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Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution [2759 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2025 and requested the Secretary-General to report on its implementation every four months. The present report provides an update on significant developments in the Central African Republic since the previous report of 11 October 2024 ([S/2024/730](#)).

II. Political situation

2. The reporting period was marked by preparations for local, legislative and presidential elections, with a focus on voter registration, despite funding constraints. The Government, supported by MINUSCA and international partners, took measures to enhance the registration of women and youth. Some political opposition parties denounced the shrinking civic and political space and continued to condition their participation in the polls on direct dialogue with the President. The Government continued efforts to decentralize the peace process and to address persisting instability in various areas, while engaging with some signatory armed groups which remained outside the peace process.

Political developments

3. Some political opposition, notably the platform Bloc républicain pour la défense de la Constitution, upheld its position of not participating in the upcoming elections unless the National Electoral Authority and the Constitutional Council are restructured. On 5 November, the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la Constitution expressed distrust in the electoral process, citing repeated postponement of the local elections, which they attributed inter alia to the embezzlement of public funds by the electoral authority. On 12 November, the National Electoral Authority denounced these accusations. Meanwhile, on 27 and 28 November, opposition parties Union pour le renouveau centrafricain and the Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain called on the population to register to vote, while reiterating their decision not to participate in the polls until conditions for credible elections were fully established.



4. The President, Faustin Archange Touadera, in his addresses on 1 December for the sixty-sixth anniversary of the Republic, on 28 December on the state of the nation in the National Assembly and on 31 December for the New Year, highlighted progress in implementing public finance and other economic reforms. He commended the lifting of the arms embargo and the Kimberley Process restrictions on diamond exports as a recognition of these reforms. The President also outlined political, security and socioeconomic achievements since he took office, in particular in restoring stability and extending State authority across large parts of the country and in fostering ties with partners, including international financial institutions. He urged political parties and civil society to ensure that the upcoming elections were inclusive, democratic and peaceful.

5. In response, on 31 December, the leaders of the opposition political parties Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain, the Parti africain pour une transformation radicale et l'intégration des États and the Union pour le renouveau centrafricain issued separate statements voicing concern over shrinking political and civic space, questioning the President's readiness to dialogue with all political parties and calling for concrete measures from the President towards dialogue.

6. On 3 January, the Minister for Youth, Sports and Civic Education launched the Coalition Touadéra 2025 initiative to support Mr. Touadera's candidacy in the next presidential election. On 7 January, the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la Constitution reiterated calls for a direct dialogue with Mr. Touadera, demanded a transparent electoral process and stated that they would use all legal means to oppose Mr. Touadera running for a third term, which they argued would lead to a political crisis. In response, on 10 January, the Spokesperson of the Presidency indicated that the President remained open to dialogue.

7. From 1 October to 30 December, the National Assembly held its second regular session, during which it adopted a corrective finance law for 2024, revising the national budget to \$537.6 million. During the year, revenue increased by 1.3 per cent, reaching \$270.8 million, while external budget support increased by 0.8 per cent, reaching \$55.7 million. The Assembly also passed the 2025 national budget of approximately \$550 million, with nearly half (\$258 million) sourced externally. A deficit of approximately \$41 million¹ is anticipated in the 2025 budget. The Assembly also adopted key legislative measures, including the law on the promotion and protection of human rights defenders in the Central African Republic, the decree ratifying the African Charter on Values and Principles of Public Service and Administration and the organic law on the High Authority for good governance.

Peace process

8. The Government took measures to improve border management, in line with the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the joint road map for peace in the Central African Republic of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. On 17 January, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Local Development and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic inaugurated the Bembéré multi-service border post in the presence of local Central African and Chadian authorities, as well as development partners. This first-ever multi-service border post in the Central African Republic, built with the support of MINUSCA, represents a milestone in implementing the national border management policy. The Government also made further progress with the mapping of existing and envisaged border posts and with the drafting of procedures to enhance coordination

¹ Fiscal deficit, including grants.

among relevant government services with the support of MINUSCA, relevant agencies and the European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic.

9. Certain armed groups signatory to the Political Agreement continued to defer their return to the peace process, affecting its smooth implementation. On 25 October, the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement Fondamentale (CPC-F), a splinter group formed in September from the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), issued a communiqué declaring the resumption of hostilities, citing continued attacks against its positions by the Government and some of its security partners. On 8 November 2024, the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), which had withdrawn from CPC to return to the Political Agreement in November 2023, announced its decision to join CPC-F, citing stalled discussions with the Government and the continued detention of its leader, Mahamat Al-Khatim, in Chad as reasons. On 28 November, CPC-F released a communiqué reaffirming its intention to overthrow the Government.

10. On 20 November, a communiqué was issued announcing the creation of the Coalition militaire de salut du peuple et le redressement, led by Armel Sayo, a leader of the self-dissolved Révolution et justice-Sayo, a signatory of the Political Agreement. The new group is not part of CPC or CPC-F, and, while it has reaffirmed its commitment to national reconciliation, it is unclear whether it wishes to join the peace process. On 17 January, Armel Sayo was arrested in Douala, Cameroon, accused of war crimes and orchestrating a coup against the Government of the Central African Republic in 2021.

11. Building on recommendations from the national high-level conference on transhumance in May 2024, local-level conferences were held in all 20 prefectures from October 2024 to January 2025. These conferences brought together local authorities, as well as representatives of civil society, women and youth to develop concrete and actionable recommendations to promote peaceful transhumance, including by leveraging conflict prevention mechanisms and community radio that are supported by MINUSCA.

12. Prefectural implementation mechanisms under the Political Agreement continued to convene local authorities, representatives of demobilized armed groups, religious leaders, civil society and women's organizations around initiatives promoting peace and social cohesion. For example, on 31 December, members of the Nana-Mambéré mechanism visited Yongoro-Mbolaye to address anti-balaka combatants targeting transhumant herders. They met with 418 people, including 102 women, to raise awareness of peaceful cohabitation, the smooth integration of returnees into communities and conflict resolution through dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation measures, while promoting disarmament.

13. The Government continued to implement the national disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme for combatants from armed groups that remained within the Political Agreement framework, as well as for combatants who have expressed willingness to disarm and be demobilized despite the reluctance of their respective armed group leaders to rejoin the peace process. Following outreach, Government mobile teams, with MINUSCA support, conducted a series of disarmament and demobilization operations for a total of 383 combatants, including 40 women, in the Haute-Kotto, Mbomou, Nana-Mambéré, Ombella MPoko, Ouaka and Ouham Prefectures. The Government continued to address cases of individual combatants disengaging from armed groups in an ad hoc manner, including by ensuring their safety and processing their registration through the national programme.

14. From November 2024 to January 2025, 322 former combatants were enrolled in socioeconomic reintegration activities supported by the World Bank in Haute-Kotto,

Lobaye, Ombella MPoko, Ouaka and Ouham Prefectures. On 31 January, 125 former combatants and 3,344 elements affiliated with armed groups not eligible to join the national disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme completed socioeconomic-related training supported by the Peacebuilding Fund and the United Nations country team in Bambari, Mobaye, Obo and Zemio. MINUSCA continued to implement community violence reduction projects involving cash-for-work activities, income-generating initiatives and vocational training in 10 prefectures. In one such project, a maternity ward in Bambouti, Haut-Mbomou Prefecture was renovated and expanded, in December, with equipment provided by the United Nations Population Fund.

Electoral process

15. On 18 October, the National Electoral Authority presented a revised electoral calendar rescheduling local elections to 13 July 2025, with voter registration beginning on 24 November. However, the extended duration of the initial phase of voter registration has impacted the electoral timelines.

16. The National Electoral Authority also announced an increased budget of \$19 million from \$14.7 million owing to operational needs, with \$12 million managed by the basket fund administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and \$7 million by the National Electoral Authority. As at 1 February, \$7.1 million from the Government, the European Union, MINUSCA and other international partners had been disbursed to the basket fund, with an additional \$1.2 million pending disbursement and \$0.5 million pledged.

17. On 24 November, the National Electoral Authority launched the first of two phases of the voter registration process with support from MINUSCA and UNDP. Beginning in Bangui and expanding to 10 other prefectures, the first phase concluded on 20 December. On 16 and 24 January, during a meeting of the strategic committee for elections chaired by the Prime Minister, the National Electoral Authority reported that 2,411 out of 2,469 voter registration centres opened across the 11 prefectures during the planned period, amounting to 97.65 per cent, despite security and access challenges. National authorities committed to resuming operations in centres that were unable to open.

18. While the registration process was generally peaceful, logistical and security challenges related mainly to criminal activities led to delays in opening some voter registration centres outside Bangui. From 28 November to 3 December, anti-balaka and Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R) combatants attacked voter registration agents near Bossangoa, Ouham Prefecture, including assaulting two agents inside the Bongozi village registration centre, leading to the temporary withdrawal of voter registration agents from the Benzambé sub-prefecture. On 8 December, around Boyo, Ouaka Prefecture, voter registration was halted at 11 registration centres following alleged threats by Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) combatants. The same day, in Batangafo, Ouham-Fafa Prefecture, 36 agents were unable to conduct registration owing to security concerns.

19. In support of national defence and security forces, MINUSCA intensified patrols and established temporary bases in Kabo, Moyenne-Sido and Ouandago, Ouham-Fafa Prefecture and in Aigbando, Haute-Kotto Prefecture. In Bangui, national defence and security forces, supported by MINUSCA, jointly secured 211 of the 250 voter registration centres.

20. On 18 December, the Prime Minister and the Special Representative launched the National Committee for Election Security to further strengthen the implementation of the integrated elections security plan and build on lessons learned from the first phase of voter registration for the second phase. Participants, including the Prime Minister,

the Deputy Chief of Staff of the national defence forces and MINUSCA, agreed to strengthen coordination mechanisms, especially at the prefectural level, to enhance operational responses.

21. The second phase of voter registration, initially scheduled to start on 8 January in the nine remaining prefectures in the Central African Republic and countries designated for diaspora out-of-country voting, was postponed to 11 March for financial and operational reasons, as announced by the National Electoral Authority during a joint press conference with MINUSCA on 5 February. During the meeting of the strategic committee for elections on 16 January, the Government and the National Electoral Authority reported that measures were being implemented to address those challenges to continuing operations, without providing a specific start date.

22. The Government, in collaboration with MINUSCA and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), continued to actively promote the participation of women, youth, internally displaced persons and returnees in voter registration. As at 31 January, MINUSCA had supported these efforts by conducting 881 awareness and civic education activities throughout the country, reaching 60,897 persons, including 30,954 women. MINUSCA and the United Nations country team continued to raise with the Government and the National Electoral Authority the need to include internally displaced persons, returnees and refugees in the electoral process, notably in voter registration.

Regional and international engagement

23. From 21 to 23 October, the fifteenth session of the High-level Joint Commission on Cooperation between the Central African Republic and Chad was held in Bangui, five years after the fourteenth session in N'Djamena in December 2019. In the joint communiqué published after the meeting, on 23 October, the Committee announced, inter alia, the signature of four instruments, namely, two bilateral agreements on regular political consultations and security matters, a protocol on the creation of a joint force to secure common borders and a tripartite agreement between the Central African Republic, Chad and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the repatriation of Central African refugees currently in Chad.

24. Likewise, the Government continued to strengthen other regional partnerships. On 18 October 2024 in Kinshasa and on 23 January 2025 in N'Djamena, the Minister of Defence and Army Reconstruction of the Central African Republic signed two distinct military cooperation agreements with its counterparts from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Chad, respectively.

25. From 25 to 29 November, the Central African Republic hosted the fifty-eighth meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. The meeting resulted in the adoption of the Bangui Declaration, in which the participants noted progress in the implementation of the peace process while condemning violence perpetrated by residual armed groups against civilians in the Central African Republic and called on Member States to prevent the supply of weapons to these armed factions.

III. Security situation, protection of civilians and the extension of State authority

26. Despite some security gains achieved in different parts of the country, the security situation remains concerning in certain areas, in particular in the north-west, the east and, to a lesser extent, the centre of the country. Armed predation and confrontations were concentrated around mining sites and along transhumance

corridors. The beginning of the transhumance season in October was marked by a surge in armed group activities, leading to killings, kidnapping and looting along transhumance corridors, as well as increased sexual violence and threats from explosives in some areas. The impact of the conflict in the Sudan on the Central African Republic deepened, with increased movements of armed combatants in the north-east. In the south-east, the Azande Ani Kpi Gbé armed group attempted to expand westward from Haut-Mbomou Prefecture to Rafai in Mbomou Prefecture. There was also an increase in violations of the Political Agreement (see annex 1, figure I). In response, MINUSCA reinforced its stabilization efforts in Basse Kotto, Haut-Mbomou, Mbomou and Vakaga Prefectures in close coordination with the Government.

27. The situation deteriorated in the north-west owing to a series of attacks by 3R on isolated national defence and security forces positions, prompting counter-attacks on their strongholds. Armed group combatants repositioned and targeted civilians around mining areas and transhumance corridors. 3R and anti-balaka combatants engaged in criminal activities in Nana-Mambéré and Mambéré Prefectures, including ambushing and looting convoys, as well as threatening civilians and foreign mine workers. In addition, around Ngoutere village, Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, armed clashes between 3R combatants and national defence and security forces displaced at least 13,500 civilians, of whom 5,000 have remained displaced since September. From 18 to 25 November, MINUSCA reinforced its presence in Bocaranga, Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, and deployed an additional search capacity for explosive ordnance to Paoua to support threat mitigation and enable access.

28. In the south-west, on 18 November, a Cameroonian truck driver was killed, allegedly by other security personnel, on the Bossembélé-Boali road, resulting in a two-week suspension of supplies from Cameroon to Bangui by the Garoua Boulai truck drivers' union. Cameroonian truck drivers resumed road transportation to Bangui following high-level consultations between Cameroon and the Central African Republic on improving security and safety measures on supply roads.

29. In the centre of the country, fewer incidents were registered as compared with the west and the east. Armed clashes between armed groups and national defence and security forces were reported in Basse-Kotto and Ouaka Prefectures during multiple operations against armed groups by national defence forces and other security personnel. On 12 October, in Zangba, Basse-Kotto Prefecture, UPC combatants ambushed a national defence force patrol, killing two soldiers. On 6 November, in Farazala, Ouham-Fafa Prefecture, some 30 CPC-F combatants attacked an outpost of the national defence forces following the Coalition's communiqué of 25 October, in which it threatened to resume hostilities unless the Government ceased attacks on its positions.

30. On 25 November, near Kopia village, Ouaka Prefecture, suspected UPC combatants killed 10 motorcycle taxi drivers and passengers. MINUSCA established a temporary operating base in the area to protect civilians, prevent intercommunal tensions and facilitate investigations. On 25 December, MINUSCA also established a temporary operating base in Zangba after a joint assessment with the Government on the need to protect civilians and create a secure environment in the area in the face of persisting security challenges. On 29 January, MINUSCA facilitated the visit of the Minister of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Local Development and the Minister for Gender Advancement and the Protection of Women, the Family and Children Protection to Zangba, during which the sub-prefect was officially installed. The Minister of Territorial Administration, Decentralization and Local Development also indicated the imminent deployment of the internal security forces to the area.

31. On 11 February, near Zobossinda village, on the Ndélé-Akursoubak road, Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture, unidentified armed elements attacked a MINUSCA long-range patrol. One peacekeeper was seriously wounded by gunfire and subsequently died of his injuries. Following the incident, MINUSCA reinforced patrols in the area.

32. In the north-east, the security situation continued to be marked by spillover effects from the conflict in the Sudan. Central African armed groups – including UPC, the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and the Parti du rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine (PRNC), as well as the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – were active in Adjar-Fatna, Boromata, Illidris, Vakaga Prefecture, Nzinzir and Tissi-Fongoro, a village located at the juncture between the borders of the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan, in October and November. On 27 October, 30 RSF combatants arrived on 16 pick-up trucks in Illidris, and on 25 November, 60 FPRC combatants moved from this locality to Tissi-Fongoro.

33. The arrival of Sudanese herders and their cattle increased tensions in the Am-Dafock-Birao area. On 18 November, in Am-Dafock, national defence forces arrested an armed Sudanese herder. Two days later, the Sudanese RSF elements fired shots in the air from the Sudanese side of the border, demanding his release. Similarly, on 14 January, national defence forces arrested two suspected armed RSF combatants in the same locality. To mitigate subsequent tensions, the herder and RSF combatants were released, and a local meeting was organized at the request of the Prefect, during which Sudanese community leaders committed to meeting with the local RSF commanders and community leaders of Um Dafuq, the Sudan, and prevent Sudanese entering the Central African Republic with weapons. On 17 January, in the same prefecture, skirmishes between suspected RSF and the Chadian armed group Rassemblement Populaire pour la Justice et l'Égalité au Tchad resulted in the killing of at least two Chadian armed combatants. The national defence forces and MINUSCA maintained their presence in Am-Dafock to mitigate the risk of escalating tension and violence.

34. In the south-east, new violence erupted in Haut-Mbomou and Mbomou Prefectures. Wagner Ti Azande (WTA), supported by Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) combatants, repeatedly targeted civilians over alleged association with UPC and the Muslim community. From 1 to 7 October, WTA and AAKG combatants committed atrocities against civilians in Dembia and Rafai, targeting, in particular, Muslim and Fulani communities, as well as Sudanese asylum-seekers, killing in total 14 individuals and raping 21 women. On 20 and 22 October, in Mboki, WTA combatants assaulted five civilians who had facilitated the disarmament of two UPC combatants. On 3 December, near Djema, WTA combatants attacked a Fulani camp, resulting in five fatalities, including two women. Lastly, on 22 January, WTA combatants reportedly attacked a Fulani camp located near Mboki with machetes, resulting in the death of 13 civilians. Following the incident, 10 WTA combatants were arrested in Mboki on 23 January and transferred to Bangui. On 24 January, in Bangui, another four WTA combatants and two AAKG leaders were arrested. In recent months, the MINUSCA Force has maintained or established temporary operating bases in Bambouti, Mboki and Dembia to prevent additional violence.

35. The crime rate in Bangui increased by 26 per cent as compared with the previous reporting period. The explosive ordnance threat persisted mainly in the north-west and Bangui. During the reporting period, the number of explosive ordnance incidents and casualties decreased, however. MINUSCA conducted risk education activities with the local population in Bangui, Mambéré-Kadeï, Nana-Grébizi, Nana-Mambéré and Ouham Prefectures, leading to an increase in the safe disposal of explosive ordnance devices (see annex I, figure III).

36. On 13 December, MINUSCA inaugurated the first post-blast investigation laboratory in the Central African Republic. In January, MINUSCA conducted the first post-blast investigation training for 25 national defence and security forces personnel. MINUSCA continued its provision of support to the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, focusing on decentralizing its operations. On 30 October, a presidential decree was issued appointing the seven regional directors and their teams.

37. The Government, with support from MINUSCA and the United Nations country team, continued efforts to extend State authority in conflict-affected areas. During the reporting period, nearly all appointed officials, including the seven Governors and 13 Prefects were present at their posts (see annex I, figure IV).

38. On 12 October, the President led a high-level visit to Bossangoa with the United Nations and international and regional partners to assess progress in stabilization projects that began on 30 June 2023 and to inaugurate rebuilt socioeconomic infrastructure, including administrative offices and a market, to deliver basic services to local communities. In Bambouti, MINUSCA, jointly with the United Nations country team, implemented projects to restore basic social services and improve water supply. MINUSCA also initiated the rehabilitation of the road between Obo and Bambouti, a strategic route linking the Central African Republic to South Sudan.

39. To enhance governance and accountability in the security sector, the Government and MINUSCA organized a meeting of relevant national oversight bodies in November, resulting in commitments to revise relevant legal frameworks and assess resource needs of the oversight mechanisms. The Mission also supported access to military justice by completing the rehabilitation and equipment of the Permanent Military Tribunal in Bouar. In October 2024 and January 2025, respectively, the Inspectorate General of the National Army visited Bambari, Ouaka Prefecture, and Kaga-Bandoro, Nana-Grébizi Prefecture, to inspect the working conditions of the national defence forces and reinforce disciplinary standards.

IV. Human rights and the rule of law

Human rights

40. Human rights violations and abuses increased by 18 per cent during the reporting period, while the number of victims increased by 26 per cent (see annex I, figure VI). The human rights situation continued to be impacted by attacks of armed groups against civilians and military operations by the national defence and security forces with the support of other security personnel against armed groups in Lim-Pendé, Mbomou and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures, coupled with instability in border areas. MINUSCA conducted field and remote investigations into grave human rights violations and abuses, including those committed during the attacks from 1 to 7 October by WTA and AAKG in Dembia, Mbomou Prefecture, targeting mainly the Muslim community.

41. On 25 November, the Minister of Justice convened the first meeting of the national steering committee in charge of implementing the national human rights policy, comprising representatives of the Government and national institutions, as well as the diplomatic corps, civil society organizations and the United Nations. The participants assessed the status of implementation of the policy and prioritized, inter alia, operationalizing the technical secretariat and enhancing cooperation between MINUSCA, the United Nations country team and the national human rights policy secretariat. In December, a national workshop on the challenges of professionalizing human rights organizations was held with the support of MINUSCA, the Office of the

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the European Union. It brought together 60 participants, including 26 women, from national human rights institutions together with members of the National Assembly and civil society throughout the country.

42. Serious violations of children's rights continued during the reporting period (see annex I, figure VIII). On 24 October, following MINUSCA advocacy, AAKG issued a command directive prohibiting their combatants and those of WTA from perpetrating grave child rights violations and committing to the unconditional release of children associated with AAKG and WTA; no children were released by AAKG or WTA during the reporting period. MINUSCA started regular engagement and awareness-raising sessions with national defence and security forces and local authorities on procedures for transferring children associated with armed forces and armed groups to civilian authorities, in line with the handover protocol adopted on 30 September.

43. Conflict-related sexual violence persisted throughout the country but was most prevalent in Lim-Pendé, reportedly perpetrated primarily by Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (see annex I, figure VII). Rape and gang-rape remained the most documented forms of conflict-related sexual violence. MINUSCA continued to engage the Government in the implementation of the 2019 joint communiqué of the Central African Republic and the United Nations on preventing and combating conflict-related sexual violence, including by raising community awareness against the stigmatization of conflict-related sexual violence survivors and by training national defence and security forces.

44. In line with the human rights due diligence policy, MINUSCA trained 133 members of internal security forces and 140 national defence forces, including 62 women, on their roles and responsibilities in upholding human rights. At the request of the Government, MINUSCA screened 81 candidates selected by national defence authorities to join the non-operational training for non-commissioned officers in January, supported by the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic.

Rule of law

45. As at 1 February, 22 of the 25 courts outside Bangui were operational (see annex I, figure IV). On 15 November, following the recommendations of the disciplinary council of the council of magistrates held from 27 to 31 May, the President issued a decree dismissing four magistrates for corruption, while five others received lighter disciplinary sanctions for breach of duties. This is the first time since the 2013–2014 crisis that magistrates have faced disciplinary sanctions, reflecting progress in the oversight and accountability system.

46. From 4 to 19 November, the Bambari Court of Appeal held its first criminal session since 2010 in its new facilities, built with the support of MINUSCA and inaugurated in September 2024. Sixteen defendants were convicted of various crimes, including rape, and received sentences ranging from 2 to 20 years of imprisonment. From 3 to 31 December, the Bangui Court of Appeal held its second criminal session of 2024. Forty-five defendants were convicted of various crimes, including rape, and received sentences ranging from one year to life imprisonment.

47. On 24 December, the Prosecutor General issued an order to release the former minister of tourism, Dieudonné Ndomaté, and dropped the charges against him, which included undermining State security, conspiracy and rebellion. He was subsequently freed from Camp de Roux after having been in pretrial detention since June 2021. On 26 December, the Bangui Court of Appeal convicted and sentenced a Member of Parliament, Dominique Ephrem Yandocka, to one year in prison for conspiracy but ordered his immediate release, as he had already spent one year in pretrial detention.

48. On 13 December, the Trial Chamber of the Special Criminal Court convicted and sentenced four defendants in the *Ndélé 1* case to prison terms of 15 and 20 years for several crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Ndélé on 29 April 2020. On 17 December, the *Ndélé 2* case opened before the Trial Chamber of the Special Criminal Court. Seven defendants are charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Ndélé and the surrounding area in March 2020.

49. The penitentiary system continued to suffer from overcrowding and limited financial resources, leading to food shortages and outbreaks of communicable diseases. Medical services for detainees have improved in Berberati prison owing to the expansion of its infirmary. While the prison administration convened weekly financial accountability meetings with the support of MINUSCA to discuss budget distribution, the budget increase has yet to be disbursed by the Government to enable the procurement of health supplies and food. On 31 December, further to the announcement in his New Year's address, the President issued a decree pardoning several categories of convicted prisoners. As at 1 February, 794 prisoners have been released, contributing to the decongestion of prisons.

Socioeconomic and humanitarian situation

50. On 16 October, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted the third review of its Extended Credit Facility programme for the Central African Republic, lowering the 2024 economic growth forecast from 1.4 per cent to 1.0 per cent. The reduced growth forecast was attributed to disruptions to the electricity supply, delays in fuel imports via the Oubangui River, insecurity in mining areas and high fuel prices. From 9 to 16 January, IMF visited Bangui to conclude its review after discussions in late October failed to secure an agreement to release the third tranche from the Extended Credit Facility owing to shortcomings in fuel sector reform and revenue collection, exacerbating cash flow challenges. Discussions were focused on financial reforms, taxpayer registration and revenue mobilization through higher contribution from all tax bases, as well as reforms of the fuel price structures for enhanced tax collection and lower pump prices.

51. On 3 December, the African Development Bank approved approximately \$11.7 million in budgetary assistance under an economic and social reform programme to enhance economic governance and support public finance management reforms.

52. At the annual plenary of the Kimberly Process, held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, from 12 to 15 November, participants decided to fully lift restrictions on exports of raw diamonds from the Central African Republic that had been adopted in 2013. On 15 November, the Government issued a communiqué welcoming the decision and called on citizens of the Central African Republic to engage in diamond mining in all mining zones in the country in strict compliance with the national Mining Code and Kimberley principles for exports.

53. From 22 to 24 January 2025, the Ministry of the Economy, Planning and International Cooperation held a workshop to discuss the implementation of the national development action plan for 2024–2028 and priority actions to be undertaken. The action plan sets out 49 priority reforms with a corresponding budget of \$12.8 billion, as well as a database of 110 major programmes and 543 projects, with a total cost of \$21.7 billion.

54. By the end of December, the 2024 humanitarian response plan, targeting 1.9 million vulnerable people with a budget of \$367.7 million, was funded with \$226 million. As at 1 February, the 2025 humanitarian response plan targeting 1.8 million vulnerable people was funded with \$30.8 million (see annex I, figure IX). Humanitarian efforts were hampered by poor roads and ferry conditions during the

rainy season, combined with security challenges in parts of the central and eastern regions.

55. The lack of access to water, sanitation and hygiene heightened vulnerabilities, increasing risks of gender-based violence for women and malnutrition among children. Twenty-seven per cent of gender-based violence survivors received medical and psychological support within 72 hours.

56. As at 1 February, there remained close to 465,500 internally displaced persons registered in the Central African Republic, 675,341 Central African Republic refugees and asylum-seekers registered in neighbouring countries and 54,011 refugees hosted in the Central African Republic, mostly from the Sudan (see annex I, figure X). In Birao, specifically, the number of Sudanese refugees at the Korsi site increased by 4,064 individuals, from 14,665 to 18,729 refugees. The United Nations country team continues to support the Government in providing assistance to address the humanitarian needs related to the influx of refugees to Birao.

V. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

Performance optimization

57. In line with its five-year political strategy, the Mission continued to explore ways to more effectively implement its mandate while improving efficiency. On 11 December, a second seminar on the new MINUSCA mandate was held, co-organized by the Government and the Mission following the adoption of Security Council resolution [2759 \(2024\)](#) on 14 November. Participants at the seminar, chaired by the Prime Minister and attended by line Ministers, the Special Representative and Mission senior leadership, members of the United Nations country team and representatives of the diplomatic corps, reviewed progress under the previous MINUSCA mandate and discussed priorities, challenges and prospects for the new mandate. They highlighted effective coordination as crucial for optimizing mandate delivery. The Prime Minister emphasized the importance of further efforts to support the extension of State authority.

58. MINUSCA delivered multifaceted support to the Government, enhanced its capacities to access remote areas and supported national institutions to implement the Political Agreement. The Mission also increased its presence in regions bordering the Sudan and South Sudan, such as in Haut-Mbomou and Haut-Kotto Prefectures, where the security situation appears particularly fragile owing to cross-border dynamics and vulnerabilities in common border areas.

59. MINUSCA further improved its mobility, fuel supply and access to remote locations, alongside efforts to optimize resources for effective mandate delivery. MINUSCA implemented rationing measures in response to disruptions to the fuel supply, while undertaking efforts to stabilize the overall supply chain, including by increasing fuel storage capacity in remote locations. Ferry damage and poor road conditions, however, continued to hamper logistics supply, as well as the deployment of MINUSCA and national defence and security forces to identified hotspots. MINUSCA continued to repair ferries as needed for its operations, including two at Dembia and Rafai Chinko, Mbomou Prefecture, with two such repairs under way at Kadjema and Kere.

60. The Mission delivered supplies to peacekeepers by airlift to deeper field locations previously inaccessible by air, including during the rainy season. This was made possible owing to new capabilities, such as the military aviation transport unit (C-130), and improved transport and logistics, such as enhanced airfield capacity in

Bossangoa, Mboki, Ndélé and Paoua. The C-130 aircraft significantly enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of cargo transport and troop rotation.

61. MINUSCA distributed two portable barrel incinerators to contingents at Dilapoko and Carnot in Mambéré-Kadéï and Mambéré Prefectures, respectively, to reduce open burning and improve the management of solid and biomedical waste disposal.

62. MINUSCA made efforts to enhance opportunities for local vendors, including by conducting business seminars and other initiatives in various locations in the Central African Republic. The seminars were aimed at informing potential vendors about United Nations procurement requirements in order to enhance the level of participation by local suppliers in the Mission's procurement activities, which are conducted in compliance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules.

63. Progress was made in the implementation of the MINUSCA action plan for the enhancement of peacekeeping-intelligence and early warning capacity, in particular in enhancing coordination. The Mission organized four specialized training sessions on peacekeeping-intelligence for more than 500 civilian and uniformed MINUSCA personnel to enhance their skills in information-gathering and analysis of developments and incidents related to the protection of civilians.

64. The Mission finalized its misinformation and disinformation strategy to detect and respond to hostile media content in an efficient and timely manner. The Mission is using automated monitoring of social media and radio to identify disinformation attacks and strengthened its engagement and communication at the local level to foster understanding of the Mission's mandate and operations.

65. MINUSCA trained 534 of its uniformed personnel, including 82 women, in explosive threat mitigation, focusing on the most exposed units in the west. This included risk awareness, post-blast investigation, search and detection and convoy commander courses. MINUSCA also trained 521 United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers, including 142 women, in explosive risk awareness to support safe operations throughout the country.

66. As at 1 February, the MINUSCA military component deployed 13,990 troops (9.19 per cent women) out of an authorized strength of 14,400 personnel, including 425 staff officers (101 women) and 151 military observers (51 women). The MINUSCA police component deployed 3,005 personnel (16.45 per cent women) out of an authorized strength of 3,020 personnel, comprising 586 individual police officers (180 women) and 2,419 personnel (317 women) in 14 formed police units and 1 protection support unit. A total of 1,571 civilian personnel (32 per cent women), comprising 706 international staff members, 592 national staff members and 273 United Nations Volunteers, as well as 103 government-provided corrections personnel, were serving with MINUSCA, representing 92 per cent of the 1,715 approved positions.

Safety and security of United Nations personnel

67. During the reporting period, security incidents involving United Nations personnel increased as compared with the previous period (see annex I, figure XII). In total, seven personnel died, one shot by armed elements, five owing to illness and one from a road traffic accident. In addition, 33 sustained injuries from road traffic accidents.

68. From 2 October to 1 February, MINUSCA recorded one violation of the status-of-forces agreement, compared with three incidents during the previous reporting period. On 19 October, MINUSCA fuel trucks were blocked by the Central African Road Transport Bureau near Bangui. The trucks were released on 18 November following discussions between MINUSCA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse

69. From 2 October to 31 January, MINUSCA documented seven allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving two minor and nine adult female victims. All victims were provided with assistance, except for one who chose to decline support. The alleged perpetrators include seven military and four civilian personnel. Four allegations reportedly occurred in 2024, and three from 2017 to 2023. Three troop-contributing countries appointed national investigators. The United Nations is investigating the four allegations involving civilian personnel.

70. MINUSCA has enhanced its reporting mechanism and mitigation efforts throughout the Mission area. Actions include the launch of community awareness initiatives, as well as capacity-building activities for members of the 48 operational local community networks to support efforts to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.

VI. Financial considerations

71. The General Assembly, by its resolution [78/298](#) of 28 June 2024, appropriated the amount of \$1,171.6 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025. As at 4 February, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINUSCA amounted to \$570.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to \$3,348.8 million. Reimbursement of the costs of troop and formed police personnel, as well as contingent-owned equipment, has been made for the period up to 30 September 2024.

VII. Observations

72. I welcome the continued efforts of the Government to prepare for local, legislative and presidential elections to be held in 2025 and 2026, with the launching of the voters' registration process. I am, however, concerned about logistical and financial challenges to the timely and smooth conduct of voter registration. I encourage the Government and its partners to sustain efforts to register all eligible citizens, with particular attention to women, youth, minorities and internally displaced persons and returnees, as well as refugees. I urge the Government and all political actors to remain open to political dialogue for the holding of peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections in the best interest of the population of the Central African Republic. I wish to recall that the 2025–2026 elections represent a unique opportunity to consolidate gains made towards strengthening stability and democratic practices in the Central African Republic. The participation of all stakeholders is important for moving the political process forward and providing a conducive environment for sustainable stability. I reiterate my calls to partners and donors to provide the much-needed financial and material resources for the timely and orderly holding of the elections.

73. I am encouraged by continued positive developments regarding the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, notably as related to decentralization, border management and peaceful transhumance. I call upon the Government to fast-track the decentralization of the peace process to fully leverage the capacities of the prefectural level mechanisms in the regions. I commend the efforts of the Government to continue to implement its border management policy, including the inauguration of the multi-service border post at Bembéré, coupled with the reactivation of the bilateral joint committee with Chad, which will contribute to enhancing security and economic

cooperation. I encourage the Government to capitalize on the resolutions of the high-level national conference and local-level conferences on peaceful transhumance to yield concrete and lasting results for social cohesion, peace and prosperity. I call upon international partners to help sustain all these efforts and the Government to further enhance ownership of the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic.

74. I am concerned at the persistent insecurity in certain areas, fuelled by transhumance-related incidents and criminal activities, often driven by competition for access to and control of natural resources. I am concerned at the continued reluctance of certain leaders of armed groups to rejoin the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic. I call upon the Government to continue to advance political solutions and urge all armed groups to lay down their weapons and join the peace process in good faith. I further call upon the Government to sustain efforts to reach out to these armed group leaders with a view to achieving their swift return to the Political Agreement.

75. I remain concerned at the pernicious use of explosive ordnance in the Central African Republic, which will have a lasting impact on the population and environment. I am encouraged by decreasing numbers of incidents, resulting from the concerted efforts of MINUSCA and the Government. I once again call upon all parties to abide by international law and ban the use of explosive ordnance against civilians. I commend the inauguration of the first post-blast investigation laboratory, which will durably help national authorities to address explosive ordnance challenges.

76. I strongly condemn attacks on peacekeepers and recall that attacks targeting United Nations personnel may constitute war crimes under international law. MINUSCA will work closely with the Government to swiftly investigate the attacks and bring perpetrators to justice. I pay tribute to the courage and sacrifice of all civilian and uniformed personnel serving under MINUSCA who continue to operate in highly challenging conditions in the service of peace and stability in the Central African Republic.

77. I am encouraged by the Government's sustained commitment to improving the governance of the security sector through enhanced oversight mechanisms and democratic control of security institutions. Further efforts must be pursued on the reform of the security sector to scale up the capacities of national defence and security forces to enable them to fulfil their primary responsibility to protect the population and the territorial integrity of the Central African Republic. I also call upon the Government to fully leverage the deployment of local authorities to their posts and strengthen State authority across regions through the effective provision of basic services and security in remote areas.

78. I commend efforts undertaken to operationalize the national development plan and encourage further collaboration between the Government, the United Nations and multilateral partners, including the World Bank and the African Development Bank, to ensure strategic alignment around the peacebuilding priorities of the plan. I call upon the Government to build on this positive momentum by continuing to improve public finances management and revenue collection in 2025, as these are critical to consolidate hard-earned security gains.

79. I am encouraged by sustained efforts in the national disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme and the community violence reduction programme, including the operationalization of new socioeconomic reintegration projects. Offering employment and social opportunities are critical in consolidating security and disarmament gains. Continued support from donors and partners remains key to ensuring that the socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combatants contributes effectively to stability and peace.

80. I condemn the persistent violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, including conflict-related sexual violence. Human rights violations and abuses must stop immediately and be prevented in accordance with international human rights law. I call upon the Government to take prompt action to address human rights violations and abuses with religious overtones in Haut-Mbomou and Mbomou Prefecture, which, if unaddressed, may jeopardize social cohesion and stability, with further serious impacts on the protection of civilians. I commend efforts made by the Government to strengthen human rights frameworks, including the adoption of the law on the promotion and protection of human rights defenders and the operationalization of the National Human Rights Steering Committee.

81. I am encouraged by progress in some areas of the justice sector, including the increased number of operational courts and continued efforts to hold perpetrators accountable by the national courts and the Special Criminal Court. Fighting impunity remains critical to sustain peace and security efforts with a lasting impact. I commend efforts leading to improved access to healthcare for detainees and urge authorities to address the issues of long pretrial detention, overcrowding and food shortage situations in prisons.

82. I remain deeply concerned by the dire humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic. I deplore the persistent access challenges linked to limited infrastructure and the destabilizing activities of armed groups, and I firmly condemn attacks on humanitarian workers. I am appalled by the low number of gender-based violence survivors receiving timely support. I call upon partners and donors to help fully fund the Central African Republic humanitarian response plan to address the most urgent needs of the affected population.


83. MINUSCA has demonstrated its ability to anticipate, innovate and adapt in addressing the operational challenges that it faces in implementing its mandate. As 2025 will be dominated by preparations for elections, while MINUSCA continues to implement all its mandated tasks, including protection of civilians and support for the extension of State authority, it would be important that commensurate resources be given to the Mission in a timely manner. Furthermore, the Mission would continue to work closely with the Government to address disruptions to the fuel supply chain and ensure that the Mission enjoys full access and freedom of movement in the execution of its mandate.

84. I wish to renew my gratitude to the Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, Valentine Rugwabiza, for her steadfast and efficient leadership. I thank the civilian and uniformed personnel of MINUSCA and the United Nations country team for their dedication in performing their mandate, often in a challenging environment, and I commend the Mission's troop- and police-contributing countries. Lastly, I convey my gratitude to the regional, multilateral and non-governmental organizations and all other partners, including donor countries, for their continued commitment towards peace in the Central African Republic.

Annex I

A. Security situation, protection of civilians and extension of State authority


Figure I
Violations of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic



Source: MINUSCA/Joint Mission Analysis Cell.

For more details, see paragraph 26.

Figure II
Protection of civilians hotspot map, as at 1 February 2025




Source: MINUSCA/Protection of Civilians Unit.

Base map source: United Nations Geospatial.

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

For more details, see paragraph 26.

Figure III
Casualties due to explosive ordnance incidents




Source: MINUSCA/Mine Action Service.


For more details, see paragraph 35.

Figure IV
State authorities present at posts


(a) Civil administrators



(b) Judicial personnel



(c) Penitentiary personnel




Source: MINUSCA/Civil Affairs Section and Justice and Corrections Section.

Note: Some of the 295 newly trained civilian prison personnel were assigned and deployed to duty stations despite not having been formally incorporated into the government payroll. These are shown in the graph as non-integrated personnel.

For more details, see paragraphs 37 and 45.

Figure V
Internal security forces deployed outside Bangui




Source: MINUSCA/United Nations Police.

As at 31 January, 1,956 internal security forces personnel are deployed outside Bangui and 6,845 in the capital; 23 per cent of internal security forces personnel are women.

B. Human rights and rule of law

Figure VI
Human rights violations and abuses, 1 October 2024–31 January 2025


(a) Non-State armed groups



Source: MINUSCA/Human Rights Division.

Note: Percentages are based on the number of documented victims. Statistics include both signatories and non-signatories to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic.

For more details, see paragraph 40.


(b) State actors

Source: MINUSCA/Human Rights Division.

Note: Percentages are based on the number of documented victims. Statistics include both state actors and other security personnel.

For more details, see paragraph 40.

Figure VII
Conflict-related sexual violence, 1 October 2024–31 January 2025




Source: MINUSCA/Human Rights Division.

Note: An increase or decrease in conflict-related sexual violence is no indication of the scale of conflict-related sexual violence in the Central African Republic as conflict-related sexual violence is largely underreported. Chart percentages refer to the number of victims. Statistics include both signatories and non-signatories to the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic.

For more details, see paragraph 43.

Figure VIII
Grave violations against children, 1 October 2024–31 January 2025



Source: MINUSCA/Child Protection Unit and country task force on monitoring and reporting.


Note: Chart percentages refer to the number of violations.

For more details, see paragraph 42.

C. Humanitarian situation

Figure IX
Humanitarian response plan funding as at 1 February 2025


(Millions of United States dollars)



Source: MINUSCA/Integrated Office.

For more details, see paragraph 54.


Figure X
Internally displaced persons and refugees



Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

For more details, see paragraph 56.

Figure XI
Bridges and ferries constructed, repaired or initiated by the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic in
previous and current budget periods




Source: MINUSCA/Civil Affairs Section.
 Base map source: United Nations Geospatial.
 Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

For more details, see paragraph 59.

D. Safety and security of United Nations personnel

Figure XII
Security incidents affecting MINUSCA personnel



Source: MINUSCA/United Nations Department of Safety and Security.

For more details, see paragraph 67.

Annex II

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic: military and police
strength as at 1 February 2025**

Country	Military component				Police component	
	Experts on mission	Staff officers	Troops	Total	Formed police units	Individual police officers
Argentina	–	1	–	1	–	–
Bangladesh	12	36	1 375	1 423	–	6
Benin	4	1	–	5	–	–
Bhutan	2	5	180	187	–	–
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2	4	–	6	–	–
Brazil	3	6	–	9	–	–
Burkina Faso	–	8	–	8	–	41
Burundi	7	14	746	767	–	–
Cambodia	4	6	335	345	–	–
Cameroon	3	7	749	759	320	31
China	–	–	–	–	–	3
Colombia	2	–	–	2	–	–
Congo	1	3	–	4	180	–
Côte d'Ivoire	–	6	198	204	–	49
Czechia	3	–	–	3	–	–
Djibouti	–	–	–	–	180	37
Ecuador	–	2	–	2	–	–
Egypt	8	28	748	784	140	29
France	–	3	–	3	–	1
Gabon	–	–	–	–	–	–
Gambia	3	6	–	9	–	16
Ghana	4	10	–	14	–	4
Guatemala	2	2	–	4	–	–
Guinea	–	–	–	–	–	14
India	–	4	–	4	–	–
Indonesia	4	11	240	255	140	23
Jordan	3	7	–	10	–	39
Kazakhstan	–	2	–	2	–	–
Kenya	7	10	–	17	–	–
Madagascar	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mali	–	–	–	–	–	18
Mauritania	8	8	450	466	319	5
Mexico	1	1	–	2	–	–
Moldova (Republic of)	3	1	–	4	–	–
Mongolia	–	4	–	4	–	1
Morocco	5	22	750	777	–	–
Nepal	5	19	1 219	1 243	–	4

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military component</i>				<i>Police component</i>	
	<i>Experts on mission</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Individual police officers</i>
Niger	–	6	–	6	–	55
Nigeria	–	7	–	7	–	7
Pakistan	9	31	1 276	1 316	–	6
Paraguay	2	2	–	4	–	–
Peru	7	9	219	235	–	1
Philippines	2	1	–	3	–	–
Portugal	–	8	210	218	–	11
Romania	–	–	–	–	–	–
Russian Federation	3	9	–	12	–	–
Rwanda	9	27	2 108	2 144	640	43
Senegal	–	14	180	194	500	41
Serbia	2	4	70	76	–	–
Sierra Leone	4	3	–	7	–	–
Spain	–	–	–	–	–	4
Sri Lanka	–	4	110	114	–	–
Sweden	–	–	–	–	–	–
Togo	4	7	–	11	–	45
Tunisia	3	14	831	848	–	49
Türkiye	–	–	–	–	–	3
United Republic of Tanzania	–	6	510	516	–	–
United States of America	–	7	–	7	–	–
Uruguay	–	2	–	2	–	–
Viet Nam	1	7	–	8	–	–
Zambia	7	19	910	936	–	–
Zimbabwe	2	1	–	3	–	–
Total	151	425	13 414	13 990	2 419	586

Annex III

Map

