.		
	March	Increase in attacks of Dadio militias targeting feriks and Arab villages north and south of Bahr Azoum (27.02.-04.03.).		
		Arab groups, Waddaian and Mimi leave the region for the Sudan following increase in attacks.		
		Attack by Arab militia on Marena pushed back by Dadio militias (20.03.).		
		Attack by JJ militias on Dadio village Twanga , (west of Dogdore), Chadian Arabs involved, several wounded, 60 goats stolen (30.03.).		
		Large scale attack by JJ militias, Arab militias and CNT on Tiero and Marena , 3 waves of attacks: 1. and 2. on horseback 3. with pick-ups; 200-400 killed, Dadio militia destroyed, villages burnt, displacement of the (Dadio) population to Koukou Angarana (31.03.).		

Year	Months	local /regional (Dar Sila)	national (Tchad)	Conflict level	International / transnational
		Arab groups of the surroundings of Tiero and Marena displace to Sudan.		→	
	April	Integration of Dadjo militias into the ANT, disarmament Harassemement of Arabs, Waddaian and Mimi around Daguessa, Goz Amer and Aradip reportedly by ANT pretending wanting to disarm Arabs (01.-05.04.). Attack by Arab militias on Kadjakse village (Ardebe, 12 km west of Dogdore) (02.04.).			
			ANT recaptures Dogdore from UFDD, air raids against rebel positions around Daguessa, lead to bombardment of Goz Malik, civilian casualties and displacement of population to Dogdore (04./05.04.).		
			ANT offensive against Daguessa, rebel troops pursued into Sudanese territory, result in ANT control over Daguessa (09.04.).		
		Offensive ANT near Tissi against rebel troops (13.04.)			
		Arab groups leave the area for Sudan following ongoing harassment by ANT.		→	

Glossary

African (non-Arab)	Term used for describing ethnic affiliation other than <i>Arab</i> . The two terms have become dichotomized regarding attack patterns dominating the violence that had escalated in Darfur and the following discussion of its causes. The idea of an <i>Arab</i> vs. <i>African</i> identity also accelerated the process of polarization of ethnic groups in Chad, stigmatizing the respective members of those groups as rather victims or perpetrators (see also under Arab).
ajawid	Council of elders; also <i>fashir</i> .
Arab	According to the genealogical paradigm of the term, the appellation <i>Arab</i> applies to someone who can retrace his or her ancestry to the original inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula or the Syrian Desert. According to a linguistic definition it relates to someone whose first language is Arabic. The distinction of <i>Arabs</i> from <i>Africans</i> in Chad and Sudan becomes ambiguous in this context as many Muslim ethnic groups in this area (as in the whole of the Sahel zone) claim an origin from the Arabian Peninsula or Syrian Desert. The linguistic definition can not entirely compensate this distinction problem as some fractions of ethnic groups lost their original language in the course of time and replaced it with Arabic. However, the linguistic paradigm seems to be applied as main method of distinction by Chadians and Sudanese. Most Arab groups in Chad and Sudan follow a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle.
‘Arab gathering’	or ‘ <i>wihida Arabiya</i> ’. The ideology of the ‘Arab Gathering’ conveyed the idea of Arab supremacy over the <i>zurga</i> (pejorative term for black Africans) spread in the Darfur region of western Sudan in the 1980s. It provided legitimacy to attack the so called ‘black’ communities such as the Fur in order to gain political power over them (see also under African ; Arab).
cheikh	Arab term for ‘chief’.
damra	Permanent settlement or village of Arabs.
diya	The term <i>diya</i> stands for the so called “blood money” which is a mean of compensation in cases of violent conflict. The <i>diya</i> system is still applied in Chad, particularly in the east and in the north of the country. <i>Diya</i> payments are meant to compensate the loss of a person from an economical point of view as well as the expenditures for the sacrifice for the dead. They also serve to prevent blood vengeance or to end ongoing blood feud.
ethnic group	Generally describes a group of people, who perceive themselves as sharing the same collective identity. In social sciences the concept has widely been debated as it offers no other clear criteria to define an ethnic group except that the group perceives itself as sharing a collective identity (self-attribution) and / or that others perceive and describe it as sharing such an identity (attribution by others). Hence, the concept of “ethnic group” emphasizes the distinct perception of “own” and “others”, although in reality delimitations are often blurred. The interpretation of identities of ethnic groups as clearly distinct from other ethnic groups has often been exploited as ideological mean in political conflict.
ferik	Arabic term for temporary nomad settlement.

'first comer'	Descriptive term for communities who claim to have been first arrivals in a certain territory.
fraction	See lineage .
fursha	Local chief before colonial times, but the term is still in use.
goumier	French term for the adjutants of the sultan. It originally is a military term that could be translated "assistant rider".
IDP	Internally displaced person.
imam	Spiritual leader of a mosque and / or a community.
Janjawid	<p>Arabic term for 'armed horseman'. The <i>Janjawid militia</i> (see below) had first assembled in the late 1980s from basically Arab Rizeigat who had fled Chad and Arab Mahamid that had hosted them on Sudanese territory.</p> <p>Nowadays the term is commonly used to describe Sudanese armed militias backed by the Sudanese government who uses the <i>Janjawid</i> as counter-insurgency force in the abolition of anti-government rebel movements in Sudan. The majority of today's <i>Janjawid</i> fighters in Sudan is said to be recruited from Arab tribes (see <i>Arab</i> below), mainly from Abbala (term describing camel herders in contrast to <i>Baggara</i> describing cattle herders) from Sudanese and Chadian origin, though other ethnic groups are represented, too. In this context, the term became part of the Arab vs. Africans ideology that dominates reflections on the Darfur conflict and the massacres committed by <i>Janjawid</i> militia.</p> <p>In Chad <i>Janjawid</i> is used as umbrella term for armed militia including all ethnic background that appears mounted and equipped with firearms; participating in every kind of organized banditry including livestock theft and robbery.</p>
kamkalak	Administrative unit or province of the Dadjo Sultanate before colonial times.
'late comer'	Descriptive term for communities who arrived only after the first settlers of a given territory.
lineage	Describes a kin group whose members descent from a common known apical ancestor in paternal line. Trbdes (see below) are normally divided into several lineages and sub-lineages. In Chad people normally use the term <i>fraction</i> to describe such segments from larger tribes that sometimes found new leadership after having separated from their original tribe and moved into other regions.
marabout	Quran cleric who can be a spiritual leader or a Quran teacher with important influences in a community; some <i>marabouts</i> in Chad maintain pre-Islamic traditions like making amulets for protection or telling the future
militia	The term refers to an army composed of rather private citizens than professional soldiers who train and/or furnish for military action in order to defend themselves, a given territory or the state. Militias are not necessarily directly supported or sanctioned by a government, but can serve as supplement to a regular army in an emergency.

In Dar Sila several militias have been founded and become active throughout the conflict that has led to mass displacement. They first emerged on the basis of traditional ad-hoc self-defence groups built up between local communities - as for example neighbouring villages - to defend its population and belongings in case of attacks. Due to an increasing ethnic polarization in the course of the conflict, the main active militia groups in Dar Sila formed between Dadjo and their allies (Mouro, Sinyar, Fongoro, Kibet, Dagal, Kadjakse) and Arabs and their allies (Waddaian, Mimi).

Some Arab centred militias are said to have had men and equipment support from Sudanese militias, especially from the Janjawid militia. Dadjo militias allegedly were supported and equipped by the Chadian government and/or Sudanese opposition groups, mainly **JEM** (see below).

self-defence groups

See **militia**.

'traditional' / 'tradition'

'Tradition' describes the accumulation and transmission of a certain wealth of experience. Strictly speaking traditions are all those elements that are neither modernisations nor borrowings from other cultures.

In this sense of the term Chadian local leaders such as the sultan, *chef de canton* and *chef de village* are no traditional leaders, because - although their social and political position is partly based on elements of former social hierarchical structures - they were placed or reorganized by the French colonial administration. They are, nevertheless, commonly referred to as 'traditional' leaders.

tribe

Originally describes a unit of socio-political organization of linguistically and culturally kindred families, clans or other groups who inhabit a common territory and are related through a common origin. In social anthropology the term is controversial especially as the classic concept of tribe overvalues the social integrity and cultural homogeneity as well as the territorial boundaries of tribes. In reality, tribes are often rather cultural constructs without clear delimitations that do not simply reflect social identities.

Glossary of ethnic groups relevant to the study

Arabs	<p>Several nomadic and semi-nomadic groups living in Chad and Sudan described as <i>Arab</i> because of genealogical origin or language references (see glossary for <i>Arab</i>). Some of the Arab groups in Dar Sila are said to have cohabited with the Sila population since the foundation of the Sultanate, having adapted a more semi-nomadic lifestyle. Others still inhabit their homelands further north and only pass through Dar Sila with their herds during dry season, searching for grazing grounds. Since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s these latter groups seem to have become more important in numbers.</p> <p>Several Arab tribes are prominent among the Janjawid militias of Sudan, namely from <i>Abbala</i> (camel herder) background.</p> <p>Some Arab tribes of Dar Sila have allied with the Waddaians and Mimi to form self-defence groups in the course of the escalating violence in that region. The Dadjo and their allies blame them to also have collaborated with and acted in the name of the Janjawid militias.</p> <p><i>Estimated numbers: no numbers available</i></p>
Dadjo	<p>Largest ethnic group of the Sila population. Dadjo settle throughout the whole of Dar Sila; there are important numbers in the Guéra region around Mongo, and in Sudan, too. The Dadjo claim to be the founders of the Dar Sila sultanate and have probably arrived in that region in the 17th century.</p> <p>The Dadjo live mainly as sedentary peasants, holding some small livestock for subsistence.</p> <p>The Dadjo of Dar Sila have allied with other co-residing ethnic groups to build self-defence forces or militias in the course of the violent conflict in Dar Sila. Their allies comprise: Fongoro, Sinyar, Kadjakse, Moubi, Mouro and Sinyar.</p> <p><i>Estimated numbers: Dar Sila / Chad 63.000 (2000); Dar Dadjo / Chad 34.000 (1993); Darfur: 143.000 (2000)*</i></p>
Fongoro	<p>The majority of the Fongoro lives in the canton Fongoro / sub-prefecture of Tissi, south of the Sinyar territory. As all the other ethnic groups of the border region Fongoro population settles in Sudan, too. They are closely related to the Fur of Sudan. Dar Fongoro lies quite isolated and is hardly accessible especially during rainy season as the huge Wadi Bahr Azoum has to be crossed to get there.</p> <p>In history the Fongoro had their proper Sultanate that was later integrated into the Sila Sultanate. Dar Fongoro in former times served as slaving ground for the Waddai empire (see Kapteijns 1985).</p> <p>The Fongoro live from agriculture and cattle breeding, subsistence is complemented by the gathering of wild fruits and honey as well as fishing in Wadis during rainy season.</p> <p><i>Estimated numbers: 1000-2000 (1983)*</i></p>
Fur	<p>The main Fur settlement area is Darfur (arab. "Land of the Fur") in Sudan</p>

Fur form important numbers among the refugee population that fled prosecution in Darfur gathered in refugee camps in eastern Chad. Fur live predominantly as peasants.

*Estimated numbers: more than 500.000 (1983)**

Kadjakse

The Kadjakse mainly settle in the area of the Kadjakse canton. They are said to have first settled alongside the Dadjo in Dar Sila before moving further to Am Dam region to the north-west of Goz Beïda. Due to insecurity in that region at the time of the rebellion against President Tombalbaye in the 1960s, they moved back to Dar Sila. Kadjakse are said to be closely related to the Mouibi.

Kadjakse live as sedentary peasants. Household economy is completed by breeding of small livestock and gathering of wild fruits.

*Estimated numbers: 10.000 (1983)**

Masalit

The traditional settlement area of the Masalit is in Darfur but also eastern Wadai on the Chadian side of the border. Some Masalit settlements are located in the northern part of Dar Sila.

Masalit constitute an important part of the refugee population gathered in eastern Chad as one of the most prosecuted groups in the Darfur conflict. Masalit live as peasants and cattle breeders.

*Estimated numbers: more than 240.000, the larger part in Sudan (2000)**

Mimi

The Mimi originate from the region around Biltine in north-eastern Chad. There, they have close ties with the Arab Mahamid, who have their traditional settlement area north of that of the Mimi around Arada. The Mimi migrated south together with the Waddaian since the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s and spread in Dar Sila. The Mimi follow a similar lifestyle as Waddaians with agriculture and livestock farming including temporary displacements during rainy season.

Mimi are considered as closely related to Waddaians and are often described as "the same" group in Dar Sila.

*Estimated numbers: 40.000 (1993)**

Mouibi

The Mouibi originally settled in the area of Mangalmé, some 200 kilometres west of Goz Beida. They moved to Dar Sila in the mid-1960s fleeing prosecution by President Tombalbaye's troops as supporters of the FROLINAT rebel movement. A second wave of Mouibi immigrants arrived in Dar Sila after the drought of the early 1980s. Mouibi settlements are spread all over Dar Sila but particularly in the western part of the region. They are said to have close genealogical links with the Kadjakse. The Mouibi are basically sedentary peasants.

*Estimated numbers: 35.000 (1993)**

Mouro

prefecture, canton Mouro. They are related to the Kibet that live south of Dar Mouro. The Mouro are said to have formerly been dependent from the Ouaddai empire but later (after Chad's independence) chose integration into the Dar Sila Sultanate. Their economy bases on agriculture supplemented by animal husbandry.

Estimated numbers: no numbers available

Sinyar

The majority of the Chadian Sinyar lives in the border region around Daguessa in the canton Sinyar. Their territory spreads over the border into Sudan where they once founded their proper Sultanate that later became integrated into Dar Massalit (Sudan) and Dar Sila (Chad). Culturally, the Sinyar are said to be closely related to the Fur.

The Sinyar are peasants with some livestock breeding.

*Estimated numbers in Chad: 12.300 (2000)**

Tama

The settlement area of the Tama is the Dar Tama in eastern Chad and West Darfur. Some Tama migrated to Dar Sila following the droughts of the last decades but also due to political conflict in their home territory (Tama-Zaghawa). The Tama are predominantly sedentary peasants.

*Estimated numbers: 60.000 (1993)**

Waddaian

'Waddaian' is a generic term that includes all ethnic groups originating from the Waddai region. Among them, the Maba form the largest part of the Waddaian population. Waddaians started to settle throughout the whole of Dar Sila only since the 1970s and 1980s following the droughts that had affected their home area. The Waddaians present in Dar Sila could be classified as rather semi-sedentary as parts of their families move with the herds throughout the rainy season. They also became important as traders throughout the last decades.

Waddaian are considered as closely related to Mimi and are often perceived as "the same" group in Dar Sila.

Estimated numbers: considering the specificity of the term no useful numbers available

Zaghawa

The Zaghawa are a nomadic and semi-nomadic group living in north-eastern parts of Chad (BET, Wadi Fira) and in northern Darfur. Zaghawa constitute the political elite in Chad. They are also prominent among the Darfur rebel movements fighting the Sudanese government. Many Zaghawa refugees live in the refugee camps of eastern Chad.

*Estimated numbers: 180.000, the majority in Sudan (1982)**

*The numbers indicated have to be understood as rough estimations that are solely meant to serve as an orientation in group sizes. They refer to speakers of the according languages that sometimes include or exclude other ethnic groups that are perceived by the proper group as included in or excluded from their perception of proper ethnic boundaries. Source: Gordon, Raymond G., Jr. (ed.), 2005. Ethnologue: Languages of the World, Fifteenth edition. Dallas, Tex.: SIL International. Online version: <http://www.ethnologue.com/>.

Glossary of military groups

There are many different political, military and armed opposition groups operating in Chad.¹⁴³ The glossary contains only groups mentioned in this report.

AN	<i>Alliance Nationale</i> (National Alliance): Union of different military opposition movements founded in March 2008 and headed by Mahamat Nouri, President of the UFDD (see below). The AN led the military operations on Chadian territory conducted in June 2008.
ANT	<i>Armée Nationale du Tchad</i> (Chad National Army)
ANR	<i>Alliance Nationale de la Résistance</i> (National Resistance Alliance): Coalition of different rebel militias united in 1995 under the leadership of Mahamat Garfa, a former Chief of Staff of Chad's armed forces. The ANR was particularly active in eastern and south-eastern Chad operating from rear bases both in Sudan and CAR before rallying to the Chadian government in 2003.
CNT	<i>Concorde Nationale du Tchad</i> (Chad National Concordia): Rebel militia whose members are predominantly belong to Arab communities, founded in 2004 by Hassan Saleh Al-Djineidi, an Arab Hemat. Al-Djineidi is said to have close ties to the Janjawid militia operating in Chad and Sudan. The CNT temporarily controlled the regions of Tissi and Daguessa in Dar Sila in 2006 and 2007 and is reported to have participated in Janjawid attacks against villages in Dar Sila. In late 2007 Al-Djineidi and his CNT section signed a peace deal with the Chadian government. One section of CNT continued fighting as FSR (<i>Front pour le salut de la république</i> / Front for the Salvation of the Republic) under the leadership of Ahmat Soubiane Hassaballah, an Arab Mahamid and former Chadian ambassador in the US.
FONALT	<i>Forces des Organisations Nationales pour l'Alternance et les Libertés au Tchad</i> (Forces of National Organizations for Alteration and Liberties in Chad): Founded in 2001 under the leadership of Abdoulaye Issakha Sarwa, a former member of the Presidential guard and mainly made up of Dadjo descendants. FONALT is reported to have had alliances with Sudanese Janjawid in early 2002 before rallying to the ANR in the same year and Abdoulaye Issakha Sarwa becoming its vice-president.
FROLINAT	<i>Front de Libération National du Tchad</i> (National Liberation Front of Chad): Rebel group active in Chad between 1966 and 1993.
FUC [FUCD]	<i>Front Uni pour le Changement [Démocratique]</i> (United Front for [Democratic] Change): A coalition of several Chadian rebel groups founded in December 2005 with the support of the Sudanese government. FUC(D) was built up by

¹⁴³ For further details on Chadian militant opposition groups see e.g. Tubiana 2008a and 2008b; HRW 2007; ICG 2006.

RDL leader Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim, a Tama backed by the Sudanese government. After its failed attack on N'Djamena on 13 April 2006 FUC(D) collapsed. Mahamat Nour rallied to the Chadian government in December 2006 bringing along the greater part of FUC(D)'s Tama section.

GNNT	<i>Garde Nationale et Nomade du Tchad</i> (National and Nomadic Guard of Chad) : The GNNT is one of the state's defence and security forces.
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement (<i>Mouvement de la Justice et l'Égalité</i>): One of the main Darfur Rebel movements. It was founded in 2000 by Khalil Ibrahim, a Zaghawa from the Kobe sub-clan. JEM maintains close links with the Chadian government and fought several times alongside the ANT against Chadian rebel groups. It has several rear bases in Chad including the Dar Sila region where it is also said to have formed and equipped local militias.
MPS	<i>Mouvement Patriotique pour le Salut</i> (Patriotic Salvation Movement): Chad's governing party. It was founded as an opposition movement in 1989 in Darfur by Idriss Déby who toppled former Chadian President Hissène Habré in December 1990.
RAFD / RFC	<i>Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques</i> (Rally of Democratic Forces) / <i>Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement</i> (Rally of Forces for Change): A coalition of Bideyat (sub-clan of the Zaghawa) deserters from Chadian President Déby's inner circle. RAFD was founded in early 2006. The group is led by the twins Tom and Timane Erdimi, cousins and former long-time-allies of the Chadian President and his government.
RDL	<i>Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et les Libertés</i> (Rally for Democracy and Freedom): A Chadian rebel group mainly made up of Tama from Chad and Sudan. It was founded in October 2005 by Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim, who himself is a Tama and former member of the ANR. In late 2005 RDL became the core element of FUC(D) under the leadership of Mahamat Nour.
SLA / SLM	Sudan Liberation Army (Armée Soudanais de Libération) or Sudan Liberation Movement (Movement Soudanais de Libération): One of the main rebel movements of Darfur fighting against the Sudanese government. It was founded in 2001 under the name of Darfur Liberation Front and emerged as SLA/SLM in February 2003 under the leadership of Abdelwahid Mahamat Nour, a Fur. Since the Abuja Agreement of 2006 the SLA divided into several fractions.
UFDD	<i>Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement</i> (Union of Forces for Democracy and Development): Rebel group coalition founded in October 2006 under the leadership of Mahamat Nouri, a descendent of the Goran ethnic group. After the defeat of the FUC in 2006 the UFDD is said to have gained increasing support by the Sudanese government. UFDD finds its supporters mainly among Goran, Waddaians and Arabs.

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