Central African Republic

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2709 (2023), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2024 and requested the Secretary-General to report on its implementation every four months. The present report provides an update on major developments in the Central African Republic since the previous report of 16 October 2023 (S/2023/769).

II. Political situation

2. The political landscape was marked by divergent reactions from the political opposition and armed group leaders to the overtures to dialogue by the President of the Central African Republic, Faustin Archange Touadera. Meanwhile, reported measures against the political opposition leaders and the arrest of a parliament member by national defence and security forces generated concerns of a shrinking political space. MINUSCA continued to use its good offices to promote inclusive dialogue, furthering efforts to consolidate gains made in advancing the peace process at the local level.

Political developments

3. Debate around the President’s willingness to engage in political dialogue with all political actors continued. On 5 November 2023, in France and Europe, the ad hoc committee for the revival of the political party Kwa Na Kwa issued a communiqué indicating its interest in participating in a dialogue process, and on 5 December, Kwa Na Kwa informed MINUSCA by letter of its exiled members’ return to the Central African Republic and the imminent resumption of the party’s activities in the country. In a radio interview on 27 November, Anicet-Georges Dologuélé, on behalf of the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la constitution de 2016, affirmed that the Bloc had neither lobbied nor advocated for the proposed dialogue and would not engage on the grounds that it would validate the new constitution. On 5 December, the former Prime Minister, Henri-Marie Dondra, launched his political party, Unité républicaine, announcing its alignment with the political centre and declaring its support for initiatives to foster peace, social cohesion and entrepreneurism.
4. On 1 December, the sixty-fifth anniversary of the Republic, the President addressed the nation, paying tribute to the national defence and security forces. He also expressed his gratitude to MINUSCA and bilateral, technical and financial partners of the Central African Republic for their support of the country. He called upon Central African political actors abroad to return and participate in the country’s development. Some political actors responded to the President’s invitation, including a spokesperson for the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la constitution de 2016, Martin Ziguélé, who commented on 5 December that the democratic opposition had been requesting inclusive dialogue since the previous general elections in 2020, while voicing concerns over the Government’s approach.

5. On 11 December, the President of the National Assembly ordered the partial reduction in the remuneration of opposition members of Parliament, including Mr. Dologuélé, Mr. Ziguélé and Ephrem Dominique Yandocka, owing to their extended absence from the country. On 15 December, a few days after his reported return to the country, Mr. Yandocka was apprehended and detained by the national defence and security forces for suspected involvement in a coup plot, an allegation that was rejected by Mr. Yandocka’s party, Initiative pour une transformation par l’action. Mr. Yandocka remained in custody as at 12 February 2024.

6. The National Assembly held its second regular session of 2023 from 2 October to 29 December 2023, during which it adopted the country’s 2024 national budget totalling $485.7 million, of which $268.9 million were expected to be generated from domestic resources (a 14.6 per cent increase compared with the 2023 budget) and $218.6 million from external resources. Overall spending was estimated at $534.4 million, resulting in a deficit of $48.7 million.

7. On 4 January, the President reshuffled the Government, appointing 10 new ministers. Key ministers retained their positions, including former armed group leaders; new members were appointed from the presidential majority, including members of the 2023 referendum campaign directorate and individuals who had played a crucial role in the republican dialogue. Opposition figures from the Bloc républicain pour la défense de la constitution de 2016, the Groupe de travail de la société civile, and Observatoire pour la Gouvernance Démocratique en Centrafrique voiced concerns about the reshuffle, which they assessed as rewarding supporters of the referendum.

**Peace process**

8. On 23 October, in Bangui, the President convened a second strategic review meeting to take stock of progress in the implementation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic and the joint road map for peace in the Central African Republic of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The meeting was attended by members of the Government, as well as regional and international partners, including the guarantors and facilitators of the Political Agreement and the Foreign Ministers of Angola and Rwanda. Participants welcomed progress in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation, security sector reform and the restoration of State authority, while noting the challenges concerning the engagement of the leadership of the armed groups present either in the country or abroad, as well as resource mobilization. Participants agreed to continue to meet on a quarterly basis to monitor progress.

9. The Central African authorities, with the support of MINUSCA, continued to promote mediation and reconciliation at the local level, as part of its broader efforts to decentralize the peace process, resolve conflict and consolidate security gains. In Sam Ouandja, Haute-Kotto Prefecture, several dialogue sessions among community leaders and armed group members were held during the reporting period. MINUSCA
also mobilized participants from different ethnic groups, including women, for community work that contributed to clear public spaces and roads in Sam-Ouandja while promoting dialogue.

10. In Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, the Mission’s engagement and support for the deployment of national defence forces prevented clashes between the armed groups Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe. MINUSCA human rights investigations revealed a pattern of abuse of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law by the two groups, including illegal checkpoints along the main axes to collect money from civilians, also impeding their freedom of movement. To address the situation, MINUSCA facilitated multiple mediation sessions between representatives of the local community and the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe, resulting in the latter signing an agreement on 20 November with a commitment to promote the free movement of people and goods and to participate actively in peace efforts. From 5 to 7 December, representatives of the Ministry in charge of disarmament, mobilization, reintegration and repatriation and the follow-up to the Political Agreement, the national disarmament, mobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme and MINUSCA visited Obo to encourage young people associated with the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe to surrender their weapons. Efforts to encourage the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique to sign the Political Agreement continued.

11. Prefectural monitoring mechanisms of the Political Agreement pursued their activities, with MINUSCA financial and technical support, aimed at fostering social cohesion, including by encouraging armed groups to renounce violence. In Basse Kotto Prefecture, local authorities and the local peace and reconciliation committee launched a dialogue with Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique combatants in Mingala and Zangba sub-prefectures on their disarmament and participation in prefectural mechanisms.

12. The Government also engaged with armed group leaders based in Chad. On 29 November, a delegation led by the Minister of State in charge of disarmament, mobilization, reintegration and repatriation and the follow-up to the Political Agreement, Jean Willybiro Sako, met with the Transition President of Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby Into, to discuss strengthening bilateral cooperation and securing the shared border. The delegation also engaged with the leader of the armed group Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique, Mahamat Al-Khatim, who reiterated the group’s decision to withdraw from the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement. Subsequently, on 30 November, a joint communiqué was issued, co-signed by Mr. Al-Khatim, Mr. Sako and the Minister for Public Security and Immigration of Chad, Mahamat Charfadine Margui, stating the commitment of Mr. Al-Khatim and the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique to return to the Political Agreement and appointing Mr. Margui as facilitator. However, on 24 December, 16 members of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique dissociated themselves from the agreement and reiterated their commitment to the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement.

 Electoral process 

13. On 26 January, the National Assembly adopted a new electoral code, a necessary step for local elections and the 2025 presidential and legislative elections. Subject to its promulgation by the President, the code introduces gender quotas for party lists; a seven-year term for the President, members of parliament, regional representatives and municipal councillors; eligibility criteria that exclude members of armed groups and instigators of rebellions; and more stringent nationality, education and physical presence conditions, among others, for presidential and legislative elections.
14. On 29 January, the Prime Minister, Félix Moloua, chaired a meeting of the strategic committee for elections, during which the Government gave a commitment to disburse an additional $430,000 in February 2024 out of its $4.5 million pledge, to complement the $240,000 already disbursed in November 2022. He also advocated for donor support to enable the timely launch of voter registration and reiterated the Government’s commitment to local elections as a national priority in 2024.

15. As at 1 February, only $104,000 had been available in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-managed basket fund, hampering the timely procurement of voter registration materials. Nonetheless, the National Electoral Authority completed the UNDP-supported development of voter registration software in November 2023.

16. MINUSCA continued outreach to promote women’s meaningful participation in local elections. On 23 December 2023 in Kaga Bandoro, local leaders and journalists met to address the challenges that women candidates faced, including intimidation, threats and lack of financial means to stand in elections.

17. On 16 January, the national defence and internal security forces and their MINUSCA counterparts resumed regular meetings within the election security working group to operationalize the integrated election security plan.

III. Security situation, protection of civilians and extension of State authority

18. The security situation remained volatile, with an increase in transhumance-related violence after the start of the dry season in November. While the number of security violations of the Political Agreement decreased during the reporting period (see annex I, figure I), armed groups maintained their presence along the north-east, north-west and south-east borders, attacking civilians as well as national defence and security forces’ positions. MINUSCA, in coordination with national security forces, launched patrols to consolidate security gains in areas where prior MINUSCA operations had helped deter security threats.

19. In the west, the Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation and anti-balaka armed groups affiliated with the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement continued to attack civilians and impose illegal taxes, in particular around mining sites, triggering armed clashes with national defence forces and other security personnel. From 19 to 29 October, national defence forces and other security personnel conducted aerial operations against armed groups in the most populated mining sites in Ouham Prefecture, resulting in an unidentified number of casualties, including former Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique local leader “Adjaj”, other combatants, and artisanal miners. Near the north-west border in Nana-Mambéré and Ouham Prefectures, Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation combatants used violence and kidnapping to regain control of mining sites. On 18 November, they kidnapped five international mine workers in the Zounggo mines, who were released on 14 December.

20. Cattle theft at the start of the transhumance period led to reprisals by Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation combatants against the national defence forces and civilian population. On 21 December, a group of suspected Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation combatants attacked a national defence forces position in Nzakoundou, Lim-Pendé Prefecture, reportedly in retaliation for cattle thefts and extortion incidents by national defence forces against Fulani herdsmen; 22 civilians and one soldier were killed, and some 3,500 civilians displaced. MINUSCA established temporary operating bases in Kowone and Pakale and facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance by air, given the transportation challenges caused by damaged bridges.
Mission redoubled its efforts to support transhumance in six identified hotspots across the country.

21. On 9 November in Paoua, Lim-Pendé Prefecture, intercommunal clashes occurred following the alleged murder of a member of the Christian community by a Muslim individual. A mob destroyed Muslim-owned homes and properties following the refusal of the local gendarmerie to hand over the suspect they had arrested. MINUSCA responded by deploying patrols to secure the area and supported operations of national defence and security forces. The Mission also engaged with local authorities to raise awareness on social cohesion and held mediation sessions between the communities to defuse tensions.

22. In the centre of the country, armed groups attacked positions of national defence and security forces, as well as humanitarian workers, displacing civilians and affecting humanitarian access. Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique combatants remain concentrated in Mingala, Pouloubou and Zangba, Basse-Kotto Prefecture, posing a threat to civilians along transhumance routes. MINUSCA installed temporary operating bases in Boyo, Grimari, Kouango, Mbrès, Tagbara and Zangba, and increased its long-range patrols in Alindao and Bambari. MINUSCA also maintained a robust posture in Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique strongholds to protect civilians and discourage armed combatants from conducting predatory attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers. These efforts resulted in a decrease in the number of recorded attacks, in particular in Ouaka Prefecture.

23. On 2 and 24 November, suspected Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique combatants attacked national defence and security force positions at the border areas of Kabo and Moyenne-Sido, Ouham-Fafa Prefecture. National armed forces and other security personnel drove the armed group out of Moyenne-Sido; armed clashes resulted in the displacement of approximately 5,000 civilians to Chad. On 8 January, the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique attacked Kabo, resulting in the killing of four soldiers, five combatants and one civilian; the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement issued a communiqué on 9 January claiming responsibility for the attack.

24. On 10 December, in Kaga Bandoro, Nana-Grébizi Prefecture, unidentified drones reportedly attacked two camps of other security personnel, killing three. During the reporting period, unidentified drones flew over MINUSCA bases in several locations, including Batangafo, Birao, Bossangoa, Grimari and Kaga Bandoro, triggering a tightening of security measures by the Mission.

25. The security situation along the border areas in the east continued to deteriorate owing to incursions of armed combatants from the Sudan and a reported increase in the recruitment and movement of armed groups along the border with Chad. In November, Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique reportedly recruited young people in Nabakaye and Tissi-Fongoro, Vakaga Prefecture. On 28 December, on the outskirts of Am-Sissia, a MINUSCA patrol apprehended three Sudanese combatants, confiscated their weapons and ammunition and handed them over to national authorities the following day. During the reporting period, five incidents involving unidentified Sudanese combatants were recorded in the Vakaga Prefecture, resulting in four civilian deaths and the destruction of property.

26. In Haute-Kotto Prefecture, combatants engaged in illegal taxation and robbery around gold mines, while humanitarian workers faced threats posed by armed combatants in Ouanda Djallé and Sam Ouandja. On 29 December, suspected Parti du rassemblement de la nation centrafricaine combatants fired at a MINUSCA patrol in the vicinity of Ouadda, in Haute-Kotto Prefecture; no casualties were reported. In Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, following an increase in incidents by combatants in the second half of December, MINUSCA launched patrols with national defence forces.
along the Zemio-Mboki-Obo axis and renewed dialogue with local leaders to defuse intercommunal tensions, including the targeting of the Muslim community.

27. In Bangui, the security situation remained relatively calm. Recorded criminal incidents decreased compared with the previous reporting period. MINUSCA increased night patrols in the fifth and sixth districts of Bangui and continued regular patrols throughout the capital to pre-empt criminal activities.

28. The Government finalized a 10-year action plan to operationalize the national border management policy, adopted in September 2023, with the support of MINUSCA and international partners’ support. In accordance with the action plan, the Government with MINUSCA and United Nations country team support launched projects to establish national inter-agency border control posts in key locations along the border with Chad.

29. Protection challenges related to explosive ordnance remained, in particular in Mambéré Kadéi, Nana-Mambéré, Ouaka and Ouham-Pendé Prefectures. Between 2 October 2023 and 1 February 2024, the number of such incidents increased, and the number of casualties increased compared with the previous reporting period (see annex I, figure III). On 15 January, near Mbindali village, Ouham-Pendé Prefecture (45 km west of Paoua), a MINUSCA patrol hit an explosive ordnance device while returning to Paoua after escorting humanitarian workers delivering assistance to Nzakoundou. One peacekeeper was killed and six injured. MINUSCA suspended United Nations civilian activities in the area on the same day.

30. MINUSCA, with its reinforced military explosive ordnance disposal capacity, cleared eleven items of explosive ordnance in the areas of Bambari, Bamingui, Baoro, Berberati and Bouar. The Mission also continued to destroy, with national authorities in Bangui, Bossangoa and Bouar, obsolete explosive ammunition, including unsafe ammunition collected as part of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration process. The Mission conducted risk education sessions for civilians, including women and girls, in local communities, mainly in the Bria and Paoua areas. MINUSCA conducted a five-week training session in Bangui for the national defence forces from 6 November to 19 December 2023, and initiated an eight-week training on 15 January, aimed at helping to build the capacity of the forces in explosive ordnance disposal.

31. In areas where the security situation had improved, MINUSCA continued to prioritize efforts to remediate the absence of State authority, including by supporting the deployment of national defence and security forces and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Lack of infrastructure and capacity shortfalls, including transportation, continued to hamper the Government’s efforts to extend its authority across the country. To address those gaps, MINUSCA provided logistical and capacity-building assistance to the national defence and security forces.

32. Progress was made in building and strengthening the institutional and operational capacities of internal oversight bodies within national security institutions. The national defence forces, with MINUSCA support, conducted scenario-based simulation workshops for soldiers on disciplinary regulations and procedures, including the conduct of disciplinary councils. The General Inspectorate of the National Army continued to perform its oversight functions to strengthen the accountability of the defence forces. From 9 October to 8 December, the General Inspectorate undertook three inspection visits to Bambari, Berbérati and Bouar with MINUSCA to assess the working and living conditions of military personnel and raise awareness on international humanitarian law, protection of civilians and gender mainstreaming. On 5 February, the President chaired a high-level meeting with senior national military authorities and international partners supporting the security sector reform process on strengthening the General Inspectorate as a key oversight
mechanism for improving the governance of the defence sector. MINUSCA continued to support the training and deployment of internal security forces personnel to enhance their capacity to engage with communities and to investigate criminal cases, including conflict-related sexual violence (see annex I, figure V).

33. The National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and MINUSCA conducted joint quality assurance and assessment visits to storage facilities in Bangui, Bossemptélé, Bouar, Damara, Paoua and Sibut and recommended the rehabilitation of storage facilities in those locations. On 20 December, the National Commission, with MINUSCA support, launched a three-day operation to place markings on 450 gendarmerie firearms in Bangui and conducted training on weapons record-keeping.

34. The Government continued to deploy civil servants to the regions with MINUSCA support with an increase in their presence outside of Bangui from the prior reporting period (see annex I, figure IV). MINUSCA worked in close coordination with strategic partners, including the United Nations country team and international financial institutions, to mobilize resources in support of the Government’s efforts to restore State authority in remote areas. In October 2023, the World Bank began to disburse $50 million to cover the salaries of civil servants in seven ministries in the areas of education, health, agriculture and social protection. In January 2024, the World Bank initiated a five-year local governance and resilient communities project to support the decentralization of State authority and services.

35. MINUSCA continued to implement community violence reduction programmes in areas affected by armed group activities and intercommunal violence, namely, Bamingui-Bangoran, Bangui, Haute-Kotto, Kémo, Mbomou, Ouham-Fafa, Nana-Mambéré, Ouham and Vakaga Prefectures. They include projects for the rehabilitation of infrastructure and roads, which have made a significant contribution to facilitating the protection of civilians and access to humanitarian aid in remote areas (see annex I, figure XII).

IV. Human rights and the rule of law

Human rights

36. Human rights concerns persisted. The number of human rights violations and abuses increased by 30 per cent during the reporting period, and the number of victims increased by 7 per cent (see annex I, figure VI). In Haut-Mbomou Prefecture, human rights investigations by MINUSCA between October and December identified attacks on civilians by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe and Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique armed groups, including killings, rapes and lootings in Bambouti, Mboki, Obo and Zemio.

37. Conflict-related sexual violence continued to be documented, with an increase in Ouham-Pendé Prefecture on the Paoua-Bilakare and Paoua-Taley axes. The ability to respond and to address such violations was impeded by the absence of security forces and the impassable condition of the road to Bilakare. Conflict-related sexual violence, which is usually underreported, continued to be committed to control a territory, gain access to natural resources or punish the population (see annex I, figure VII).

38. From 13 to 17 November, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sexual Violence in Conflict visited the Central African Republic to engage with national authorities, in particular on the implementation of the 2019 Central African Republic and United Nations joint communiqué for preventing conflict-related sexual violence. From 15 to 17 November, the Office of the Special Representative and the Minister Counsellor to the President to combat sexual violence in conflict established recommendations in a high-level round-table on accountability for conflict-related
sexual violence that will serve as a road map to strengthen the judicial response to conflict-related sexual violence.

39. Grave violations against children persisted, mostly in the form of rape, other forms of sexual violence, abduction, recruitment and use of children comprising the majority of grave violations. The majority of such violations were committed by the armed groups, predominantly by the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement factions, followed by unidentified perpetrators (see annex I figure VIII). During the reporting period, MINUSCA initiated a dialogue on child protection with the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia to prevent the recruitment and use of children and other grave violations. From 4 to 8 December, the Government, with MINUSCA support, conducted a three-day awareness-raising session in Bria on conflict-related sexual violence, including forced marriage and sexual slavery, with girls being the main victims, and on access to justice for victims.

40. On 15 November, the Government, with MINUSCA support, submitted to the Human Rights Council its fourth report to the universal periodical review on human rights. The examination of the human rights situation by the universal periodical review process of the Human Rights Council took place on 26 January, during which 244 recommendations were made, including the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolishment of the death penalty and of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the reinforcement of the national legislative framework to prevent and protect the population from discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, violence against women and girls and recruitment and use of children by parties to the conflict. Recommendations were also made to reinforce the fight against impunity and enhance respect for the rule of law in the country.

41. On 11 December, during the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Government pledged to establish a national mechanism for the prevention of torture and reaffirmed its commitment to implement the newly adopted national human rights policy to meet its obligations under international human rights treaties. As part of the same commemoration, on 9 December, MINUSCA supported the Ministry of Justice, the National Commission on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the University of Bangui to organize a series of human rights events across the country, aimed at creating awareness and mobilizing communities to enhance the respect of human rights.

42. From 30 to 31 January, the Government organized a forum of ministers for communication and media of the Economic Community of Central African States in Bangui, with the support of the Economic Community of Central African States, MINUSCA and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, to adopt the draft strategy and action plan on the prevention of hate speech and incitement to violence in the subregion.

43. MINUSCA continued to implement the United Nations human rights due diligence policy to ensure that its support to security forces is consistent with international human rights law. To mitigate the risk of human rights violations, MINUSCA supported the rotation of national defence and security forces in the Haut-Mbomou Prefecture in November 2023.

Rule of law

44. As at 1 February, 18 of the 25 courts outside of Bangui were operational. While all judicial personnel were present in the five courts of Bangui, only just over half of judicial personnel were present outside of Bangui, with personnel either absent or posts vacant.
45. On 30 October, the Bangui court martial resumed criminal hearings after a two-year hiatus. On 4 December, the Bangui Court of Appeal launched its third criminal session of 2023. In total, 37 of the 51 cases on the docket were tried. As had been done in the previous criminal sessions, the Court continued to try cases concerning sexual violence in hearings closed or partially closed to the public, with preventive measures in place to protect the identity of victims and witnesses. On 17 January, the Bangui Court of Appeal tried and convicted Abdou Karim Meckassoua, former President of the National Assembly and leader of the political party Chemin de l’espoir, affiliated with the political opposition Bloc républicain pour la défense de la constitution, in absentia. He was found guilty of the charges brought against him, including undermining the internal security of the State and his alleged involvement in and support for the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement, which carried out attacks against State institutions in December 2020 and January 2021. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, forfeiture of all his assets and deprivation of civic rights. In addition, the Court also convicted and sentenced one individual to life imprisonment for the murder of two Moroccan peacekeepers during an attack against the village of Zemio on 3 January 2017.

46. On 5 December, the Special Criminal Court launched the trial of its second case concerning 10 individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Ndélé in 2020 during clashes between two factions of the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique. Hearings were adjourned on 8 December and resumed on 16 January.

47. The penitentiary system continues to suffer from overcrowding and food shortages, compounded by the continued lack of national civilian prison capacity, contributing to poor detention conditions. As a result, since 1 October, 14 prisoners have died and prison security has been affected. Since 1 October, 41 prisoners have escaped from the prisons in Bangassou, Berberati, Bossembélé, Bria, Carnot, Ngarabga and Nola, while an intervention by MINUSCA helped to quell a mutiny in Bria Prison on 25 November. On 7 February, national defence and security forces and other security personnel responded to a mutiny at Bambari Prison, during which two prisoners were reportedly killed and three injured.

V. Socioeconomic and humanitarian situation

48. Despite the Government’s efforts to stabilize fuel prices and accelerate economic and financial reforms supported by the International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit Facility programme, the economic situation remains challenging. Forecasts for real gross domestic product growth have been revised downwards to 1 per cent. Inflation, which was projected at 6.3 per cent at the beginning of the year, had been revised slightly upwards by the International Monetary Fund to 6.5 per cent by the end of 2023. Budget support increased by 22 per cent to around $59.3 million with the support of the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

49. Liquidity shortage of the State treasury persisted, affecting the timely and regular payment of State officials’ salaries during the reporting period.

50. The Government continued to pursue reforms, such as the digitization of tax and customs administrations to enhance revenue collection. Those reforms should enable the Government to meet International Monetary Fund debt repayment schedules of around $37.5 million in 2024, in addition to repaying around $50.9 million in public bonds, along with other external and domestic debts.

51. Since the establishment of the national fund for climate change in the Central African Republic in May 2023, the Government, with the support of UNDP, expedited
its resource mobilization efforts in climate finance. From 26 to 28 October, in Brazzaville, President Touadera attended the summit of the three basins to maximize climate finance opportunities in deforestation, energy, climate change mitigation and carbon offsetting.

52. As per the 2024 humanitarian response plan, a total of 2.8 million people in the Central African Republic, or 46 per cent of the population, need humanitarian assistance. The number of people with humanitarian needs decreased by 19 per cent compared with the previous year, especially in those parts of the country where the security situation has improved. However, criminal activities, natural disasters and insecurity in border regions continue to exacerbate humanitarian risks. Floods affected close to 90,000 people in 2023, as poor infrastructure increased the risk of flooding. On 20 December, the Humanitarian Coordinator allocated $11 million from the 2023 Humanitarian Fund to address the humanitarian crisis in the Haut-Mbomou Prefecture and other remote and marginalized areas.

53. As at 31 December, the number of internally displaced persons stood at 512,000, compared with 516,000 at the end of 2022. The number of Central Africans taking refuge in neighbouring countries stood at 669,629. As of 31 December, a total of 65,440 refugees and asylum-seekers were in the Central African Republic, an increase of 82 per cent compared with 2022, owing mainly to the outbreak of conflict in the Sudan and intercommunal fighting in southern Chad. Most refugees live with host families, adding pressure on already vulnerable households.

54. On 31 October, in Bangui, the President convened the first statutory ministerial meeting of the steering committee of the support platform for solutions in the context of forced displacement related to the Central African Republic. With the support of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, representatives of the Governments of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo, South Sudan and the Sudan agreed to use the platform as the main framework for comprehensive responses to protection for those who had been forcibly displaced by the Central African Republic crisis, pursuant to the Yaoundé Declaration on Solutions in the context of Forced Displacement related to the Central African Republic Crisis of 27 April 2022.

55. The 2024 humanitarian response plan for the Central African Republic targets 1.9 million vulnerable people, with funding requirements of $367.7 million. It is currently financed at 9.78 per cent, leaving a funding gap of $332 million. In 2023, 56.3 per cent of the $533.3 million funding requirement for the humanitarian response plan was received, with which humanitarian partners provided assistance to 2.04 million people. The Government pursued the preparation of the National Development Plan to succeed the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan (Plan national de relèvement et de consolidation de la paix) by consolidating diagnostic reports and defining strategic objectives in accordance with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.

VI. United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

Performance optimization

56. MINUSCA developed a mission plan to guide the implementation of its political strategy to further strengthen mission-wide integration and coordination for the effective delivery of its mandate. The plan is aligned with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and supports the integration of the
Mission with the United Nations country team, facilitating increased coordination and strengthening joint activities.

57. The Mission continued to strengthen the effectiveness of its early warning and rapid response capacity, in line with the action plan for the enhancement of peacekeeping intelligence, including the operationalization of the peacekeeping-intelligence coordination mechanism. Weekly meetings of the mechanism contributed to the development of integrated security assessments, which informed operational planning and response to mitigate transhumance violence and criminality along critical transportation routes, and to monitor the movement of internally displaced persons and refugees.

58. In addition to the Mission’s regular monitoring and actions to combat misinformation and disinformation, on 8 December 2023, the Government and MINUSCA held a seminar, co-chaired by the Prime Minister and the Special Representative, on the content of Security Council resolution 2709 (2023) and the achievements made under Security Council resolution 2659 (2022). The seminar was a strategic initiative to combat disinformation in the country by facilitating transparent communication and collaboration among government officials, the diplomatic community and international partners. The initiative was then replicated at the prefectural level, with the field offices and local authorities holding 16 such events throughout the country in January 2024.

59. MINUSCA continued to realign its military and police footprint with local administration boundaries to enhance coordination with the national defence and security forces. During the reporting period, quick reaction forces were deployed to hotspots in Diki, Gounda-Gordil and Haut-Mbomou axis to rapidly respond to security threats, while securing a logistical route to support its deployments along the Bangui-Mbomou-Haut-Mbomou axis. In addition, MINUSCA deployed its force to key areas bordering Chad, South Sudan and the Sudan, namely, Am-Dafock, Bambouti and Markounda and Moyenne Sido.

60. MINUSCA continued to face considerable challenges in terms of logistics, supply chain management and transportation owing to the inhospitable terrain. It therefore continued measures to enhance its capacity pursuant to its multi-year plan to improve its supply chain and operational and logistics capacities. During the reporting period, the Mission rehabilitated or constructed 40 bridges and 4 ferries, and improved aviation infrastructure to support mobility. The transfer of some assets from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali for MINUSCA operations further enhanced the latter’s logistics. MINUSCA continues to prioritize improving its cargo handling, as well as improving ground and air mobility by, inter alia, acquiring and installing Bailey bridges and increasing air lift capacity for efficient logistical support and casualty evacuation to improve living and safety conditions for personnel in remote bases, and further developing aviation infrastructure.

61. During the reporting period, MINUSCA trained 202 military personnel, including 19 women, in practical explosive ordnance threat mitigation and conducted 19 awareness-raising sessions for 231 United Nations personnel (58 women) and 253 humanitarian actors (73 women). In line with the recommendations of the independent strategic review on the United Nations response to explosive ordnance threats, MINUSCA started the construction of a level-2 forensic laboratory in Bangui in January to support post-blast investigations and related judicial procedures.

62. MINUSCA is currently installing four additional solar photovoltaic systems since the previous reporting period to increase its renewable energy capacity in Bangui and Sibut, now totalling seven solar systems. MINUSCA also continued to improve the conditions of the remaining temporary operating bases with respect to
wastewater risks, as well as mitigation measures in all Mission locations. MINUSCA distributed 10 portable drum incinerators for solid waste disposal in remote permanent and temporary operating bases in Bangui (2), Bossembele, Bria, Damara, Dekoa, Grimari (2), Mbaiki and Sibut.

**Safety and security of United Nations personnel**

63. From 2 October to 5 February, 224 security incidents involving United Nations personnel were recorded, representing an increase compared with the previous reporting period (see annex I, figure XIV). Five personnel died during the reporting period, one in a mine incident, three from road traffic accidents and one of illness.

64. Between 2 October and 28 December, MINUSCA recorded four violations of the status-of-forces agreement, compared with three incidents recorded during the previous reporting period, as well as the obstruction of entry and confiscation of passports of some United Nations contractors working on a key peacekeeping intelligence capability of the Mission. MINUSCA continued to raise these violations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant national stakeholders, including the highest government officials, who expressed their commitment to addressing the violations.

65. On 22 December, the Government issued a new circular revoking standing procedures on the use of uncrewed aerial vehicles in the Central African territory and reinforcing controls on them, including suspending their use and prohibiting night flights, effectively grounding MINUSCA uncrewed aerial vehicles.

**Serious misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse**

66. Between 1 September and 31 December, MINUSCA recorded 15 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, including 3 incidents from 2023 and 12 between 2017 and 2021. In total, 11 allegations related to alleged incidents implicating military personnel from five troop-contributing countries. Five of the allegations are pending the appointment of national investigators. Three allegations involving civilian personnel and one police personnel are pending United Nations investigations. The Mission referred 23 alleged victims, including four children, to humanitarian partners for assistance.

67. MINUSCA pursued the implementation of its enhanced prevention of misconduct strategy among personnel through training sessions and outreach campaigns. The implementation of vocational skills training projects for vulnerable members of the population, funded by the trust fund in support of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, is progressing steadily. and has so far equipped 220 beneficiaries, including 121 victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, with vocational skills. To date, MINUSCA has established 38 local prevention and response networks in high-risk areas to support its decentralized and integrated approach to preventing and responding to sexual exploitation and abuse.

**VII. Financial considerations**

68. The General Assembly, by its resolution 77/307 of 30 June 2023, appropriated the amount of $1,145.6 million for the maintenance of the Mission for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024. As at 31 January 2024, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINUSCA amounted to $421.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,838.8 million. Reimbursement of the costs of troop and formed police personnel,
as well as for contingent-owned equipment, has been made for the period up to 30 September 2023.

VIII. Observations

69. The peace process continued to advance incrementally, with the organization of the second strategic review meeting demonstrating the Government’s continued ownership and commitment to pursuing the implementation of the Political Agreement and the joint road map. I urge the Government to build on the momentum created by the return of the leader of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique, Mr. Al-Khatim, to the Political Agreement and follow through with the demobilization, disarmament, repatriation and reintegration of the group’s combatants. I also urge the Government to pursue its dialogue with the armed groups within the framework of the peace process, while calling on all armed groups to lay down their weapons and participate in the latter without delay.

70. It is essential that peace and political gains be accompanied by sustained expansion of State authority, with tangible peace dividends realized by the people of the Central African Republic. I therefore commend the ongoing mediation and reconciliation efforts where coordinated stabilization efforts by the national defence forces and MINUSCA have created an environment conducive for the decentralization and advancement of the peace process.

71. I take note of President Touadera’s commitment to maintaining political space. The preservation and facilitation of peaceful democratic political debate remain critical to reverse the cycle of armed rebellion. It is also a prerequisite for the peaceful organization of local elections in October 2024, which will provide a crucial opportunity to expand political space, promote decentralization and heal societal divisions. I call on the Government to pursue dialogue with the political opposition, and on the latter to engage productively. I further urge the relevant Central African authorities to identify and implement confidence-building measures for an inclusive and credible electoral process. Timely completion of key milestones, including the submission of the updated voters list that enables internally displaced persons, returnees and newly eligible voters to cast their votes, among others, is critical. I reiterate my appeal to international and regional partners to provide financial support to the United Nations Development Programme basket fund to allow the timely implementation of the activities foreseen in the electoral timetable.

72. I am deeply concerned by the continued volatile security situation, in particular in border areas and transhumance zones, compounded by the absence of State authority and limited socioeconomic opportunities. MINUSCA support to the national security forces to stabilize geographical hotspots continues to make a difference, as illustrated in N zakoundou, where the integrated efforts of the Government, MINUSCA and the United Nations country team secured the locality, assisted the population, and ensured the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Early warning and prevention mechanisms are imperative in preventing transhumance-related violence, and in this regard efforts by MINUSCA to improve the efficiency of its information collection systems to assess threats, improve its preventive and pre-emptive posture and provide reliable community protection remain critical.

73. I welcome the Government’s initiatives to implement the national border policy by working with international partners on a 10-year action plan. Nevertheless, the porosity of the country’s border continues to remain a significant challenge and poses severe risks for civilians, as witnessed in the northwest, Particularly in Lim-Pendé and Ouham Prefectures. The Central African Republic alone will not be able to address the insecurity caused by cross-border movement of armed elements, which
undermines regional stability and requires a regional approach based on good neighbourly relations.

74. The humanitarian situation in the Central African Republic remains concerning. While I note a slight reduction in need, I am concerned that the influx of refugees from Sudan could lead to a renewed deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the country. We must remain prepared to help those in need. I appreciate the support of the international community to the Central African Republic humanitarian appeal and call their enhanced support, to address the most urgent needs of the population in distress.

75. I strongly condemn the use of explosive ordnance, which has killed and injured peacekeepers and civilians and limited access to life-saving humanitarian assistance. I salute the contribution of the peacekeeper who was killed on 15 January while facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and pay tribute to the courage and sacrifice of all those who continue to operate in highly challenging and often dangerous conditions in the service of peace. Attacks targeting civilians, humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers jeopardize the lives and future of all in the country and must stop immediately. I further urge the Government to make every effort to investigate and hold accountable all perpetrators of these attacks.

76. In the context of challenging economic conditions, I welcome the support of partners to the Central African Republic and urge greater and sustained support to the country and its people. Socioeconomic development is essential for the country’s sustainable peace and stability. I encourage the continued engagement of the Government and partners to support social service delivery and recovery initiatives to bolster socioeconomic opportunities, in particular at the local level. The liquidity shortage of the State treasury continues to affect the timely payment of civil servants’ salaries. I therefore commend the Government’s pursuit of reforms that enhance revenue collection.

77. Continued violations and abuses of human rights, conflict-related sexual violence and violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by all parties to the conflict are unacceptable and must stop. I urge all parties to the conflict to end immediately and prevent human rights violations and abuses, in accordance with international human rights law. At the same time, I am encouraged by the progress witnessed during the reporting period, and the commitments made by the Government during the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, notably by using its national human rights policy to meet its obligation under international human right treaties and the creation of a national mechanism on the prevention of torture.

78. I welcome the resumption of criminal hearings by the court martial and the opening by the Special Criminal Court of the trial of its second case, demonstrating progress in the fight against impunity, which is a priority to end the cycle of violence and promote reconciliation. The three criminal sessions that were held in a single year by the Bangui Court of Appeal are unprecedented and a sign of the strengthening of the criminal justice system in that jurisdiction. I also welcome the trial of the case concerning the two Moroccan peacekeepers killed during an attack against the village of Zemio on 3 January 2017. The conviction of one individual in the case is an important step towards accountability for crimes committed against peacekeepers.

79. I condemn any act of sexual exploitation and abuse by the United Nations personnel and reaffirm my commitment to zero tolerance for any such incidents. I call upon all troop- and police-contributing countries to uphold their obligations by addressing allegations referred by the United Nations, with a view to holding perpetrators accountable and ensuring the resolution of paternity claims.
80. I salute the progress made by the Government in its efforts to extend the State’s presence in historically marginalized areas, including through the deployment of civil servants to these regions, with the support of MINUSCA. However, limited infrastructure continues to pose challenges to consolidate the hard-won gains made. Investments will be necessary to enable MINUSCA to support the Government for the sustainable restoration of State authority and to continue to provide a rapid response to security threats. I encourage all stakeholders, including troop-contributing countries and other partners of the Central African Republic, to support the enhancement of the Mission’s mobility, logistics, intelligence and early warning capacities, which are crucial to protecting civilians and for the safety and security of peacekeepers.

81. Lastly, I wish to thank my Special Representative for the Central African Republic and Head of MINUSCA for her proactive and effective leadership. I remain grateful for the dedication of the civilian and uniformed personnel of MINUSCA and the United Nations country team in performing their mandate, often in difficult contexts, and I highly appreciate the Mission’s troop- and police-contributing countries. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to regional, multilateral and non-governmental organizations and all other partners, including donor countries, for their invaluable contributions to peace in the Central African Republic.
Annex I

I. Security situation, protection of civilians and extension of State of authority

Figure I
Violations of the Political Agreement

Source: MINUSCA/Joint Mission Analysis Cell.

Political Agreement violations, 2022

Political Agreement violations, 2023

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: MINUSCA/Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise.
Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

Source: MINUSCA/Protection of Civilians Unit.

High priority: areas with high protection of civilians threats.

Medium priority: Presence of threats, intense response needed to prevent an escalation.

Watching: nascent situation that needs to be watched closely to prevent an escalation.

Transhumance passage: high probability of violations.
Figure III
Incidents of explosive ordnance in 2022 and 2023

Explosive ordinance incidents, 2022

Explosive ordinance incidents, 2023

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Source: MINUSCA/Mine Action Service.

Figure IV
State authorities present at posts

Source: MINUSCA/Civil Affairs Section and Justice and Corrections Section.
As at 31 December, 1,794 internal security forces personnel were deployed outside Bangui, and 5,093 inside the capital, 21 per cent of whom were women.

II. Human rights and rule of law

Figure VI
Human rights violations and abuses, October 2023–January 2024

Non-State armed groups

Armed groups
642 violations, 794 victims

- Right to liberty and personal integrity 21%
- Right to life 15%
- Right to physical and mental integrity 15%
- Conflict-related sexual violence 11%
- Forced recruitement and use of children 17%
- Unlawful attacks 3%
- Right to property 18%
- Unlawful attacks 3%

Source: MINUSCA/Human Rights Division.
* Percentages refer to the number of victims.

Armed groups signatories to the Political Agreement were responsible for 61 per cent of the total documented human rights violations and abuses, with Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique the main perpetrator.
State actors

State actors were responsible for 39 per cent of the total documented human rights violations and abuses of human rights and 45 per cent of the documented victims. National defence and security forces are the main perpetrators of these violations, followed by other security personnel.

Source: MINUSCA/Human Rights Division.
* Percentages refer to the number of victims.
Figure VII
Conflict-related sexual violence, October 2023–January 2024\(^c\)

Source: MINUSCA/Human Rights Division
\(^c\) Percentages refer to the number of victims

From 2 October 2023 to 1 February 2024, armed groups were responsible for 85 per cent of the documented cases of conflict-related sexual violence and 88 per cent of the total number of documented victims, while State actors were responsible for 15 per cent of the documented cases and for 12 per cent of the documented victims.
Figure VIII
Grave violations against children, October 2023–January 2024

Note: Chart percentages refer to the number of victims.  
Source: MINUSCA/Child Protection Unit and country task force on monitoring and reporting.

Armed groups were responsible for 64 per cent of grave violations, of which Coalition des patriotes pour le changement was responsible for 75 per cent.

Figure IX
Number of operational courts and prisons

Source: MINUSCA/Justice and Corrections Section.
III. Humanitarian situation

Figure X
Severity and number of people in need as at 31 December 2023

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The final boundary between South Sudan and the Sudan has not yet been determined.

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Figure XI
**Internally displaced persons and refugees**


Figure XII
**Bridges constructed, repaired or initiated by MINUSCA in 2023**

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The final boundary between South Sudan and the Sudan has not yet been determined.

Source: MINUSCA/Civil Affairs Section.

Figure XIII
Incidents targeting humanitarian actors in 2023

Note: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the above map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. The final boundary between South Sudan and the Sudan has not yet been determined.

Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
IV. Safety and security of United Nations personnel

Figure XIV
Security incidents targeting MINUSCA personnel

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic: military and police strength as at 1 February 2024

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Experts on mission</th>
<th>Staff officers</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Formed police units</th>
<th>Individual police officer</th>
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