Central African Republic

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2552 (2020), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2021 and requested the Secretary-General to report on its implementation every four months. The present report provides an update on major developments in the Central African Republic since the previous report of the Secretary-General of 16 February 2021 (S/2021/146) and on the reinforcement of MINUSCA authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2566 (2021).

II. Political situation

2. The President and legislature were inaugurated in accordance with constitutional timelines, preserving democratic order and institutional stability in the Central African Republic. Efforts were made to revitalize the peace process in a context of heightened political tension, ongoing military operations and a deepening humanitarian crisis.

Political developments

3. The President, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, was inaugurated on 30 March. In his inauguration address to the nation, the President set out his vision and priorities for his second term, which include good governance, human rights, security and civic participation; economic development and enhanced livelihood opportunities for the people; healing ethnic, religious, cultural and other divisions in society; and implementing the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic, which he stressed remains the only valid political framework for peace and stability. While committing to political dialogue, the President also emphasized the importance of addressing impunity.

4. On 8 April, the Minister of Justice ad interim formally requested the President of the National Assembly to lift the parliamentary immunity of four opposition members of parliament in a criminal investigation against the former President, François Bozizé. Three are members of the political opposition Coalition de l’opposition démocratique 2020. All four have protested that the request was
politically motivated. They were also subject to a travel ban, which was eventually lifted on 31 May. This situation exacerbated tensions between the Government and opposition political parties, which were already heightened by the ongoing state of emergency.

5. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA, in close coordination with international partners, continued to engage all national stakeholders to encourage an inclusive, constructive and credible political dialogue to promote national stability, in accordance with his good offices mandate. He has also publicly underscored the importance of addressing human rights violations, irrespective of the perpetrators. Since March, MINUSCA and its leadership have been targeted by a disinformation campaign waged through social and local media, including by actors close to the presidential political party. In addition to threats against United Nations personnel, there were accusations of electoral manipulation and collusion with armed groups, as well as calls and demonstrations for the withdrawal of MINUSCA.

6. On 19 April, the President launched national consultations with a variety of stakeholders, excluding armed groups affiliated with the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement (CPC), to inform a potential “republican dialogue”. On 25 April, the Coalition de l’opposition démocratique 2020 declined to participate, claiming that the consultations were not inclusive and were therefore unlikely to achieve peace, national reconciliation and stability. On 10 June, the President announced the conclusion of the consultations and the imminent launch of the dialogue and requested the support of the international community.

7. The cohesion of CPC diminished owing to military setbacks and financial constraints, although it issued numerous communiqués setting out demands and conditions. Mr. Bozizé publicly formalized his leadership of CPC in a letter dated 18 February and subsequently appointed an interim president of the opposition Kwa Na Kwa political party that he previously led. Moderate CPC elements seeking to strengthen their political footing recommitted to the Political Agreement, distancing themselves from the coalition’s agenda and amplifying internal dissent. However, in Ouham Prefecture, Mr. Bozizé’s stronghold, national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel increased targeted attacks against Muslim communities in areas previously dominated by the Retour, réclamtion et réhabilitation (3R) and Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) armed groups, owing to their perceived complicity with CPC.

8. The Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Deputy Secretary-General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response and the Managing Director for Africa of the European External Action Service conducted a joint visit to Bangui from 2 to 5 June, where they met with Mr. Touadéra, representatives of political parties, the President of the National Assembly, the political opposition and civil society representatives to encourage credible and inclusive political dialogue to revitalize the peace process. They also denounced disinformation campaigns and the unprecedented instances of violations of the status-of-forces agreement and obstructions targeting MINUSCA and putting its personnel at risk.

9. Two rounds of legislative elections were conducted during the reporting period. On 14 March, elections were convened in 118 constituencies, including 68 constituencies in which elections were not held in December 2020 owing to violence perpetrated by CPC. As part of the integrated security plan for the elections, 8,000 MINUSCA troops and nearly 2,000 members of the national defence forces
deployed to secure priority constituencies; voting did not take place in three constituencies owing to CPC obstruction. National and international observer missions, including that of the African Union, expressed general satisfaction with the elections, noting improvements compared with the first round in December 2020. The National Electoral Authority announced that voter turnout was 66 per cent.

10. The Constitutional Court proclaimed the final results on 19 April. Sixty-nine candidates were elected; results were annulled in six constituencies. On 29 April, the court annulled results in one constituency owing to the successful candidate's association with armed groups. A total of 90 members of parliament were elected, including 22 who had secured seats in the December election, meeting the constitutional threshold required to convene the inaugural session of the new legislature. The majority of elected representatives are from the ruling Mouvement des coeurs unis (23), followed by independents (20), Kwa Na Kwa (7), Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain (7) and 33 others spread across 15 parties.

11. The National Assembly held a two-week extraordinary session from 3 May to swear in its new members for a five-year term. On 5 May, Simplice Mathieu Sarandji of the Mouvement des coeurs unis was elected President of the National Assembly. The following day, the 14 members of its bureau were elected, including 8 from the presidential party.

12. On 23 May, legislative elections were held in the remaining 50 constituencies, with operational, logistical and security support provided by MINUSCA. The National Electoral Authority announced that voter turnout was 62 per cent. According to the provisional results, 44 candidates were elected, of whom 4 were women, bringing the total to 15 women, including 3 in the National Assembly bureau. The remaining seats will be contested during a last round, scheduled for 25 July.

13. On 10 June, the Prime Minister, Firmin Ngrébada, submitted his resignation and that of his Government to the President prior to the expected formation of a new government, following the presidential election. On 11 June, the President appointed Henri-Marie Dondra, the Minister of Finance and Budget since 2016, as Prime Minister.

Electoral preparations

14. The National Electoral Authority made efforts to implement lessons learned from the elections on 27 December to enhance preparedness for the legislative elections on 14 March and 23 May. MINUSCA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported the authority with good offices, electoral training materials, outreach and civic education initiatives, data processing, operational planning, and logistical and security support.

15. To facilitate participation in the elections on 23 May, the National Electoral Authority decided that voter cards could be collected up until election day; over 97 per cent of registered voters collected their voter cards. Following requests by women candidates to reinforce security, MINUSCA and national security forces deployed patrols to enhance their safety and reactivated the related hotline.

16. As at 1 June, the basket fund managed by UNDP for the presidential, legislative and local elections through 2022 had spent or committed $30.7 million of the $30.9 million disbursed by the Government and its international partners. Efforts are under way to bridge the funding gap for the local elections, estimated at $9 million.

17. MINUSCA and the United Nations country team continued to provide integrated electoral support for the preparation of local elections, last held in 1988 and tentatively planned for the first quarter of 2022. The National Electoral Authority has initiated consultations with political actors, institutions and civil society to secure
support for those polls, including plans to update the voter list to include new voters, internally displaced persons, recently returned individuals and refugees.

Implementation of the Political Agreement

18. Efforts to reinvigorate the implementation of the Political Agreement continued despite ongoing armed confrontation with CPC. On 19 February, the President and the Prime Minister, Firmin Ngrébada, signed decrees rescinding the government appointments of 13 individuals, including 12 representatives of armed groups, as an apparent sanction of CPC members who had renounced the Agreement. Prefects subsequently excluded representatives of CPC-affiliated armed groups from participating in the Agreement’s implementation mechanisms, thereby weakening their effectiveness. On 11 May, local media reported the arrest of one of the dismissed ministers, a former anti-balaka leader.

19. On 16 April, the Executive Monitoring Committee of the Political Agreement adopted a report on the state of the Agreement’s implementation. Recommendations focused on improved national leadership and ownership, enhanced participation in national-level implementation mechanisms, sanctions for violations and the dissolution of armed groups. On that occasion, the Prime Minister announced that international partners must notify the Government of any contact with CPC-affiliated armed groups.

20. Succession issues arose following the death of the leader of 3R, Sidiki Abbas, on 25 March. The new self-proclaimed leader, “General” Bobbo, reaffirmed the affiliation of the group with CPC, while also seeking dialogue with the Government. On 5 April, the UPC leader, Ali Darassa, announced his intention to withdraw from CPC, which did not result in UPC re-engaging in the peace process. 3R, the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and UPC also faced internal rifts as some elements defected owing to their refusal to participate in CPC.

21. Local-level implementation mechanisms helped to minimize tensions surrounding the elections on 14 March and 23 May, particularly in Bamingui-Bangoran, Haute-Kotto, Ouaka and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures. In Vakaga Prefecture, sessions of the implementation mechanisms to address local and cross-border security concerns resumed on 24 March for the first time since intercommunal tensions erupted in September 2019.

22. Some progress was made in operationalizing the special mixed security units. In February, monthly allowance payments resumed, prompting the return of elements who had abandoned the Paoua and Bouar camp sites in December 2020. The units resumed patrols in Paoua in February, although frequent reports of misconduct against the population risked undermining relations with local authorities and communities. From March to May, engineering work at the training camp in Ndélé provided temporary employment for 48 recently demobilized individuals.

Local dialogue and reconciliation

23. The Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation, with support from MINUSCA and the United Nations country team, established local peace and reconciliation committees in Birao, Boali, Bossembélé, Bouar, Ndélé, Obo and Yaloké to prevent and resolve community conflicts, including the acceptance of returnees. In Birao, Bria and Ndélé, women-led peace initiatives were focused on reconciliation and income-generating activities, with the support of MINUSCA.

24. In Nana-Grébizi Prefecture, local authorities conducted a peace initiative between 23 March and 10 April to facilitate freedom of movement along the Ndometé-Mbrés axis, with the support of MINUSCA. The situation subsequently
improved, owing to better relations between Christian and Muslim communities in the area.

III. Security situation

25. The security situation remained fragile, particularly in the west, north-west and centre of the country, owing to continued clashes between armed groups, mainly CPC-affiliated, and national defence forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, resulting in loss of lives and displacement. There have also been reports of human rights abuses associated with such incidents. A widespread, unprecedented pattern of incidents had a negative impact on the ability of MINUSCA to implement its mandate and the Mission’s freedom of movement, in some cases seriously endangering its personnel.

26. As at 1 June, fewer violations of the Political Agreement had been recorded during the period under review (513) than during the previous reporting period (530). Civilians were the target of 302 violations, followed by movement restrictions against all actors (95), illegal military activities (79) and obstruction of State institutions, humanitarian organizations or the United Nations (37). UPC perpetrated the highest number of violations (116), followed by FPRC (111), national defence and internal security forces (78), anti-balaka (75), 3R (70) and Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) (63).

27. National defence forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, conducted offensive operations to clear the main supply route from Cameroon and dislodge CPC from positions in the west (controlled by 3R, MPC, FPRC and anti-balaka) and the centre (controlled by UPC). By April, the national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel had reached most armed group strongholds, including Batangafo, Bossangoa, Bozoum and Kaga-Bandoro, and areas bordering Chad, including Kabo, Markounda and Sido.

28. On 16 February, during clashes in Bambari between UPC and national defence forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, at least 17 people were killed, 24 were injured and 39 shelters at the Elevage site for internally displaced persons were destroyed. MINUSCA conducted robust patrols to protect civilians, including by evacuating them from the combat area. Over 800 civilians took refuge at MINUSCA positions. On 17 and 22 March, several hundred civilians sought refuge at MINUSCA bases during armed confrontations between national defence forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, and CPC-affiliated armed groups in Ouham Prefecture.

29. Offensive operations by the national armed forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, diminished the operational capabilities of CPC and confined the coalition to Basse-Kotto and Haut-Mbomou Prefectures and the far north-west of the country. CPC and 3R resorted to ambushes and targeted bridges to slow the advance of national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel. Since 21 April, MINUSCA has recorded seven explosive device-related incidents along main axes, principally in Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, which is under the control of 3R, that killed civilians, one internal security force element and three bilaterally deployed and other security personnel and injured civilians and two peacekeepers. On 6 May, 3R issued a statement denying responsibility and accusing bilaterally deployed and other security personnel of laying the explosives. MINUSCA was repeatedly prevented by national defence and internal security forces from accessing an incident site in Yongo village, north of Bouar, to investigate. While the actions of 3R delayed advances by national defence forces towards Koui, other CPC-aligned elements in the north, including FPRC, MPC and UPC, withdrew from
urban centres with minimal confrontation and moved to rural areas and the border with Chad.

30. Challenges in consolidating military gains led to continued instability. When the national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel left an area, armed groups frequently returned and retaliated against civilians. For example, on 18 March, 3R combatants shot two moto-taxi drivers in Bondiba, Nana-Mambéré Prefecture, killing one, for collaborating with the national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel during prior clashes. On 19 April, FPRC combatants returned to Mbrès, Nana-Grèbizi Prefecture, killed a civilian and issued death threats to the population for collaborating with government forces.

31. In the east, beginning on 20 February, CPC elements, mainly UPC and FPRC, withdrew from the Bangassou area towards the Yalinga-Nzacko-Bakouma triangle, isolated locations rich in mining sites. On 23 March, 18 United Nations personnel and 21 non-governmental organization personnel were temporarily detained by UPC and FPRC elements in Bakouma, Mbomou Prefecture, and robbed of eight vehicles and other assets. In April, national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel arrived in Bria, Haute-Kotto Prefecture, subsequently proceeding to Yalinga and Nzacko.

32. UPC and FPRC elements attempted to preserve their stronghold in the Bakouma area, by using counter-mobility measures, such as the destruction of infrastructure. On 9 May, MINUSCA re-established its presence in Bakouma after repairing six bridges destroyed by armed groups and deploying 300 peacekeepers. During the legislative elections on 23 May, bilaterally deployed and other security personnel shot down a MINUSCA drone in Bakouma, which was retrieved the following day.

33. Cross-border tensions persisted in Vakaga Prefecture. Armed Misseriya elements continued illegal taxation in Am Dafok, including of a humanitarian convoy on 3 February. A MINUSCA field mission revealed the growing control of Misseriya at the Sudanese border. On 16 April, armed Misseriya elements attacked a national defence forces patrol in Am-Sissia, killing three and injuring four. The remaining 27 national defence forces soldiers posted in Am Dafok left for Birao on 12 May, following persistent threats by armed elements. Their convoy was ambushed in the evening by presumed armed Misseriya elements near Dongore, injuring two.

34. Security incidents spiked in the north-west, starting from 25 May, primarily clashes between national defence forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, and CPC elements, particularly 3R, which triggered displacement of the population towards Chad and Cameroon. On 28 May, in Bang, close to the Cameroonian and Chadian borders in Ouham-Pendé Prefecture, national defence forces reportedly arrested and tortured approximately 20 civilians from the Muslim community, including five women, based on their perceived association with 3R combatants. On 30 May, 3R elements reportedly crossed the border into Chad, following clashes near Bang. National defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel reportedly followed in pursuit, resulting in clashes with Chadian forces and casualties on both sides. On the same day in Bang, bilaterally deployed and other security personnel obstructed the access of a United Nations delegation led by the Deputy Special Representative and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. Sporadic gunfire in the border area continued on subsequent days.

35. In Bangui, MINUSCA recorded 215 criminal incidents in the PK5 neighbourhood, compared with 172 in the previous reporting period. The increase was caused by former “self-defence groups” elements and the disruption of the electricity supply in the capital. Reporting of crimes by the population also increased.
IV. Regional engagement

36. On 20 April, the Heads of State of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region met in Luanda for a mini-summit on the situation in the Central African Republic, which the President attended. A working group was established, led by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Angola and Rwanda, to formulate recommendations on consultations with armed groups.

37. In a joint communiqué issued on 1 June, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Chad and the Central African Republic announced their agreement to establish an independent international commission comprising representatives of the United Nations, the African Union and ECCAS to clarify the security incident of 30 May.

V. Humanitarian situation

38. The humanitarian situation deteriorated to its most acute level in five years owing to violence, population displacement, surging food prices triggered by disruption of the country’s main supply route, the socioeconomic impact of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) and declining agricultural production caused by floods. Over half the population, 2.8 million people, need humanitarian assistance and protection, of whom 1.9 million are in dire need. Half of the country’s children are out of school.

39. One third of the population remained displaced. As at 1 June, approximately 738,000 Central Africans were internally displaced; an additional 688,000 were estimated to be living as refugees in neighbouring countries. Owing to electoral violence, approximately 388,000 people were newly displaced within the country from mid-December 2020 to mid-March 2021, while a further 121,000 people fled to neighbouring countries.

40. As at 1 June, 2.3 million people are food insecure, 633,000 of whom are facing emergency (phase 4) acute food insecurity, characterized as inability to meet daily food needs and at risk of starvation; this represents 13 per cent of the population and is higher than had been initially projected. Across the country, cases of severe acute malnutrition among children under 5 years of age increased by 16 per cent in the first five months of 2021 compared with the same period in 2020.

41. There was an upsurge in COVID-19 cases among the population in March, which spread to several towns outside Bangui. Of nearly 55,000 people tested as at 1 June, 7,091 people had tested positive, of whom 98 had died. The official figures do not fully reflect the impact of the pandemic owing to limited testing. As at 1 June, almost 7,000 Central Africans have been vaccinated.

42. Security incidents affecting humanitarian workers increased, primarily burglaries, robberies and obstruction of aid delivery. In the first five months of 2021, 229 incidents were recorded, compared with 154 in the same period in 2020. Since February, one humanitarian worker has been killed while providing aid and another 12 have been injured, including 9 in April.

43. As at 1 June, 32 per cent ($141.2 million) of the funding for the $444.8 million 2021 humanitarian response plan had been mobilized, leaving a funding gap of $303.6 million, required to provide life-saving aid to 1.84 million extremely vulnerable people.
VI. Protection of civilians

44. Protection concerns, including conflict-related civilian deaths, were exacerbated by the military operations of government forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, against CPC. They also impeded the freedom of movement of MINUSCA, hindering its protection activities.

45. MINUSCA and the United Nations country team strengthened community alert networks through capacity-building and refresher sessions to ease community tensions, resolve local conflicts and facilitate information-sharing. Between 1 February and 1 June, MINUSCA conducted 53 activities on the protection of civilians, benefiting 1,479 people, including 347 women.

46. Local authorities, community leaders and other partners facilitated awareness sessions in Berberati, Birao, Bossangoa, Bouar, Bria and Ndélé to reduce transhumance-related tensions, with the support of MINUSCA. The Mission and the United Nations country team supported national and local authorities, women’s organizations and youth organizations in mapping emerging transhumance routes and collecting data on gender-based violence in Ouham and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures to inform targeted, preventive and responsive protection activities.

VII. Extension of State authority and the rule of law

Extension of State authority

47. MINUSCA and the United Nations country team continued to support the Government in strengthening the deployment and presence of national authorities. As at 1 June, the deployment of local authorities had increased to 15 of 16 prefects, all 16 secretaries-general, 60 of 71 sub-prefects and 45 of 71 sub-prefectural secretaries. This enhanced local ownership of and involvement in the legislative elections of 14 March and 23 May, paving the way for the forthcoming local elections. However, the post-election period exposed weaknesses in the presence, capacity and legitimacy of State authority. The deployment of national defence and internal security forces and State officials did not enable the effective functioning of social and economic services, governance or the justice and security sectors.

Security sector reform

48. National authorities undertook a review of the national security sector reform strategy, following the challenges that national defence and internal security forces faced during the 2020 electoral period. The review concluded in April with a sector-wide workshop, including national security sector institutions and partners and MINUSCA. Improving security sector governance was among the priorities identified during the review.

49. MINUSCA and the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic continued to support and advise the Inspector General of the national armed forces in strengthening oversight. In March, the Inspector General visited Bangassou and Bouar to investigate the performance of the national forces during the electoral violence. The objective was to review the conditions of service, command and control, and other challenges.

50. MINUSCA continued to monitor integration efforts launched in November 2020 for 292 former combatants. According to official figures, it appears that 411 individuals, some of unclear origin, are enrolled in the training in the army, police
and gendarmerie, exceeding the national integration quota of 10 per cent for former combatants.

National armed and internal security forces

51. As at 1 June, the European Union Training Mission completed the training of five battalions of the national defence forces as well as 50 per cent of the non-commissioned officers. It also supervised the basic training of 1,647 recruits into the army, as part of the 2020 recruitment campaign.

52. As at 1 June, 4,904 internal security forces, including 2,254 police officers (596 women) and 2,650 gendarmes (351 women) had been deployed countrywide, except for Basse-Kotto Prefecture. During the reporting period, an additional 75 gendarmes, including 28 women, were deployed to 23 locations across the country, bringing the total to 1,230 stationed outside Bangui. MINUSCA, together with other technical and financial partners, continued advocacy efforts with the national authorities to review, assess and adjust police and gendarmerie performance within the security sector reform framework. The Mission, together with partners, continued to support capacity-building of the internal security forces to improve discipline and operational readiness of the gendarmerie, and to support police training academies, including through the ongoing training of 1,312 recruits since December.

53. The Mine Action Service trained 24 members of the national defence and internal security forces in weapons and ammunition management, including self-sustained ordnance disposal. The Service also delivered explosive ordnance risk-awareness sessions to 380 members of MINUSCA, the United Nations country team and humanitarian actors.

54. Despite advocacy efforts, MINUSCA did not recover its explosives that had been seized by the Ministry of Defence in July 2020, which were intended for the training and operationalization of explosive ordnance disposal teams in the national defence forces. Consequently, the project remained suspended.

Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation

55. The Government, with the support of MINUSCA, continued disarmament and demobilization operations targeting non-CPC armed groups. National authorities sought in parallel to obtain lists of eligible combatants from armed group factions not associated with CPC. Since February, 329 ex-combatants (including 54 women) have been disarmed and demobilized in Bangui from Séléka rénovée, Union des forces républicaines, Union des forces républicaines fondamentales and FPRC. In the process, 250 weapons of war, 16,356 rounds of ammunition and 222 grenades and other explosives were collected. In May, operations were conducted in Kaga-Bandoro and Mbrès, resulting in 162 combatants (including two women) being disarmed and demobilized from anti-balaka (Mokom wing) FPRC and MPC; 140 weapons of war, 3,450 rounds of ammunition and 23 rockets were collected in the process. A total of 3,023 former combatants, including 199 women, have entered the programme since its launch in December 2018.

56. Community violence reduction activities continued countrywide to mitigate the risks of youth recruitment into armed groups and contribute to local reconciliation. In the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui, reinsertion opportunities, as well as civic education and awareness-raising sessions on social cohesion, contributed to decreasing communal violence. As at 1 June, a total of 3,652 beneficiaries (including 1,525 women) had been registered, and 63 weapons of war, 1,393 artisanal weapons, 143 rounds of ammunition and 20 items of unexploded ordnance had been collected in Bangui, Bangassou, Bossangoa, Bouar, Bria and Kaga-Bandoro.
Justice and the rule of law

57. While the security situation had a negative impact on the functioning of the justice sector during the electoral period, the deployment of judicial personnel improved. As at 1 June, 67 per cent of 208 planned judicial personnel had taken up office, up from 55 per cent on 1 February. A total of 57 per cent of first instance and appellate courts were operational, up from 18 per cent.

58. Between 1 February and 1 June, MINUSCA transferred to national authorities in Bangui 34 individuals who had been arrested, including through urgent temporary measures, on suspicion of having committed various criminal offences. During the same period, national authorities, with the support of MINUSCA, opened three investigations into cases of attacks against peacekeepers.

59. Since February, national defence and internal security forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel have detained an estimated 61 individuals, including foreign nationals, considered to have links to armed groups, and transferred them to the Office centrafricain de répression du banditisme and to other detention facilities. MINUSCA provided technical advice to the judicial authorities to ensure compliance with relevant national legislation on the protection of detainees’ rights. However, national authorities have not made available information about the legal status or detention conditions of most of these individuals.

60. As at 1 June, 7 of the 10 prisons outside Bangui were operational, resulting in overcrowding, particularly in Bangui. Four of the eight prisons affected by electoral violence have since resumed operations, and 14 of the 311 prisoners who had escaped during the electoral violence were recaptured. MINUSCA and UNDP provided support for prison infrastructure projects, including necessary repairs following the electoral violence. On 5 March, 151 prison officer candidates completed essential training; UNDP and MINUSCA continued to advocate their inclusion in the national budget.

61. On 24 March, two international judges of the Special Criminal Court were sworn in by the President. The Special Prosecutor’s Office opened one additional preliminary investigation, while judges continued to investigate 10 cases.

62. The Bangui military tribunal, with the support of MINUSCA, held its first disciplinary hearings since the adoption of the code of military justice in 2017. Twenty-five cases were on the docket, two of which involved members of the national armed forces who had abandoned their posts during the electoral violence.

VIII. Human rights and the fight against impunity

63. The human rights situation deteriorated significantly. Between 1 February and 1 June, MINUSCA documented 344 incidents of human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law that affected 628 victims (349 men, 52 women, 51 boys, 30 girls, 80 groups of collective victims and 66 unidentified victims) and caused 82 conflict-related civilian deaths. This represents an increase of 28.4 per cent in the number of incidents and 40.2 per cent in the number of victims compared with the previous reporting period.

64. Armed groups that are signatories to the Political Agreement perpetrated the majority of documented human rights abuses, including the killing of civilians and the occupation of public infrastructure and private residences. They were involved in 197 incidents that affected 371 victims, of which at least 32 incidents affecting 56 victims were attributed to CPC.
65. MINUSCA documented 140 incidents perpetrated by national and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, affecting 249 victims, representing an increase of 278.4 per cent and 289 per cent, respectively, compared with the previous period. National defence and internal security forces were responsible for 66 incidents and 112 victims, while their joint actions with bilaterally deployed and other security personnel resulted in 37 incidents, affecting 82 victims. Bilaterally deployed and other security personnel were responsible for 37 incidents of human rights and international humanitarian law violations, affecting 55 victims.

66. Clashes between armed groups and national defence forces, assisted by bilaterally deployed and other security personnel, resulted in a spike in conflict-related civilian deaths, 82 as compared with 41 in the previous period, or a 100 per cent increase. Investigations by MINUSCA revealed that most civilian deaths resulted from indiscriminate, disproportionate and excessive use of force by national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel.

67. MINUSCA continued to implement the United Nations human rights due diligence policy. The Mission conducted seven risk assessments under the policy on its support for national security forces and raised awareness among national authorities, including the President, about the obligation to align all support for non-United Nations forces with the policy. On 30 April, MINUSCA shared with the authorities a list of violations allegedly committed by the national defence and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel. Subsequently, on 4 May, the Ministry of Justice issued a decree creating a special commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of serious crimes and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by national armed forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel from December 2020 to April 2021.

**Transitional justice**

68. The operationalization of the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation remained pending. The 11 members, nominated in December 2020, have yet to be sworn in and a budget has yet to be allocated.

**Conflict-related sexual violence**

69. Between 1 February and 1 June, MINUSCA received reports of 218 incidents of conflict-related sexual violence, 79 of which have been verified, a significant increase from 51 incidents in the previous reporting period. The 218 incidents, mostly rapes, affected at least 262 victims (141 women and 121 girls). Among the total number of allegations, 165 involved armed groups, 6 incidents were attributed to the national defence forces, and 9 incidents, affecting five women and eight girls, were attributed to bilaterally deployed and other security personnel. Medical, psychosocial and legal services for survivors, which were suspended as a result of electoral violence, began to be reopened across the country.

70. Between 1 February and 1 June, MINUSCA conducted 10 capacity-building and awareness-raising activities containing a component on preventing and eliminating conflict-related sexual violence for some 620 members of the national defence and internal security forces, 60 members of the MINUSCA force and 130 transhumance leaders and civil society representatives. UNDP and the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict trained the Special Criminal Court and judicial police of the mixed unit for rapid intervention and repression of sexual violence against women and children on investigations into conflict-related sexual violence.
Children and armed conflict

71. Between 1 February and 1 June, the country task force on monitoring and reporting verified 272 grave child rights violations committed by armed groups (198), bilaterally deployed and other security personnel (40), national defence forces (10), national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel jointly (3) and unidentified armed individuals (20), directly affecting 177 children (98 girls and 79 boys), including sexual violence (70), killing and maiming (42) and attacks against schools (11). Thirty-three instances of the military use of schools were documented, up from seven in the previous reporting period.

72. On 1 April, the country task force on monitoring and reporting received lists of 251 children from FPRC (50 girls and 70 boys) and Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (28 girls and 103 boys), for verification and separation. On 10 April, MINUSCA and local authorities met a commander of a Lord’s Resistance Army splinter group in Haut-Mbomou Prefecture to advocate the release of abducted children.

73. MINUSCA raised awareness among 1,412 individuals (including 380 women), including community leaders, members of political parties and national defence and internal security forces, regarding the risks of grave child rights violations during the electoral period and as a result of armed conflict, as part of the ongoing “Act to protect children affected by conflict” campaign.

IX. Socioeconomic situation

74. Domestic income in 2020 exceeded the projection of $218.2 million, reaching $232.4 million. Even though revenue was 12.1 per cent higher than in 2019, it was insufficient to cover State expenditure of $305 million, which increased by 12 per cent owing to costs associated with the electoral process and security operations. According to the International Monetary Fund, domestic revenue in the first quarter of 2021 was about 20 per cent lower than expectations owing to reduced customs tax income resulting from the disruption of the main supply route by CPC. The International Monetary Fund projects that the country will face a liquidity shortfall by July, estimating a gap of $64.7 million in the period to October.

75. On 26 March, MINUSCA submitted a report on the second phase of the study on the socioeconomic impact of COVID-19 to the Minister of Economy during the annual review of the United Nations Peacebuilding and Development Assistance Framework. Findings revealed that the pandemic had contributed to a gross domestic product contraction of 5.8 per cent, affecting more than 2 million people.

76. The prices of basic food and non-food items have risen by approximately 60 per cent since December 2020, owing to the combined effects of supply disruption and limited agricultural production, considerably diminishing purchasing power. More than 71 per cent of the population is below the poverty line.

X. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

Military component

77. As at 1 June, the military component of MINUSCA had 11,516 personnel (5.4 per cent women), out of an authorized strength of 14,400, including 327 staff officers (63 women) and 157 military observers (40 women).
78. On 10 February, the Security Council extended by an additional two months the temporary reinforcement of MINUSCA in the context of inter-mission cooperation with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as requested by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 4 February (S/2021/126). By 30 April, the two infantry companies and two helicopters, totalling 355 personnel, had returned to South Sudan.

79. Pursuant to resolution 2566 (2021), in which the Security Council authorized an increase of up to 2,750 military personnel, planning and preparations for the sequenced deployment have progressed. Troop-contributing countries with pledges in the peacekeeping capability readiness system have been identified for the first phase through July, as follows: (a) advance party (300 troops) of an armoured battalion (750 troops); (b) one quick-reaction force (180 troops) to Bouar; and (c) 30 staff officers. In parallel, the deployment of an armed helicopter unit with an embedded special forces platoon is planned in the same period.

80. Planning and preparations are also under way for the second phase between August and December, specifically: (a) the remainder of the armoured battalion (450 troops); (b) three quick-reaction forces (540 troops) to Bangassou, Bangui and Ndélé; (c) the reinforcement of the infantry capability (600 troops) in Carnot, Grimari and Tagbara/Ippy; (d) the reinforcement of the engineering capability (250 personnel); and (e) 70 staff officers.

81. Assets for air-to-ground targeting and mobile unmanned vehicles to enhance operations and intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capacity are not presently available in the peacekeeping capability readiness system. Force generation efforts will continue, while keeping under review the continued requirement to deploy such assets in the light of the political and security situation in the country and the implementation of the priority mandated tasks of MINUSCA.

Police component

82. As at 1 June, the MINUSCA police component stood at 2,107 personnel (13.91 per cent women), out of an authorized strength of 3,020, including 388 individual police officers (113 women) and 1,719 personnel (180 women) in 11 formed police units and one protection support unit.

83. Pursuant to resolution 2566 (2021), the first phase of the authorized increase of 940 police personnel is under way. Police-contributing countries with pledges in the peacekeeping capability readiness system have confirmed their readiness to deploy: (a) 100 individual police officers (30 of whom have already been deployed); and (b) four out of five formed police units outside Bangui will be reinforced with 40 personnel by July, bringing their strength to 180 personnel. The first complement of 40 personnel for the formed police unit in Kaga-Bandoro deployed on 21 May.

84. The second phase, between August and December, will involve the deployment of: (a) 40 personnel to reinforce the formed police unit in Bouar; (b) three formed police units (540 personnel) for Bangassou, Batangafo and Ndélé; and (c) 100 individual police officers.

Civilian personnel

85. As at 1 June, 1,487 civilian personnel (26 per cent women), including 261 United Nations Volunteers and 108 government-provided correctional personnel, were serving with MINUSCA. This represents 92 per cent of 1,624 approved positions.
Status-of-forces agreement

86. Since February, MINUSCA has recorded a surge in the number and gravity of violations of the status-of-forces agreement between the United Nations and the Government of the Central African Republic. A total of 22 violations involving members of national defence forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel were recorded, as compared with 2 in the previous reporting period. Violations included hindering the freedom of movement of MINUSCA patrols, threats against United Nations personnel, attempts to search MINUSCA vehicles and the residences of United Nations personnel, and infringement of the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Those violations were brought to the attention of the President, including during the joint visit in early June, and he underscored that MINUSCA remains essential in the Central African Republic, reiterated his Government’s full support and pledged to hold the perpetrators of the violations accountable.

Safety and security of United Nations personnel

87. Between 1 February and 1 June, 152 security incidents involving United Nations personnel were recorded. Six personnel died of illness, of whom four died as a result of COVID-19. There were 56 road traffic accidents and 14 personnel who sustained injuries in other non-hostile incidents; 15 residence break-ins and lootings; 12 hostile attacks; 9 cases of arrests; and 16 cases of road harassment by national defence forces. The Bangui residence of one international staff member was searched by national defence and internal security forces in connection with the state of emergency. The movement of MINUSCA personnel continued to be restricted owing to security risks and COVID-19 prevention measures.

88. As at 1 June, MINUSCA had recorded 811 confirmed cases of COVID-19, 783 recoveries, 31 evacuations and 6 deaths since the beginning of the pandemic. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes had registered a total of 184 active cases, including 10 active cases, 172 recoveries and 7 evacuations. On 19 April, MINUSCA launched a voluntary vaccination programme for United Nations personnel. As at 1 June, 7,306 United Nations personnel had received a first dose. On 21 April, MINUSCA strengthened preventive measures to curb local transmission and initiated polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing for United Nations personnel after receiving accreditation from the Ministry of Health, leading to a significant decrease in the number of cases in the Mission.

89. MINUSCA continued to implement the action plan for improving the security of United Nations peacekeepers. This included revising and enhancing contingency planning, increasing security planning, using intelligence surveillance reconnaissance to monitor road access and improving compound security measures.

Serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse

90. Between 1 January and 1 June, 12 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse were reported against MINUSCA uniformed personnel, one of which related to an incident alleged to have occurred in 2021, while the remainder were from previous years.

91. MINUSCA continued outreach campaigns against sexual exploitation and abuse, engaging the most vulnerable members of the community, including women in rural areas, youth groups and internally displaced persons. The Mission also piloted an awareness-raising initiative with one contingent, conducted jointly with a community-based complaint mechanism, to improve trust with communities and enhance the involvement of contingents in prevention activities.
92. MINUSCA completed the sexual exploitation and abuse risk self-assessment exercise within all formed police units and several military contingents. Newly identified victims were systematically referred for assistance and support, although the security situation and limited services posed challenges in that regard.

Support considerations

93. MINUSCA continued to improve its environmental practices and reduce its environmental footprint. Remediation of the Kolongo landfill continued and the drilling of three boreholes for communities as a mitigation measure was completed in March. The installation of biomedical incinerators in the Bambari and Kaga-Bandoro field offices was completed in February and March, respectively. In addition, MINUSCA continued to reduce its energy consumption through renewable energy systems, such as the ongoing installation of a full solar energy system at a Bangui base.

Action for peacekeeping and performance optimization

94. MINUSCA increased its early warning and information-sharing capacity, despite pandemic-related challenges. The Mission also conducted table-top exercises to strengthen crisis preparedness.

95. COVID-19 and the security situation limited the conduct of the force’s operational readiness assessment to one unit; the assessment process resumed in June. MINUSCA submitted evaluations of 12 formed police units. Eleven units were deemed satisfactory, including in terms of mandate, command and control, tasks relating to the protection of civilians, training, welfare and health. One unit was rated below satisfactory, with shortfalls in logistics/sustainment, which is being addressed by the police-contributing country concerned.

96. MINUSCA continued to utilize the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System to assess progress in achieving its objectives and to inform the development of strategies, such as its political strategy, to reflect the evolving context. The Mission is also revising various products under the System to develop new intended impacts for the new political and security dynamics.

XI. Financial considerations

97. The General Assembly, by its resolution 74/284 and decision 74/571, appropriated the amount of $937.7 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021. As at 1 June, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINUSCA amounted to $199.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,501.4 million. Reimbursement of the costs of troop and formed police personnel, as well as of contingent-owned equipment, has been made for the period up to 31 December 2020, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

XII. Observations

98. Through two successive elections, in 2016 and 2020, the people of the Central African Republic expressed their aspirations for sustainable peace and progress, and the expectation that their elected representatives would deliver on their promises. That hope remains, despite the unacceptably high level of violence that the population continues to face. I call upon the President to place peace and reconciliation at the
heart of his second mandate and to seize the opportunity to address the root causes of the conflict.

99. While I am encouraged by preparations for a republican dialogue, such a process can succeed only if it is genuinely inclusive and allows legitimate grievances to be heard and acted upon. It is critical that all stakeholders are given a voice, including armed groups that have renounced violence, the opposition, civil society, women, youth and religious leaders from all over the country. I encourage political actors to continuously engage and build trust. All armed groups should immediately cease violence, with a view to participating constructively in the peace process.

100. The formation of a new inclusive Government, which has significant responsibilities in advancing institutional reforms and addressing the challenges facing all Central Africans, including minority communities, will be critical. I note with concern the barriers to women’s full, equal and meaningful political participation and encourage the authorities to champion women in elected positions. The forthcoming local elections, if truly inclusive, offer an essential opportunity to expand political space and decision-making authority to underrepresented groups and minority communities and will pave the way to decentralization and strengthening of local governance.

101. I welcome the President’s commitment to the Political Agreement as the only viable path to a durable resolution of the crisis. The assessment of the Agreement’s implementation provides an opportunity for its revitalization, which requires the continued good faith participation of all signatories, supported by the guarantors and facilitators. The inclusive nature of the Agreement’s implementation mechanisms, which have provided space for genuine dialogue, particularly at the local level, should be preserved.

102. I am deeply concerned that the overreliance on force could jeopardize the authorities’ investment in fostering social cohesion and extending State authority. I am particularly concerned by the significant increase in human rights violations and abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence, targeted abuse and stigmatization of ethnic and religious minorities, and excessive use of force committed by all perpetrators, including armed groups, national defence and internal security forces, and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel. Such violations and abuses risk reversing the fragile, hard-won gains; and the suffering of the population compromises national reconciliation and social cohesion. I am equally concerned about forced displacement, discrimination against certain communities and confrontation over territorial and natural resources. I call upon the Government to ensure that all forces and personnel that provide security in the Central African Republic abide by applicable international humanitarian and human rights law and that all violators are held accountable.

103. I am deeply troubled by the unacceptable and unprecedented increase in hostile threats and incidents by the national security forces and bilaterally deployed and other security personnel targeting MINUSCA, which obstruct mandate delivery and pose grave risks to the safety and security of peacekeepers. Such actions contravene the commitments of the Government as part of the status-of-forces agreement. I invite the President to follow through on his commitment to ensure that such hostile actions end immediately, and to hold perpetrators accountable.

104. Disinformation campaigns that seek to incite hatred and violence, particularly on local and social media, is also having an adverse effect on the country. I salute and take note of the President’s public condemnation of such incitement against international organizations, in particular MINUSCA, and call upon the Government to work closely with its partners towards the concrete implementation of announced
measures, including the prosecution of instigators, to protect the population and international partners working in the country.

105. The acute humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic is deeply concerning, with a significant increase in people requiring protection and assistance amid the ongoing violence and the COVID-19 pandemic. In conflict-affected areas, the protection environment is particularly challenging owing to the destruction of infrastructure and attacks against humanitarian workers and assets. I call upon the Government and all armed actors operating in the country to ensure unhindered humanitarian access. I appeal to the generosity of donors and partners to remain mobilized in providing financial support for the country’s humanitarian response plan.

106. I call upon the Government to redouble efforts to reach remote populations and reinforce the quality of services delivered to the people as part of its efforts to extend State authority. Regaining of territories under armed group dominance and keeping control thereafter require efforts to strengthen social cohesion.

107. The Government is encouraged to continue to implement its vision for its security sector as contained in its national security sector strategy and sectoral plans. I welcome advances in oversight, including the work of the Inspector General of the armed forces and the re-establishment of the military justice system. I call upon the Government, with the unified, coordinated and transparent support of all partners, to build professional, inclusive and apolitical security institutions. Strengthening good governance, command and control and the capacity of these institutions remains critical for the minimal operational readiness of the national defence and internal security forces and merits prioritization.

108. The fight against impunity is essential for sustainable peace. I commend the commitment of the national authorities to address serious crimes against civilians and to investigate attacks against peacekeepers. A balanced approach to criminal accountability for all parties is essential. I stress the importance of the role of the national judiciary in upholding the law in an impartial and independent manner and ensuring due process and humane conditions for all detainees. I welcome the important work of the Special Criminal Court and encourage efforts to continue operationalizing the Court and the Commission on Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation as important pillars of transitional justice.

109. I welcome the commitment of the Central African Republic and Chad to resolve the recent border incident through diplomatic means. I also welcome the joint visit of early June, which demonstrated the continued strong engagement by international partners in support of peace and stability in the Central African Republic. I encourage the international community, including the working group established by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, to closely coordinate all efforts with the national authorities and its partners. I invite the guarantors of the Political Agreement, the African Union and ECCAS, together with neighbouring countries, to closely coordinate their efforts to strengthen stability in the region. The United Nations stands ready to support regional initiatives, including efforts to revitalize regional political and joint security cooperation mechanisms.

110. In this highly fragile context, the presence of MINUSCA has proven essential to creating space for durable political solutions in the Central African Republic. The ongoing reinforcement of MINUSCA, as authorized by resolution 2566 (2021), remains crucial in providing the overstretched Mission with the means to fully implement its mandate, particularly the protection of civilians, without prejudice to the national authorities’ primary responsibility to protect its population. I greatly appreciate the readiness of troop- and police-contributing countries to expedite the
deployment of these essential capabilities, which enhance the ability of MINUSCA to support the creation of conditions conducive to advancing the peace process.

111. I wish to express my support and deep appreciation to my Special Representative, Mankeur Ndiaye, for his continued dedication to the peace process in the Central African Republic and steadfast leadership. I call upon all stakeholders to provide him with their full support in furtherance of lasting peace, stability and sustainable development. I also thank all MINUSCA personnel, troop- and police-contributing and donor countries; regional, multilateral and non-governmental organizations; and all other partners for their invaluable contributions.
### Annex I

**United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic: military and police strength as at 1 June 2021**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military component</th>
<th>Police component</th>
<th>Formed police units</th>
<th>Individual police officers</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts on mission</td>
<td>Staff officers</td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Experts on mission</td>
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Annex II

Map